Reason: traditional and contemporary

or

Why should we still speak of reason after all?

In the present essay - which was originally presented as a lecture at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing on October 11, 1999 - I try to give a brief account of my guiding idea when developing my conception of reason.[1]

There is a riddle in philosophy concerning reason. In tradition, reason was considered our supreme faculty and the very core of philosophy. Think, for example, of Aristotle's praise of reason's capacity for self-cognition (noesis noeseos, Met. XII 9, 1074 b 34 f.). In present times, however, many philosophers want to do without reason at all. Feyerabend paradigmatically proclaimed a "Farewell to Reason".[2] - Instead of the previous highest appreciation, a blank abolishment of reason is today being advocated.

With respect to this riddle, I would like to address two questions. First: How did this change happen? Second: Should "Farewell to Reason" remain our final word in matters of reason?

I. The traditional distinction between reason and rationality

1. Duality and hierarchy

In tradition, a distinction has always been made between two faculties, or types of activity, of our reflective capacity: in Greek this distinction reads as nous versus dianoia or logos, in Latin as intellectus versus ratio, in German as Vernunft versus Verstand, and in current English as reason versus rationality. The first faculty (nous, intellectus, Vernunft, reason) was considered to be the higher, the second (dianoia, logos, ratio, Verstand, rationality) the lower one. Why was this distinction made and why was this hierarchy established?

2. Logos and argumentation - and their limits

There is no doubt that most of our philosophical and scientific activity is performed through logos or - in modern terms - rationality. The core of logos lies in argumentation, in giving reasons for the views one holds. This is what makes logos so constitutive for philosophy and science. Logos is a capacity not just for making statements but also for providing their proofs. The paradigm form of argumentative proof is the syllogism. A statement is proven by being derived as a conclusion from premisses.

But there is a problem with argumentation. Its reach is limited. For the certainty of a conclusion depends on the certainty of the premisses (as well as the correctness of drawing the conclusion). So if the premisses are not certain, the whole edifice of conclusions, the whole system of knowledge based on those premisses cannot be certain either, but will remain unstable and may finally collapse. Hence the main task is to achieve and guarantee the certainty of the fundamental premisses. How can this be done?

3. First premisses cannot be secured via argumentation

Certainly not through the method of argumentation so typical of logos. One can, of course, try to prove a premiss by deriving it from deeper premisses. But even if one succeeds in doing so, the problem will not be eliminated but only shifted - to that of the certainty of those deeper premisses. In order to secure them one would have to go back to even deeper premisses - but with the same problem arising once again with respect to them, and so on. In other words: the attempt to secure the certainty of premisses through argumentation leads into an infinite regress, and so the edifice of philosophy and science would remain uncertain.

Another strategy to solve the problem would consist of a mere trick: the premisses are proven via steps of argumentation which in fact already presuppose those premisses - just in a concealed, not obvious manner. Instead of providing a correct proof, one would then only turn a circle, so that after the argumentation the premisses are no more secure than before - at most they might seem to be so.[3]

How can this problem, so crucial for all our cognition, be solved? How can we obtain reliable basic premisses - first principles -, if argumentation is, by its nature, unable to do so?

4. Reason is needed to provide and guarantee first principles

It is here that reason comes in. In tradition reason is conceived as the faculty capable of providing and guaranteeing first principles. In order to be able to do so, reason must, of course, be different in its structure from logos and argumentation. What, then, is typical of reason? According to Plato reason is characterized by intuition, according to Aristotle it grasps the first principles through induction.

I am not going to discuss the details here. I just wanted to make clear why traditional philosophy saw a need for conceiving of two cognitive faculties, not only that of logos (or, in modern terms, rationality) alone, but also that of reason. Logos would be unable to do its job of argumentation if reason did not provide the conditions necessary for this business, the first premisses.

So, in short, the traditional pattern is the following: Reason is responsible for first principles, while rationality's task is to operate and argue on the basis of those principles. Hence the classical distinction, hierarchy, and cooperation between reason and rationality.

II. Changing the traditional pattern - from Kant to Feyerabend and the contemporary rationality types theory

1. Kant: rationality takes over

A big change occurred with Kant, the paradigmatically modern philosopher. At first glance no shift is visible: Kant continues speaking of Vernunft and Verstand (which for our purpose can be rendered as reason and rationality). But the definition and content of those two faculties is severely altered by Kant. According to him reason no longer provides first principles for cognition. It only provides the perspective of totality, driving us to be dissatisfied with partial, and to strive for total comprehension. The first principles are instead provided by the Verstand which contains our most basic notions, the Categories, and establishes the axioms for all our experience, the basic propositions (Grundsätze).

