Knowledge, Belief, and Assertion

Hindriks, Frank A. (2003) Knowledge, Belief, and Assertion. In: Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 135-137.

[img]
Preview
PDF
hindriks.pdf

Download (123kB)

Abstract

The traditional answer to the question what it is to make an assertion appeals to belief (see Grice 1989 and Searle 1969). To assert something, so the analysis goes, is to express a belief by way of uttering a sentence. Timothy Williamson claims (1) that on the traditional analysis assertion is constitutively governed by the truth rule (242):1 One must: assert p only if p is true. He argues (2) that the traditional analysis is mistaken, and (3) that assertion is constitutively governed by the knowledge rule instead (243): One must: assert p only if one knows p. I will argue that all three of these claims are false.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Constitutive Rules; Regulative Rules; Necessary Conditions; Searle, J.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2008 14:57
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:52
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1609

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year