Some Remarks On Propositional Attitudes and Mutual Assumptions. A Re-construction of an Aphorism by Ronald D. Laing

Gelbmann, Gerhard (2005) Some Remarks On Propositional Attitudes and Mutual Assumptions. A Re-construction of an Aphorism by Ronald D. Laing. UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

The problem of multiple operating epistemic modalities in the interaction of propositional attitudes within mutual assumptions in communication, raised by Ronald D. Laing in an aphorism in his opus "Knots", shall be analysed in a rough symbolic notation. We shall start with looking at an aphorism by Laing that runs as: "If I don't know I don't know, I think I know. If I don't know I know, I think I don't know." The field of application for Laing's aphorism as well as for my approach is interpersonal communication and hence belongs to the realm of psychological phenomena. My philosophical contribution consists in giving my logical analysis via negationis, i.e. we shall encounter a sketch for a reductio ad absurdum. To outcome will be the refutation of certain assumptions we originally attempted to set off with. But the result is not completely negative, since it leads to a plea, firstly, for giving up a purely formal analysis of pragmatics and, secondly, for interpersonal experience as a cornerstone of pragmatic phenomena in the realm of communication between human beings.

Item Type: Other
Uncontrolled Keywords: Laing; to know; to believe; modal logic; logical operators; epistemic logic; logical analysis via negationis; reductio ad absurdum; Peirce; sign; symbol; Morris; certainty; Wittgenstein; ascription; attitude; notational devices; elliptical; ordinary language; situational fact; semiotic subjectivity; pragmatic communication; formalization; inescapability of pragmatic intertwining; concatenation of propositional attitudes; epistemic conventionalism; private-language-argument; a priori method of analysing interpersonal communication fails; pragmatic communication is a matter of synthetical judgement; communicative experience
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Gesellschaftsphilosophie, politische Philosophie, Rechtsphilosophi
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Sprachphilosophie
Depositing User: Gerhard Gelbmann
Date Deposited: 19 Oct 2005
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:51
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1110

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