Thus rationality has become more powerful than reason. It is now the capacity which provides (as Kant puts it) the constitutive principles of cognition, whereas reason only plays a secondary role by providing regulative ideas, and furthermore carries with it almost insurmountable misunderstandings (which Kant discusses under the title dialectics).[4] In short: rationality has taken over the former role of reason, the provision of first principles.

2. Feyerabend and others as echoing Kant

With this shift, initiated by Kant, in mind we can get a better understanding of the current slogan of "Farewell to reason" and contemporary philosophers' widespread willingness to abandon reason. Their abstinence from reason obviously echoes the decisive break initiated by Kant. He was the first to develop a conception of rationality and reason according to which we can in fact (with respect to reason's traditional main task, the provision of first principles) very well, and even must, do without reason. In this respect the contemporary abolishment of reason proves to be a late consequence of the change initiated by Kant.

3. Rationality as providing its own principles - the contemporary rationality types theory

That in contemporary philosophy rationality is in fact assumed to have taken over reason's traditional role of providing first principles can be made more evident by taking a closer look at the contemporary understanding of rationality. Today one no longer speaks of rationality tout court, but advocates distinguishing between different types of rationality.

a. Habermas: three types of rationality

Paradigmatically Habermas lists three types of rationality: the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic. These types are regarded as autonomous, as establishing their own principles, methods and viewpoints. Therefore they cannot be reduced to each other, or be judged upon criteria taken from a different type. Each of these types determines its own principles and has its proper sense and right.

Let me briefly illustrate this. The theorem of "art for art's sake" (l'art pour l'art), so prominent since the early 19th century, was directed against moral judgement and censorship of the arts (as had been a popular strategy before, think, for example, of Plato's moral banishment of the arts). Aesthetic rationality - say not only contemporary theorists of rationality, but for a long time artists themselves - is to be held free from the intrusion of moral demands. Likewise the difference between moral and cognitive rationality is obvious. Whereas in cognition the particular can only be understood as a case of something general (there are no singular "events" in physics, if this appears to be so, then one has to find the law of which the seemingly singular event is a typical event), moral-practical rationality demands high respect for situation, context, individuality and singularity; here one certainly has to correspond to general demands too, but what their application is in a given situation cannot be stated generally, but is to be determined in accordance with the specificity of the case. - Such considerations make it clear that it would be mistaken to apply cognitive rationality to moral questions, or moral rationality to aesthetic problems, or aesthetic rationality to cognitive tasks. And all this results from the various rationalities' determining their principles themselves - this aspect which so strongly distinguishes modern, post-Kantian from pre-Kantian understanding of rationality.

b. Postmodernism: plurality of types and paradigms of rationality

In this respect the view of postmodernists is quite similar. They proceed along the same lines as modernists, only going a bit further.

Postmodernists too advocate a plurality of kinds of rationality, but they list a broader range, also including, for example, economic or religious rationality. Furthermore, they may emphasize that there is no single standard version of whatever type of rationality, but that within each of these a plurality of paradigms, each establishing its own set of principles, needs to be taken into account[5] - so that the view becomes altogether much more complex than Habermas' triadic picture suggests. Instead of just praising the liberating effect of pluralization in contrast to the uniformity formerly assumed of rationality, postmodernists also emphasize the conflicting character of the various versions of rationality.

The decisive point in any case is that there is no meta-rationality regulating or softening the plurality and difference of the various kinds of rationality. In fact they establish their own principles instead of just following the authority of some meta-principle. The lack, or better: the impossibility of a meta-position is perhaps the most important insight and common ground in Western philosophy in the second half of the 20th century, one shared by modern as well as postmodern, and continental as well as analytic philosophers. Wittgenstein expressed this state of affairs early on when saying that there is no "metaphilosophy" - and adding: "We might so present all that we have to say that this would appear as a leading principle."[6]

4. Intermediate summary: as rationality provides its own principles, traditional (principle-providing) reason is no longer needed

So far I have been trying to explain why, and in which sense most contemporary philosophers think it sufficient to speak of rationality alone (that is, of different types or paradigms of rationality) and no longer see any space or task for reason. Rationality does it all, and does it in a quite differentiated and sophisticated manner. And up to a point I agree. reason in the traditional sense of a provider of first principles is out. Rationality has taken over this role.

III. Reason renewed

1. The need for reason - but in a different design

My question and my appeal to take up the issue of reason anew arise in a different respect. For one thing is overlooked by the contemporary theories of rationality which want to explain the whole range of our cognitive and reflective activities with recourse to rationality alone. The question I pose is the following: Which faculty are we actually using when distinguishing these various kinds of rationality, when declaring them to have proper sense and when decreeing their autonomy, irreducibility and untranslatability?

