Judgement and Certainty

van der Schaar, Maria (2003) Judgement and Certainty. In: Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 311-313.

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Abstract

Judgement is the interiorisation of assertion: the inner notion of judgement is to be explained in terms of the outer notion of assertion. When someone asserts "Snow is white", an interlocutor is entitled to ask "How do you know?" If the asserter is not able to give grounds for his assertion, it has to be withdrawn. In an assertion an illocutionary claim that one has grounds is present; an assertion is thus a claim to knowledge. Not all occurrences of declarative sentences are asserted. In such cases the context should make it clear that the declarative is, for example, used to express mere opinion or conjecture. Whereas an assertion made is correct or incorrect, other uses of the declarative do not allow for this distinction. Just as for assertion, implicit in every judgement is a claim to knowledge; judgement is an epistemic notion.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Certainty; Non-Epistemic Certainty; Wittgenstein, L.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Epistemologie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Naturphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 18 Apr 2008 15:01
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:52
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1688

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