Some Further Remarks on the "I�

Munz, Volker A. (2003) Some Further Remarks on the "I� In: Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 251-253.

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Abstract

In Wittgenstein"s discussion of first person psychological statements, we find a number of remarks that point to a semantic difficulty in the use of such ascriptions. The meaning ambiguity is due to the fact that one and the same proposition can both be used to state a matter of fact and a metaphysical assumption. Hence a sentence such as, e.g., "Only my pain is real pain� might mean that all others except me are only pretending. In a solipsistic context, however, the claim is supposed to express that nobody except me can be in pain.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Symbolism, Alternative Symbolism; Concept of Self; Soplipsism; Moore, G.E.; Wittgenstein L.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Epistemologie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Naturphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 03 Apr 2008 08:52
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:52
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1668

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