Gendler on Why We Can't Trust Thought Experiments on Personal Identity

Kanuck, Kathryn (2002) Gendler on Why We Can't Trust Thought Experiments on Personal Identity. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 100-102.


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In "Exceptional Persons," Tamar Gendler argues that we cannot make reliable judgments about imaginary cases because the conceptually necessary and sufficient conditions for application of the concept of personal identity (sameness of person) don"t guide our application in everyday cases, and while acceptable in actual cases, this leads to error in considering hypothetical cases. In this paper, I explain Gendler's argument against the utility of thought experiments on personal identity and argue that the central case she uses to illustrate the problem is mishandled.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Personal Identity; Gendler T.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Anthropologie
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 16 Nov 2006
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:51

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