Understanding Everyday Mental Concepts: Theory or Simulation?

Röska-Hardy, Lousie (2002) Understanding Everyday Mental Concepts: Theory or Simulation? In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 208-210.

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Abstract

In the course of explaining and anticipating thought and action, we characterize both ourselves and others in mental terms, e.g. as "believing the bus departs at ten" or "wanting to go swimming". The ability to characterize oneself and others in such terms is central to understanding persons. It underwrites the self-attribution of beliefs, desires, emotions and other conscious, occurrent "mental states" (MS) and subserves MS-attribution to others. How do ordinary people understand the contents of mental state concepts like belief or desire? Philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists have put forward answers based on theory-theory (TT), modularity theory (MT) and simulation theory (ST). Before examining how these approaches explain the contents of MS-concepts, two widespread assumptions concerning everyday psychological attributions should be discussed.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Theory Theory(TT); Modular Theory(MT); Simulation Theory(ST); MEntal States Concept (MS); Strawson P.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Ontologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 26 Jan 2007
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:52
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1452

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