Why is the Notion of Person also Descriptively Problematic?

Kirschenmann, Peter P. (2002) Why is the Notion of Person also Descriptively Problematic? In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 103-105.

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Abstract

Informally and on occasions formally, the notion of person seems to be indispensable in many walks of life. In philosophical debates, though, the notion oftentimes appears to play a subordinate role. Other notions--subject, self, individual, human being, or characteristic marks of persons: mind, consciousness, rationality, (individual or cultural) identity, autonomy, authenticity, responsibility-- occupy center stage. There are exceptions: there is the venerable problem of personal identity through time; in certain ethical issues, e.g., in bioethics or political philosophy, conceptions of person figure explicitly; and there are some treatises of the "concept of person" itself. Yet, even here one can hear warnings, e.g., that the concept is fraught with dilemmas and should be avoided in bioethical debates (Birnbacher 1997), or warnings concerning the "vagueness" (Wils 1997, 37) or the "contemporary crisis" of the concept (Kobusch 1997, 263ff.).

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Person;
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Allgemeine Ethik
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 16 Nov 2006
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:51
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1388

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