Incompatibilidades en las teorias del contenido mental

Broncano, Fernando (1999) Incompatibilidades en las teorias del contenido mental. Teorema, XVIII (2).

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Abstract

We examine in this paper a family of current theories of mental content from the perspective of their commitment with three assumptions: the first is the representationalism, as it is exposed in the so-called Theory of Representational Mind; the second is the naturalism, as a constraint involved in many approaches to mind; and the third is the holism, as it is derived from the radical-interpretation theoretic approaches to mind and language. We argued that the most known theories are unable to meet jointly the three requirements. But we have strong reasons, on the other hand, to support each requirement one by one.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Content; Epistemology; Language; Mental; Mind
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XVIII (1999)
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Epistemologie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Naturphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 29 May 2006
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:51
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1239

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