Is Explaining Intuition Compatible with Trusting it?

Miščevič, Nenad (2003) Is Explaining Intuition Compatible with Trusting it? In: Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 242-244.

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Abstract

First, a summary of anti-naturalist criticism of explanationism, taking Th. Nagel"s work (1997) as typical. A common assumption in the debate is the following one: if there is a causal explanation of our intuitions, it will appeal to the design of our mind, and ultimately to the causal-historical forces shaping it. In other words, the thinkers find their intuitions immediately compelling because they, the intuitions, reflect the built-up of thinker"s minds. The intuitioncontents, on the other hand, tend to be true, since the built-up of the mind reflects the most general structures of reality that has been causally shaping it. Most explanationists offer the design account as the best available explanation-sketch. The anti-explanationists, from Kant (Critique of Pure reason, B 176) through Wittgensteinians (e.g., J: Lear) to Th. Nagel (1997), G. Bealer (1987) and J. Pust (2001), perform a modus tollens on this designfocused account. Since it is self-undermining and has unacceptable normative conesquences it should be rejected, they claim. Here is Nagel"s recent formulation of the use of evolutionary hypothesis about the origin of our minddesign.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Intuition; Anti-Naturalistic Criticism; Causal Explanation; Kant, I.; Nagel, T;
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Epistemologie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Naturphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 03 Apr 2008 08:30
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:52
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1665

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