*IS THERE ANY LOGIC IN MADNESS?
LINGUISTIC REFLECTIONS ON AN INTERPERSONAL THEORY OF MENTAL
ILLNESS.*

Rudi *Fischer*,
Universitaet Heidelberg
Deutschland


INTRODUCTION

Wittgenstein`s legacy does not consist in conceiving a systematic
philosophy, but in a certain kind, a method of thinking. This
thinking focuses on philosophical problems as illnesses of
thinking and tries to cure these by means of philosophy/therapy.
This approach with all its implications is certainly one of the
reasons why Wittgenstein is practically ignored by a large number
of academic philosophers. The therapeutic impetus of
Wittgenstein`s philosophy can be understood against the background
of his own psychological problems. Throughout many years of his
life he himself felt threatened by insanity. If one takes his
descriptions of himself seriously, these apprehensions seem
justified. He had an early desire to become a psychiatrist, as his
friend Drury later on, and this can be interpreted as an attempt
to achieve a metaposition vis-a-vis illness. However, Wittgenstein
finally decided in favour of philosophy and realised his
therapeutic ambitions in that field. As is well known, he
initiated a linguistic turn, a change of perspectives in
philosophy, which has given us many new insights regarding the
relation between philosophical problems and language. The problem
of mental illness, of insanity, appears in many scattered remarks
which show that Wittgenstein looked at it through a therapeutic
lens. If one examines these remarks systematically (they are
occasionally based on personal experiences), some basic elements
of a theory of mental illness can be formulated. For a number of
years I have been attempting in psychiatric and psychotherapeutic
research to implement the linguistic turn, which took place long
ago in analytical philosophy. In this respect, Wittgenstein`s
notes play an important role. At the beginning of our century,
Karl Jaspers introduced the hermeneutic dichotomy between
explanation and understanding into psychopathology. In this view,
we are separated from being able to understand the creations of
insanity by the gap of incomprehensibility. The creations of
insanity, for instance the speech of a lunatic, are
incomprehensible by their very nature; they belong to a sense-free
area which may be accessible to scientific explanation, but never
to geniunely hermeneutic understanding. The falling of Newton's
apple can be "explained" via gravitation, the falling of the apple
itself is, however, sense-less and therefore can not be
understood. It is precisely this sense-lessness which was adopted
by Jaspers for the definition of psychosis. From an historical
viewpoint, the grammar of this term has had devastating
consequences. It has resulted in those persons being excluded from
psychotherapeutic treatment who in the psychiatric language-game
have been belaboured by the diagnostic-semantic mace labelled
"psychosis". Jaspers' dictum sealed the excommunication of
lunatics for decades. Terms of deficiency like disorganisation,
schizophrenia, disorder, disintegration, etc. have become a common
vocabulary in the psychiatric language-game. It is against this
background that the following thoughts need to be considered.


1. *Truth versus certainty*
2. *Error versus insanity*
3. *Insanity as a different grammar*
4. *Opportunities for therapy*


