What does Haack"s double-aspect experientialism give us?

Talmont-Kaminski, Konrad (2003) What does Haack"s double-aspect experientialism give us? In: Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 342-344.


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Twentieth century analytical epistemology concerned itself mainly with various attempts to work out two basic issues. The issue most often engaged was the relationship between beliefs, propositions, theories and such other elements of a world view that had been thought of as deserving of being called "knowledge". The other issue that was often considered was the relationship between the abovementioned elements and experiences. This issue was of manifest significance given the empiricist roots of most of the analytic tradition and became even more vital once Quine"s critique seemed to rule out a priori knowledge and gave rise to the naturalist tradition (Quine 1953). The middle of the century didn"t just witness Quine"s undermining of the a priori. At much the same time, Sellars attacked the idea of The Given and seemed to remove the possibility of experience being involved in the justification of our beliefs (Sellars 1963). The two arguments taken together have given rise to a number of epistemologically nihilist positions – most clearly to Rorty"s anti-realist neopragmatism (Rorty 1979).

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: The Myth of the Given; Normative naturalism; Sellars, W.; Haack, S.; Davidson, D.; Quine, W.v.O.; Popper, K.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 29 May 2008 07:34
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:52
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1751

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