What Kind of Modality Does the Materialist Need For His Supervenience Claim?

von Wachter, Daniel (2009) What Kind of Modality Does the Materialist Need For His Supervenience Claim? In: Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Universitätsverlag Winter. (In Press)

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Abstract

Materialists who do not deny the existence of mental phenomena usually claim that the mental supervenes on the physical, i.e. that there cannot be a change in the mental life of a man without there being a change in the man"s body. This modal claim is usually understood in terms of logical necessity. I argue that this is a mistake, resulting from assumptions inherited from logical empiricism, and that it should be understood in terms of synthetic necessity.

Item Type: Book Section
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Metaphysik
Depositing User: Prof. Dr. Dr. Daniel von Wachter
Date Deposited: 25 Sep 2009 15:31
Last Modified: 02 Oct 2013 20:20
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/1843

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