Can Program Explanations Save the Causal Efficacy of Beliefs?

Walter, Sven (2003) Can Program Explanations Save the Causal Efficacy of Beliefs? In: Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 360-362.

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Abstract

Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit offered the "program explanation account� (PEA) in order to vindicate the causal relevance of mental states such as beliefs. According to J&P, a property F of a cause-event c (potentially a mental property) can be causally relevant for an effect-event e"s having property G because "e had G because c had F� is an informative, non-redundant program explanation. If PEA succeeded, the causal relevance of beliefs would be vindicated and mental property epiphenomenalism would be avoided.1 However, it doesn"t succeed.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Program explanation account; belief;
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Depositing User: Stefan Köstenbauer
Date Deposited: 06 Jun 2008 08:00
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:52
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1757

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