Discursive conditions and contextual presuppositions. Habermas versus Apel.

Hedberg, Petra (2003) Discursive conditions and contextual presuppositions. Habermas versus Apel. Sats - Nordic Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 4 (No. 2). pp. 67-93.

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Abstract

The terms "morality� and "ethical life� refer to the relationship between Kant"s universalistic and Hegel"s "contextualised� account of morality. In this essay, the problem of universalism and contextualism will be addressed to Apel"s and Habermas"s positions. I will divide the theme into three main topics: 1) The historical reconstruction of the rational conditions of discourse ethics within Habermas"s position: in which sense could this approach lead to a contextualism? 2) The difficulty with establishing a non-contextual justification of the discursive, rational conditions. Habermas"s reconstructive approach will be confronted with Apel"s "strict reflectional� approach which relies on stronger universalistic presuppositions. 3) This last topic will focus on the main difference between Habermas"s and Apel"s perspectives. This is connected to the double function of the rational "symmetry and reciprocity�-conditions: they are seen as consensual and simultaneously meta-normative conditions. Their meta-normative character is Apel"s main concern, and seen as vital to social criticism.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: universalism, contextualism, ultimate justification, justification, reconstruction, ideal speech situation, ideal community of communication, theoretical discourse, practical discourse, meta-norms, norms, facts
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Gesellschaftsphilosophie, politische Philosophie, Rechtsphilosophi
Depositing User: Petra Hedberg
Date Deposited: 23 Jun 2007
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:52
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1574

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