*Truth versus certainty*

Interestingly, the central ideas of the later philosophy of
psychology are already formulated in nuce in the Tractatus-logico-
philosophicus (Wittgenstein 1969, p. 172f.). These ideas develop
from an implicit discussion of scepticism and Cartesianism. There
is one passage of the Tractatus in which Wittgenstein directs the
rigid basic concept of the Tractatus against certain kinds of
propositions in psychology (Tractatus 5.541). This concept says
that meaningful propositions must be either true or false. This
refers to the propositional attitudes, those intentional attitudes
towards propositions which become a major topic in the later
philosophy: I doubt that p (I have a hand), I know that p (I am in
pain), etc. These passages of the Tractatus demonstrate that truth
and certainty are two entirely different things, they belong to
different games. The eye analogy (Tractatus 5.6.331), in which
Wittgenstein compares the transcendental subject with the eye,
illustrates the connection of solipsism/Cartesianism and
philosophical psychology. The eye itself, i.e. the transcendental
(metaphysical) subject, is not part of the visual field, not the
object of contemplation, but is the blind spot of the
presentation. Accordingly, in the philosophy of the Tractatus the
relationships of this subject to the objects of his desire, the
true or false propositions, are victims of the thesis of
extensionality . This means that the DOUBT in p, the KNOWLEDGE of
p, the CERTAINTY that p etc. will not be part of the field of
vision and can therefore not be represented, which means that they
cannot be true or false.*1*  By means of this implicit distinction
between truth and certainty, Wittgenstein opens the way to his
later philosophy and its distinction of the first and third person
singular, which is crucial for the philosophy of psychology. Truth
is - as in the Tractatus - a meaningful term only where it is a
question of knowledge, and there can only be questions of
knowledge and cognition where doubt is logically possible. This is
the position of the later philosophy. According to Wittgenstein`s
interpretation in his later philosophical psychology, those
philosophical predicates which are already discussed in the
Tractatus (to believe, to think, etc.) can neither be verified nor
falsified by the first person singular. In other words, these
predicates are attributed by the subject to itself without any
criteria. As becomes more clearly evident in the later philosophy,
in these cases it is useless to talk about knowledge: I don't know
that I'm sad but I AM SAD and I am CERTAIN about that. As far as I
am concerned, I can't be wrong in this without losing the ground
beneath my feet. Thus a doubt always presupposes certainty, which
means something that is a priori excluded from doubt. Being
excluded from doubt, it cannot be made use of as a foundation of a
game, but rather defines a boundary of a game and, being a
semantic horizon, allows right and wrong, true and false moves in
the game. Those certainties which are manifested in what
Wittgenstein calls grammatical propositions or grammatical rules,
belong to the grammar of the game. They constitute the semantic
space in which reality can be described by language. Being rules
of this kind, they are independent of reality, which means they
cannot be legitimized by recourse to experience because they
determine the frame of possible experience. The boundaries of
experience can thus be seen in the concepts, in the grammar of the
concepts, which determine the language-games. As far as the later
philosophy is concerned, the relationship between language and the
world and reality respectively, which Wittgenstein interpreted in
the Tractatus as an internal one, has to be understood as a
recursive relationship.


*Error versus insanity*

The difference between error and insanity is discussed by
Wittgenstein in connection with mathematical rule-following. If
somebody does not follow an arithmetic rule, the question arises
whether one should talk of an error or rather of a mental
disturbance? There is no sharp boundary here. If such a
miscalculation is made often or always, the question arises
whether it is sensible to talk about "error" or "mistake". In
order to be able to err, one has to judge in conformity with
mankind, as Wittgenstein pointed out in ON CERTAINTY. A certain
amount of conformity is necessary for something to be qualified as
an "error". If this basic consensus is lacking, the error can no
longer be realised, the indeed very idea of error is questionable.
This is true of any form of rule-following. There indeed seems to
be just such a consensual gap in most forms of insanity because
the "insane" person cannot be convinced that in believing that p,
he is believing in a false proposition. This leads to the
conclusion that insanity cannot be understood as a hyperbolic,
pathological form of error, but as a change in precisely that
system of "certainties" which has to be presupposed for error to
be possible. Therefore, the question arises whether there exists a
different order, a method in madness. If it can be established
that the creations of insanity follow certain rules then they are
in principle accessible to understanding. My contention is
precisely that i.e. there exists a logic and a grammar of
insanity. Dealing with Freud on the issue of insanity,
Wittgenstein's thoughts moved in the same direction, leading via a
critique of the psychiatric paradigm to a different understanding
of mental illness.


