The Joint Philosophical Program of Russell and Wittgenstein (March–November 1912) and its Downfall

Milkov, Nikolay (2002) The Joint Philosophical Program of Russell and Wittgenstein (March–November 1912) and its Downfall. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 162-164.

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Abstract

After finishing Principia Mathematica in 1910, Russell concentrated his efforts in questions of epistemology. In �Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description� (1911), and The Problems of Philosophy (written in 1911 but published in 1912), Ch. III, he developed the epistemological implications of his logic in detail. At that time, Russell accepted that whereas we are acquainted with sense-data, we know physical objects by description only. More precisely, we logically infer that there are physical objects from the sense-data we are acquainted with. In 1911 Russell believed that this understanding is much more coherent than any competing philosophy of matter, for example, from solipsism, according to which there are no physical objects at all or from naive realism, according to which we directly apprehend material objects.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Knowledge by Acquaintance; Knowledge by Description; Joint Programm in Logic; McGuiness, B.; Russel, B.; Wittgenstein L.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Epistemologie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Naturphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Sprachphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 16 Jan 2007
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:52
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1434

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