One thing is clear: This cannot be done by any of those types or paradigms of rationality themselves. Because they would, according to the contemporary rationality theory's own assessment of the matter, necessarily misrepresent the other types or paradigms. If one tried to draw the whole picture of rationality, for example, on the ground of cognitive rationality, one would only get a biased description of moral rationality, and likewise of aesthetic rationality. The same would apply if one were to draw the whole picture from the angle of moral or aesthetic rationality.

Hence it must be a different type of functioning of our reflective capacity, one equally neutral towards the various types of rationality that alone can allow us to draw the picture which the theory of different kinds of rationality suggests. This type of reflection (presupposed as well as overlooked by this theory) is what I suggest understanding as reason.

This is reason in a new design. Firstly, because this type of reason no longer provides contentful first principles (as was traditional reason's main task). In denying reason as a provider of principles, my conception of reason is in agreement with the contemporary understanding of rationality as providing its own principles. Secondly, it is new because this type of reason stands in a horizontal rather than vertical relationship to the various kinds of rationality, and its main activity consists of performing transitions between the manifold of rational complexes. This is why I call this type of reason "transversal reason".

2. Taking up the reflective, not the principles side of the traditional understanding of reason

But before explaining this new view of reason in more detail, I'd like to point out another respect in which my conception of reason indeed takes up a basic traditional intuition about reason. In tradition reason was not only, as discussed so far, understood as the capacity for providing first principles, but also as the ability to reflect upon and explore our reflective capacity itself. In my understanding of reason this aspect is brought to the fore again by emphasizing that to speak of various types of rationality in the sense explained a reflective stance is required, and in play, which cannot be equated with any of the single forms of rationality, but which must be able to thematize all of them in a neutral manner and clarify their differences as well as their relationships. This kind of reflection is even - to say it again - a necessary condition for the theory of different rationality types itself - it is presupposed by this theory, but at the same time detrimentally overlooked or ignored by the advocates of this theory.

Renewing the understanding of reason as the activity of exploring the core structure of our reflective capacity itself means taking up one of the innermost issues of philosophy - and philosophy, I think, cannot do without addressing this basic issue of the self-cognition of our reflective capacity.

                             3. Reason altogether: our transversal reflective capacity

However, reason's reach is far from being restricted to the function pointed out so far. Once the dam has broken - and precisely with the core of contemporary rejection of reason, that is, with the theory of plural types of rationality, which from the non-necessity of reason for the provision of principles falsely concludes the dispensability of reason altogether - the broad range of our actual practices and uses of reason comes into view again. It reaches from most of our contemporary tasks in thinking through to current orientation in daily life.

a. The current state of affairs being characterized by plurality

There is a general precondition for this: the modern rise of plurality in virtually all matters. It reaches from high-brow to everyday aspects, say from the diversified understanding of rationality or the insurmountable variety of conflicting theories referring to the same topics; the plurality of cultures in the old sense of national cultures as well as the new sense of diverging forms of life within one society, and the related differences of worldviews; through to the plurality of life designs, political options, or ideas about the good life (concerning work, family, leisure, education etc.) in the everyday. The crucial point is that, despite some overlap and potential connections between those views, they diverge on essential matters, and cannot be reconciled with respect to these core questions. And furthermore there is no meta-view (and, according to modern philosophy's insights, there cannot be one) through which this plurality could be united, ordered, or eliminated once again.[7] In fact, any pretended meta-view is just one more view within the plural condition.

b. The congruence between the general situation of plurality and the proper character of transversal reason

The question then is how we can deal with this plurality, how we can equitably refer to and pass between the variety of positions and do justice to them. Which capacity do we need in order to do this, and which enables us to do so? Now, in all these cases of plurality the problem, in its structure, is obviously the same as discussed before with respect to the various types of rationality. And so is the answer. It is precisely reason - transversal reason - which allows us to take this variety of views into consideration and to move between them.

Why is this? Because reason is a capacity not bound to any particular stance, position or content. This enables it to pass between the various positions without inevitably misrepresenting them from a specific position's angle. So reason allows us to consider any position in its own light - and even to do so independently of asking or being biased by the question whether one would oneself be inclined to share this position or to adopt at least some elements of it (which, however, may later on be a result of such considerations).

From this the congruence between the situation of plurality and the proper character of reason - reason's appropriacy for this situation - becomes evident. It is precisely reason's neutrality which enables it to meet the demands of plurality: to take the whole variety of positions into consideration, to do so in a fair way, not misrepresenting but adequately considering the single positions, and to pass between the various positions, to perform transitions within their plurality. This is why reason thus conceived - transversal reason - is exactly what is required today, and is able to deal with this (modern or postmodern) situation of plurality. Transversal reason - and, as far as I can see, transversal reason alone - is appropriate for this task and enables us to come to grips with the conditions we live in.