*Insanity as a different grammar*

In 1938 Wittgenstein characterizes Freud's idea by saying that the
lock to the understanding of insanity has not been destroyed but
only changed. The old key is no longer capable of opening it but
maybe a new key would (Wittgenstein 1980, p. 33). Some years later
(1946), he demands in his notebooks a paradigmatic change in the
view to be taken of mental illness. His question is if insanity
might not be better comprehended as a CHANGE OF PERSONALITY rather
than as an illness, if insanity could not be seen in a more
productive way as a DIFFERENT rather than a degenerate order. This
approach does indeed provide a new key to the understanding of
insanity *2* . But what does insanity as a change of personality
mean? The personality of a person is not destroyed but changed. G.
Bateson explained the personality of a human as being the system
of interpretation that we apply to the contexts which we are
confronted with. Wittgenstein's note on the changed personality
refers to the subjective side of the problem whereas the idea of a
different order, a different language-game touches upon the
intersubjective side of the problem. The intersubjective aspect
focuses on the system of certainties which makes communication
possible by means of a common rule structure. Insanity is
precisely this communication which seems to change which makes it
evident that we are in fact dealing with a different grammar. The
rules (the grammar) which underlie the verbal description of
reality are the epistemic system, which in ON CERTAINTY
Wittgenstein points out to be a system of faith. The grammar as a
petrified form of "knowledge" cannot be falsified by experience,
because it is the very system of certain propositions which we
cannot give up without losing the ground beneath our feet. Grammar
is also described by Wittgenstein as being a picture of the world;
he applies the analogy of the bed of a river in which our language
(the water) moves. If we comprehend insanity as a changed grammar,
as a changed picture of the world to which a coordinated form of
life corresponds, then we can recognize the internal logic of
lunacy. Also, the language of lunacy and lunatic reality are
related to each other recursively, so that the reality of the
lunatic is as full of verifications for him as ours is for us.
Here, Wittgenstein is fully in line with Nietzsche`s
perspectivism, because grammar is one form of perspective on
reality; in itself it is neither true nor false, it is unfounded
and infoundable. Accordingly, the thinking of the lunatic is not
wrong but different. He is deranged (in German the word for "mad"
is "verrueckt", which means "in the wrong place") with respect to
his own grammatically standardised perspective, so he categorises
reality by using different rules. If we now look at grammar more
closely, we find that it establishes some prior assumptions about
the world. Because grammar is arbitrary with respect to
experience, it forms an epistemic system which displays the
character of a faith system. Therefore, grammar is responsible for
the categorisation and conceptualisation of experience and also
for what we call our rationality. This faith system is conveyed to
us by means of language acquisition through the internalisation of
grammatical rules. So these grammatical rules are the basic
pillars of our socialisation; they may be compared with a path on
which one learns to walk (Wittgenstein, 1967a, _ 155).

The image of a road emerges again in a different context and
stresses the psychological aspect:

"But our interest does not attach to the fact that such-and-such
(or all) human beings have been led this way by this rule (or have
gone this way); we take it as a matter of course that people - if
they con think 'correctly' - go this way. We have now been given a
road, as it were by means of the footsteps of those who have gone
this way." (Wittgenstein 1978, p. 98)
This ist Wittgenstein's metaphorical paraphrase of rule and rule-
obeying which is very important in socialization. This path leads
throught a historically formed landscape into which the individual
is born. This horizon Wittgenstein calls 'forms of life' and
'culture' (Fischer 1984). We read in Wittgenstein that within the
language there is 'a whole mythology'(Wittgenstein 1967b, p. 46).
He attaches this to the idea of a linguistic world picture as
already found in Humboldt's philosophy. Wittgenstein referes to
'normal' and 'undisturbed' speech. The user of the language is not
conscious of the inherent world view of our grammar, and this only
becomes clear when looking at other cultures or, in the context
discussed here, when looking at world pictures of the insane which
are different from the myth of our 'rational' languages and
actions.

It should be emphasized that by the internalization of grammatical
norms a world picture is communicated which has the nature of a
belief system. It can neither be reflected nor explained and
therefore the end of all proven belief is unproven belief
(Wittgenstein 1969, _ 243).

