A Dilemma for Personal Identity

Kügler, Peter (2002) A Dilemma for Personal Identity. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 124-126.


Download (63kB)


Some theories of personal identity allow persons to lose their identities in processes of qualitative change, i.e., to become a numerically different person by getting new physical and/or psychological properties. I shall call these theories strong. Weak theories, in contrast, do not allow for such a loss of identity. In general, weak theories put less restrictions on personal identity than strong ones. I will argue that each type of theory faces a serious problem.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: person-theories, strong theory, weak theory; Memory; Intention; Persistence; Causality
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 20 Dec 2006
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:51
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1412

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item


Downloads per month over past year