Is the Private Language Argument a Transcendental Argument?

Mom, Karel (2002) Is the Private Language Argument a Transcendental Argument? In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 165-167.

[img]
Preview
PDF
mom.pdf

Download (66kB)

Abstract

Comparisons between Kant´s critique of pure reason and Wittgenstein´s critique of language, which became current in analytic philosophy (Cf. e.g Hacker 1972, 30.) seem not far-fetched in view of the impetus for the destruction of dogmatic metaphysics both philosophers share. Their relevance would gain though by an elaboration of their dissimilarities rather than by just stressing similarities. An example of the former approach, Weinert (1983, 412) contrasts the tools both critics of metaphysics employ: the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and the description of the logic of languageuse and in particular the ´Argument from Epistemic Operators´ (Wittgenstein 1961, sects. 6.5, 6.51; 1958, §§ 246, 247, 251, 303; references in the form of paragraphnumbers are to the latter text) respectively. The analysis of the employment of those tools in anti-metaphysical arguments -and Weinert treats the Private Language Argument (PLA) as such (427-429)- enables to uncover underlying assumptions, e.g. the implicit assumption in Kant of a prior conceptual relation between concepts to which his notion of analysis is to be applied (430-431) and Wittgenstein´s explicit doctrine that "ordinary language is alright� (434).

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: private language argument; analytic judgement; synthetic judgement; Wittgenstein, L.; Kant, I.; Kripke, S.; Strawson p.;
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Sprachphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 19 Jan 2007
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:52
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1435

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year