The cognitive aspect of grammar, which is important for our
subject, can now be clarified in its relationship to the form of
life. The individual who is integrated into the system has a range
of experience which is kept in balance because this system
determines the cognitive/conceptual as well as the concrete
experience of its members. This implies that we construct our
reality by means of a specific grammar, and create and maintain it
by using it in our forms of life. This cognitive reality is
sustained in a recursive way by living these forms of life. This
concept can now be applied to deviant communication, which is
viewed as pathological (cf. Fischer 1987b).

Thus we have achieved a theoretical perspective regarding
socialisation which can be used to clarify how deviant
communication and deviant language-games may originate. In the
process of language acquisition, speech and action (behaviour) are
connected, and in this way actual linguistic activity is
constituted. At the early stage of language acquisition, rules are
not explicitly taught but demonstrated by example (Wittgenstein,
1970, 295ff). The rule that is conveyed in the learning situation
becomes the path on which we learn to walk, as Wittgenstein
describes it metaphorically. In this phase of socialisation, the
switches are set that will guide verbally dependent thinking and
acting, as well as verbal access to our emotions. According to
Wittgenstein, the rule-obeying aspect forms the central problem.
It precedes the explicit formulation of the rule, and therefore we
first need to follow the rule blindly. Because rule-following is
not governed by a further metarule, the learning situation has the
crucial function of conveying socially accepted rule-obeying. As,
in these early stages, there is not yet any understanding of the
explanation of rules, Wittgenstein calls it in this context
'conditioning', 'drill' or 'training'.

Of course, in this learning situation there always remains the
possibility that socially deviant rules will be internalized.
There are various experimental psychological studies that
Wittgenstein's analysis casts light on. I wish to refer to a study
by A. Bavelas that is mentioned in a report by Watzlawick (1981).
The study belongs to what is called 'non-contingent reward
experiment'. In these tests the connection between the subject's
behaviour and its assessment by the experimenter is absent. In the
study, a long series of number pairs was read to the subjects and
they were asked to decide whether the two numbers fitted together.
When the subjects asked how the numbers were supposed to fit
together, the only answer was that the objective of the experiment
was to discover the rule behind this connection. Thus the
impression developed that it was a 'trial- and-error' study. The
subjects were given the answer 'right' or 'wrong' in accordance
with the Gauss' law of distribution, which takes no account of the
answer as such. It is actually somewhat surprising that, in the
course of the experiment, the subjects developed a hypothesis
which they held onto even after being told that their answers had
been non-contingent. I shall go on to describe this experiment
against the background of Wittgenstein's discussion concerning the
term 'rule'. I shall compare this experiment to a learning
situation where the experimenter plays the role of a teacher and
the subject the role of a pupil. The pupil starts the learning
situation by trying to determine a rule relationship between the
number pairs presented - that is, he tries to reconstruct a rule
that governs the use of the words 'fit' and 'does not fit' and
thus constitutes their sense within the language-game. At first
the experimenter is the arbiter, the final authority assessing the
rightness of the answer. In the course of the experiment the
'right' answers take shape, with the outline of a rule, its
rejection or modification entirely determined by the teacher's
judgment. An increasing number of 'right' answers encourages the
pupil to establish a seemingly valid rule for the rule and also
obedience to that rule. In fact we can understand the teacher's
answers as positive or negative reinforcement and thus interpret
the learning situation as an act of social instrumental learning.
We can imagine the language acquisition situation to be similar,
with the selective moment which reinforces what is taken to be
'right' rule-obeying, playing the outstanding role. The pupil gets
more and more convinced of the 'rightness' of his outline because
of this reinforcement. When, according to the Gauss law of
distribution, the frequency of his correct judgements decreases,
he at first continues to hold onto his belief and defends it
against the assessment of the teacher who had just previously
confirmed the 'rightness' of his rule. The teacher 'suddenly'
wants to convince him of the false nature of the rule which has
already pragmatically proved useful.

