El escepticismo y el principio de justificacion inferencial

Hookway, Christopher (2000) El escepticismo y el principio de justificacion inferencial. Teorema, XIX (3). pp. 161-182.

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Abstract

In his book Metaepistemology and Skepticism, Richard Fumerton formulates a "principle of inferential justification" which he takes to be fundamental to our practice of reflection on the epistemic status of our beliefs and which he takes to provide the basis of some powerful skeptical arguments. After introducing Fumerton's principle and the role it is given in skeptical arguments, the paper argues that it does not have the force that he claims.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Contextualism; Epistemology; Justification; Reflection; Scepticism; Fumerton, R.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Epistemologie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Naturphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XIX (2000)
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 27 Mar 2006
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:51
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1203

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