Cartesian Minds

Levin, Yakir (2002) Cartesian Minds. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 133-135.

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Abstract

According to a basic dualistic conception that originated in Descartes, minds are immaterial, non-spatial and simple thinking particulars that are independent of anything material. Call this view the Cartesian conception, and minds thus conceived, Cartesian minds. In what follows I propose a new version of an argument against the Cartesian conception that can be traced back to Descartes" days (Garber and Ayers 1998, 232). The inspiration behind my version is an argument suggested by Strawson"s seminal discussion of the concept of a person (1959, Chaps. 3-4). However, in both form and substance my argument takes its own course.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Dualism; Mind; Realism; Nominalism; Descartes R.; Goodman N.; Strawson P.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 12 Jan 2007
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:52
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1426

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