This experiment explains how a rule is intersubjectively
internalized and how, on this ground, a perspective is developed
from which reality is seen and organized. An essential element in
the formation of a rule is the systematic reinforcement of what is
counted as 'right'. If the experiment was set up so that the
experimenter answered 'wrong' and 'right' alternately, the pupil
would never be able to establish a rule. He would perhaps
determine the reason for the experiment and thus dissolve it. For
a rule must be applied repeatedly, and this is not possible in an
experiment which has been modified in this way. In this experiment
the achievement of the pupil lies in the reconstruction of a
grammatical rule. It constitutes the application of the verbs
'fit' and 'does not fit' and hence their sense in the given
language-game. Thje pupil has recourse to this rule when in
conflict, for it is the basis of his orientation in this specific
experiment situation, and it is to his rule that the pupil will
refer when justifying his assessment. The rule is the paradigm
which reality and experience is compared to or organized in
accordance with. The pupil by himself can no longer justify these
grammatical rules theoretically; perhaps he can do so
pragmatically, as it is then useful in obtaining the teacher's
reward in the form of a 'right' assessment.

At this point the pupil becomes uncertain. In his opinion the rule
has visibly proved useful, namely, the rule that he has factually
learned through the noncontingent behaviour of the experimenter,
which the subject of course is not aware of. The teacher
'suddenly' does not accept the pupil's game any more. The pupil's
behaviour is psychologically understandable. In the course of the
experiment or learning situation, he has developed a perspective
which confirms his behaviour and thus renders it meaningful, at
least subjectively. 'Objectively' this assumption seemed to be
confirmed by the teacher's assessment. When the teacher factually
rejects this rule, an explicit contradiction becomes apparent and
the student defends his belief system until the experimenter
dissolves the situation (cf. Watzlawick 1981: 13ff.). In the
experiment, the adult is able to recognize the contradiction and
to cope with it intellectually. The contradiction between pupil
and teacher in this experiment lies in the fact that the pupil's
grammatical rule that has given him orientation is suddenly not
valid any more, and is now inconsistent with the 'objectively'
valid grammatical rule which appears to underlie the
experimenter's answers. The experiment shows clearly how
uncertainty comes about when the student can no longer act
adequately on the grounds of the acquired role. Another important
aspect of such a learning situation is the asymmetrical power
structure in the teacher/pupil relationship. It is analogous to
the learning situation of the child, in which both experimenter
and parents are the final authorities who decide what is 'right'
or 'wrong'. The adult in the experiment has the possibility of
opting out, whereas the child does not have such an option. This
situation is similar to what Laing called 'mystification'. In many
examples, he shows how parents systematically undermine their
children's statements and in so doing disrupt the organization of
the perceptions and feelings which they have formed on the grounds
of their grammatical rules. In this context Laing talks about the
parents being arbiters (Laing 1964, p. 43) or representing the
orientation axis (Laing 1969, p. 302). Indeed, a functioning
grammar is the orientation axis around which our perception
revolves. As the grammar, however, is conveyed by the parents,
they are the institution that uses grammar as a power factor and
as an instrument of control for their own needs.

