BÃ¥ve, Arvid (2006) Deflationism: A UseTheoretic Analysis of the TruthPredicate. UNSPECIFIED thesis, Stockholm University.

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Abstract
I here develop a specific version of the deflationary theory of truth. I adopt a terminology on which deflationism holds that an exhaustive account of truth is given by the equivalence between truthascriptions and denominalised (or disquoted) sentences. An adequate truththeory, it is argued, must be finite, noncircular, and give a unified account of all occurrences of "trueâ€?. I also argue that it must descriptively capture the ordinary meaning of "trueâ€?, which is plausibly taken to be unambiguous. Ch. 2 is a critical historical survey of deflationary theories, where notably disquotationalism is found untenable as a descriptive theory of "trueâ€?. In Ch. 3, I aim to show that deflationism cannot be finitely and noncircularly formulated by using "trueâ€?, and so must only mention it. Hence, it must be a theory specifically about the word "trueâ€? (and its foreign counterparts). To capture the ordinary notion, the theory must thus be an empirical, usetheoretic, semantic account of "trueâ€?. The task of explaining facts about truth now becomes that of showing that various sentences containing "trueâ€? are (unconditionally) assertible. In Ch. 4, I defend the claim (D) that every sentence of the form "That p is trueâ€? and the corresponding "pâ€? are intersubstitutable (in a usetheoretic sense), and show how this claim provides a unified and simple account of a wide variety of occurrences of "trueâ€?. Disquotationalism then only has the advantage of avoiding propositions. But in Ch. 5, I note that (D) is not committed to propositions. Usetheoretic semantics is then argued to serve nominalism better than truththeoretic ditto. In particular, it can avoid propositions while sustaining a natural syntactic treatment of "thatâ€?clauses as singular terms and of "Everything he says is trueâ€?, as any other quantification. Finally, Horwich"s problem of deriving universal truthclaims is given a solution by recourse to an assertibilist semantics of the universal quantifier.
Item Type:  Thesis (UNSPECIFIED) 

Uncontrolled Keywords:  truth, deflationism, disquotationalism, proposition, usetheory, semantics, nominalism, inferentialism, assertibility, thatclause, singular term, Tarski, Horwich, Field, meaning 
Subjects:  Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Sprachphilosophie 
Depositing User:  Stefan Köstenbauer 
Date Deposited:  06 Dec 2006 
Last Modified:  08 Sep 2011 18:51 
URI:  http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1401 
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