»I can"t have your pains« First Person Statements and the Ambiguity of Meaning

Munz, Volker A. (2002) »I can"t have your pains« First Person Statements and the Ambiguity of Meaning. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 179-181.

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Abstract

In PI 246 Wittgenstein remarks: »In what sense are my sensations private?« This question is embedded in a broader context that deals with the possibility of a private language (cf. PI 243-315). Sensations can thereby be considered with respect to an epistemic as well as a possessive kind of privacy. In PI 246 Wittgenstein refers to statements of the form »Only I can know that I am pain whereas others can only surmise it«. He then argues that such expressions are in one sense false and in another nonsense. Although this remark refers to the epistemic aspect of privacy I shall argue that this semantic differentiation also holds for sentences stating the ownership of sensations.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: sensations; private sensations; private language; Wittgenstein, L.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Sprachphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 22 Jan 2007
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:52
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1440

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