La mente es una estructura causal: el funcionalismo teorico

Villanueva, Enrique (2000) La mente es una estructura causal: el funcionalismo teorico. Teorema, XIX (1). pp. 27-44.


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Causal functionalism of the sort David Lewis advocates is subject to examination and criticism. This brand of functionalism is brought to bear on the ontological question what are psychological properties? Answering that they are causal theoretical properties whose natures will be empirically discovered eventually.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Causal; Functionalism; Identity; Metaphysics; Psychology; Lewis, D.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XIX (2000)
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 23 Mar 2006
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:51

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