Indefensibility, Skepticism and Conceptual Truth

Keller, Philipp Indefensibility, Skepticism and Conceptual Truth. In: Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 175-176.

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Abstract

It is true of many truths that I do not believe them. It is equally true that I cannot rationally assert of any such truth that it is true and that I do not believe it. Such a claim is indefensible, i.e. for internal reasons unable to convince. I claim that such is the skeptic's predicament, trying to convince us to bracket knowledge claims we have good grounds to take ourselves to be entitled to. An analysis of skepticism as an epidemic rather than epistemic challenge will shed new light on what it is to doubt a proposition and provide us with an analysis of conceptual truths as those which cannot rationally be doubted.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Moore´s Paradox; Conceptional truth; Scepticism; Indefenceability
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Sprachphilosophie
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 10 Mar 2008 12:11
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:52
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1639

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