Personal Identity and What Matters

Holtug, Nils (2002) Personal Identity and What Matters. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 90-91.

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Abstract

Identity is not what prudentially matters in survival (this is originally and most famously argued in Parfit 1984, 245-280). Consider the case of division. a is one of three identical triplets. In World 1 his equipollent cerebral hemispheres are removed from his head and each is inserted into the (suitably emptied) skull of one of his brothers, resulting in the existence of two persons, b and c. In World 2, only one of his hemispheres is transplanted (while the other is destroyed), resulting in the existence of b*. Note that, assuming the necessity and transitivity of identity, b* is identical to neither b nor c.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: modal logic;Personal Identity; Self Confidence
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 16 Nov 2006
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:51
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1383

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