On the Interpretability of Rules

Fang, Wan-Chuan (2002) On the Interpretability of Rules. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 54-55.

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Abstract

Saul Krikpe"s skeptical argument and skeptical solution concerning rule-following are quite well known (cf. Kripke 1982). As an interpretation of Wittgenstein"s view, it seems to has a basis in Wittgenstein"s writings such as the following remarks: "And how can it [a rule] guide us, when its expression can after all be interpreted by us both thus and otherwise? I.e. when all various regularities correspond to it� (Wittgenstein 1978, 347) It is in the spirit of such a passage that Kripke starts his own unusual reading of Wittgenstein"s views on rule-following. In particular he considers the case that in teaching a rule such as "addition" to a person, the number of examples actually shown is finite. Various rules would be compatible with such a finite number of examples. So there seems to be no reason to insist that the teacher teaches, or the pupil learns, a particular rule rather than any of the other possible rules. Against this, one may want to cite a fact which can be used to single out one particular regularity. But Kripke goes on to show that various possible candidates that may constitute such a fact are all wanting. Thus he concludes that there is no matter of the fact as to what an expression or rule means, a dire consequence that seems to obliterate meaning and even mental contents, his skeptical solution in terms of communal agreement notwithstanding.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Rules; rule-following; Kripke S.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 13 Nov 2006
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:51
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1368

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