4. Reason in practice

a. Philosophical tasks today

Consider, first, the state of affairs in specifically philosophical matters. We have to deal with various positions, say hermeneutics versus deconstruction, system theory versus structuralism, constructivism versus pragmatism, and so forth. In doing this we have two options. The first consists of judging every other position from one's own position, one's own standpoint. But this is obviously insufficient. It would correspond only to a premodern stance, one predating the insight into plurality. The standards of modernity - and in the same way, and indeed even more so those of postmodernity - demand taking plurality into account and doing equal justice to the various positions, from their understanding and reconstruction on, through to the assessment of their relations, their advantages and disadvantages, their potential exchange and interconnections or conflicts. This demand, however, can be met only by considering them through a capacity of neutral reflection, one ultimately not bound to any of them, but capable of considering each of them in its own structure and right. In other words: What is required for philosophical work today, is reasonable instead of merely rational reflection. I am not saying that philosophical work factually always follows this reasonable type of reflection, but it ought to - and I am confident it will do so more and more.

b. Transversality in everyday life

In the same way we need and increasingly practice this kind of reason in our orientation in daily life. Here too we are confronted with a plurality of options - deriving from different cultures and world-views and offering a variety of sensible suggestions. In order to deal with this plurality we need to be able to transverse between these various standpoints and perspectives. We need to do so in order to communicate with others as well as with ourselves because we are increasingly internally affected and characterized by plurality. Transversal reason - as the genuine capacity for transitions - provides the means to pass between those plural stances.

In these matters it might even be appropriate to shift from terms of `need' to terms of actual practice. Because, it seems to me, people are actually making use of transversal reason to an extent much larger than the professional philosophical treatment of the matter is usually aware. People are experts in transversal reason to a higher degree than most philosophers are. In other words: transversality is increasingly becoming an inner constituent of people's reasoning and life designs. The fact that we are more and more achieving a mixed cultural constitution - that we are becoming "cultural hybrids"[8] - contributes to this turn to transversality. Transversality seems to be increasingly characterizing the factual life forms of many contemporaries.

5. Reason and rationality

Altogether, in my conception, reason's axis is shifted from verticality to horizontality. Reason, properly understood, is not a capacity beyond or above plurality, but a capacity within it. It is, so to speak, the fluidum of all our reflective or mental activity.

So, in present conditions, not only is the former task of reason (that of providing first principles) dropped, but also the hierarchical structure (with reason being understood as a faculty above rationality) is altered. Reason's relationship to rationality is not an external but an internal one. Properly speaking, `reason' is an expression with which we refer to the underlying structure (or the framework) of all our mental and reflective activity - one which is also in play in every step of rationality. Reason and rationality are not two separate faculties, and in a sense are not faculties at all, but rather signify different layers and functional modes of our reflective activity. `Reason' refers to the basic mechanism, `rationality' to the various concrete, object-directed versions of this activity. There is ultimately no (rational) reference to any object outside this (reasonable) realm of self-reference.[9]

So ultimately I bring reason and rationality together again - but not in the old style of a hierarchy or a cooperation of two faculties, but as two modes of our reflective capacity. It should be clear that I am not at all opposed to rationality, but only to the dominant rationality-theory's claim that rationality does it all. Against this I point out the indispensability of reason, the fact that even in all rational activity we permanently make use of reason, and that, above all, reason - in the new design of transversal reason - is the capacity which allows us to come to grips with the conditions we are living in.

              6. Having not only theoretical obligations, but practical advantages in view

I set out to explain my view of reason by contrasting it with the current rationality types theory and its claim for the exclusivity of rationality and the rejection of reason altogether, then pointed out the kind of questions and reflective procedures overlooked by this claim, in order to bring the indispensablity of reason to the fore as well as to present an altered, contemporary conception of reason.

But ultimately this correction of contemporary philosophical commonplaces about rationality and reason in theoretical matters is more a secondary aspect of my endeavour. My emphasis is on a different aspect: to suggest a concept of reason workable under present conditions, not only in theoretical, but also in practical matters, to develop an understanding of reason which can help us in our daily orientation. Or should I say: to articulate reason as it is factually used and proves helpful in people's current practices of self-understanding and life? I am confident that the latter description has a point. The task of philosophical clarification is not to decree something from nowhere, but to make more transparent and thus closer to hand capacities we already possess and practice - and thus to help in using them in a more conscious and intense way.

Wittgenstein once noted: "I still find my own way of philosophizing new".[10] But then he went on also to express confidence about it: "It will have become second nature to a new generation".[11] I'd like to think that this might apply to transversal reason as well - which, in my view, has already become second nature to a large extent for many of our contemporaries.