Las distinciones modales de Kripke y el concepto de proposicion

Perez Otero, Manuel (1998) Las distinciones modales de Kripke y el concepto de proposicion. Teorema, XVII (1). pp. 61-74.

[img]
Preview
PDF
Otero.pdf

Download (188kB)

Abstract

I analyze here some insights of Naming and Necessity that have become especially influential in the subsequent philosophy of language and metaphysics. Kripke's distinction between necessary truth and a priori truth plays a central role in two respects: it is fundamental to understand how essentialism has received support from Kripke's book; and it can be seen as closely related to another distinction between two independently plausible but confronted conceptions about what is the proposition expressed by a sentence.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Language; Name; Necessity; Proposition; Truth; Kripke S.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XVII (1998)
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 19 Jun 2006
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:51
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1264

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year