Closure and Rational Belief

Evnine, Simon J. (2003) Closure and Rational Belief. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 109-111.

Preview

PDF evnine.pdf Download (143kB)

Abstract

What kinds of principles belong in a theory of rational belief? One contention of this paper is that it is impossible to reach informed conclusions about the answer to this question without a clear sense of what such a theory is intended to do. It may be rejoined that such a theory is always, at least, intended to cash out, in perspicuous terms, the notion of rationality, and hence no further context is needed to try and decide what principles belong in the theory. This will not do: use of the term "rationality" is so multi-faceted that it is doubtful whether there is a single concept that it picks out. In fact, specifying what a theory of rationality is intended to do may go hand in hand with providing a characterization of one notion (out of many) of rationality. This will prove to be the case in the following.

Item Type:	Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Rational Belief; Closure;
Subjects:	Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003 Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Religionsphilosophie, Religionskritik
Depositing User:	Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited:	25 Jun 2007
Last Modified:	08 Sep 2011 18:52
URI:	http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1567

Actions (login required)

View Item

Downloads