Predictive Knowledge in Wittgenstein

Marques, Antonio Predictive Knowledge in Wittgenstein. In: Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 215-217.


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Predictive statements deserve a specific grammatical inquiry, since they have not only an epistemological status, but also appear in Wittgenstein"s writings on philosophy of psychology and touch deeply the problem of free will. So predictive knowledge covers a very large spectrum of human experience. This grammatical exploration leads to acknowledge an essential difference between predictive statements, which are expressions or exteriorisations of will (Willensäusserungen) and predictions, which are made from the perspective of the third person (although they can be uttered in the first). As Wittgenstein notes: "Two things however, are important: one, that in many cases someone else cannot predict my actions, whereas I foresee them in my intentions; the other, that my prediction (in my expression of intention) has not the same foundation as his prediction of what I shall do, and the conclusions to be drawn from these predictions are quite differentâ€? (PI, Iixi, 224e). It is the grammatical elucidation of predictive language games that allows us to solve the problem of the incompatibility between predicted and at the same time free choices.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Predictive Knowledge; Free Will; Voluntary Behavior; Wittgenstein, L.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Epistemologie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Naturphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Sprachphilosophie
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 14 Mar 2008 10:59
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:52

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