The T-Schema and the Epistemic Conception of Truth

Szubka, Tadeusz (2003) The T-Schema and the Epistemic Conception of Truth. Teorema, XXII (3). pp. 93-99.

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Abstract

It is widely assumed that any satisfactory account of truth has to accept all (or nearly all) instances of the following T-schema: it is true that p if and only if p. Hence any argument showing the incompatibility of a given account of truth with this schema would be damaging for the account in question. Incompatibility arguments are sometimes directed against the epistemic conception of truth, for which truth is some sort of idealized rational justifiability or warranted assertibility. An intriguing argument of that kind has been recently put forward by William Alston. The aim of the paper is to discuss and undermine Alston's argument.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Epistemology; Incompatibility; Schema; Truth
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XXII (2003)
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 08 Dec 2005
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:51
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1137

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