Social Externalism and Psychological Explanations - The Problem of the Semantic Features of Contents

Dellantonio, Sara (2002) Social Externalism and Psychological Explanations - The Problem of the Semantic Features of Contents. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 48-50.

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Abstract

It starts to rain and I open the umbrella or, if I don"t have one, I ask my colleague, who is walking with me, if he has an umbrella in the bag. Why do I do so? There are many ways to answer this question, but if I adopt the strategy to explain the causes of my acting or speaking by looking for the reasons that I have for doing it (for instance, I notice that it is raining and I don"t want to get wet), I commit myself to an explanation of a psychological kind (Davidson 1980). The following discussion tackles an internal problem of psychological explanations concerning the taxonomy (or categorization) of intentional contents. Intentional contents define what beliefs, desires, hopes, etc., are about. One believes that something is so-and-so (for instance, one believes that it is raining); one desires that something is going to be so-and–so (that tomorrow it isn"t going to rain), etc. The content of intentional states is the object of those so-called that-clauses: "it is raining" is, for instance, the content of the belief that it is raining.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Social Externalism; psychological Explanation; Contents; Semantics; Davidson D.; Kripke S.; Putnam H.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Sprachphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 09 Nov 2006
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:51
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1362

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