On Horgan's Causal Compatibilism

Bregant, Janez (2003) On Horgan's Causal Compatibilism. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 55-57.

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Abstract

It is quite obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation, which rests on supervenience, is such an attractive theory. On one side it secures the mental a preservation of its unique and different nature; on the other side it tries to place the mental in our world in a way that is compatible with the physicalistic view. But Kim's argument from supervenience reminds us that while trying to do so the antireductionists face the following dilemma: if mental properties have causal powers we risk a violation of the causal closure of the physics and threaten our physicalistic position; if they do not have them we adopt epiphenomenalism, which denies the mental causal powers of any sort. So, either we violate the causal closure of the physics or we adopt epiphenomenalism. We can write it as an argument in the form of a constructive dilemma and may call it the causal dilemma.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Mental Causation; Epiphenomenalism; Causal Dilemma; Causal Compatibilism; Horgan, T.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Epistemologie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Naturphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 30 Mar 2007
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:52
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1514

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