In order to illustrate a more fruitful understanding of lunacy,
let me refer to Kant's "Anthropology" of 1798, in which he writes
about "the illnesses of the head", as he calls mental illnesses.
Kant provides a detailed nosography of the different forms of
insanity. The only general feature of lunacy - Kant says - is the
loss of common sense (sensus communis) and the logical
stubbornness which developes instead (BA 151). Kant's distinctions
refer to the various cognitive faculties which may be disturbed.
He differentiates between commotional, methodical and systematic
illness. The latter form of "lunacy" is especially interesting for
our topic here, because it implies that there exists a "system" of
insanity. In this respect, Kant's idea is analogous to
Wittgenstein`s concept that there is no "error" possible in a
systematically different perspective on categorising "reality".
The class of psychoses which Kant calls `sheer foolishness'
(vesania) corresponds to Wittgenstein's idea and this can also be
found mutatis mutandis in Bateson's understanding of schizophrenia
as a change in the system of interpretation of reality. Let me
therefore quote the crucial passage in its full length: (BA
147/148). "Denn es ist in der letzteren Art der Gemuetsstoerung
nicht bloss Unordnung und Abweichung von der Regel des Gebrauchs
der Vernunft, sondern auch positive Unvernunft, d.i. eine ganz
andere Regel, ein ganz verschiedener Standpunkt, worein sozusagen
die Seele versetzt wird, und aus dem sie alle Gegenstaende anders
sieht, und aus dem sensorio communis [...] sich in einen davon
entfernten Platz versetzt findet (daher das Wort Verrueckung). Wie
eine bergichte Landschaft, aus der Vogelperspektive gezeichnet,
ein ganz anderes Urteil ueber die Gegend veranlasst, als wenn sie
von der Ebene aus betrachtet wird. Zwar fuehlt sich die Seele
nicht an einem anderen Ort im Raume ... aber man erklaert sich
dadurch, so gut wie man kann, die sogenannte Verrueckung."
According to Kant's theory of the cognitive faculties, `sheer
foolishness' means a systematic change of Reason, considered as
the major cognitive faculty. In this case, Reason judges according
to different rules. In a more abstract way, a connection can be
drawn from Kant's understanding of systematic lunacy to Bateson's
statements describing insanity as a change of personality/change
of the modes of punctuation of reality. Similarly - though on the
basis of a different understanding of language - I comprehend
insanity as a result of a different grammatical (cognitive)
perspective from which reality is organised, experienced and
described.


*Opportunities for therapy*

As explained above, insanity and its different forms can be
understood as a changed form of life with correspondingly changed
grammatical structures. These grammatical structures lead to a
change in the view of and the coping with reality in such a way
that the result is "lunatic behaviour". This "lunatic behaviour"
can be detected in the language-games of mental illness. Clinical
linguistics - a discipline to be developed in the future - could
set out to create a typology of grammatical deviations which can
be related to certain phenomena of illness. Creating and
generating meaning is one of the essential basic functions of
language, what Gianbattista Vico called poiesis. The task of and
opportunity for therapy lies especially in its potential poetic
effectiveness; therapy creates meaning where lunacy reigned and
thus makes new sensible thinking and behaviour possible. Let me
tell you a tale which may serve as an illustration.
In the Brothers' Grimm's tale of `the farmer's bright daughter' a
young girl finds herself in a situation which is contradictory in
terms of logical categories. Her father has been arrested on the
orders of the king. The girl wants to release her father from jail
and must therefore solve a riddle: She has to find a way out of a
paradoxical language-game. The king orders the farmer's daughter
to appear in the court "neither naked nor dressed". Because the
girl absolutely has to obey the king's order to free her father,
any escape or way out of the situation is psychologically blocked.
The girl finds herself within a communication pattern,defined as
double-bind by Bateson et al. and described as a specific learning
context for schizophrenia. In order to cope with the pragmatic
paradox, the girl presents herself to the king naked/dressed in a
fishing net. This solution is accepted as the correct one by the
king; he marries the farmer's daughter and her father is released
from jail. The interactional context, the language-game holds no
rule for the meaning of "neither nude nor dressed". The girl in
the tale can escape the paradoxical trap by transcending the
logical `tertium non datur' by creating something new which is
accepted as a solution by the king. Therefore, a local,
paralogical solution of the incommensurably paradoxical situation
can be found which is located outside customary logic/grammar. It
can be compared with the reaction of a zen monk to the solution of
a koan or with that of a schizophrenic who creates a
transcontextual syndrom - as Bateson called it - in order to
escape from the paradoxical communication structures in his
family. The solution found by the girl makes possible a new
language-game which is about the intersubjective consensus between
two individuals. A new grammatical rule is formed, which defines
what is accepted as "neither nude nor dressed". Thus, a new
paradigm has been introduced into the language, a new pattern for
future cases. The behaviour of the girl can be understood
genetically from the situation, but it is yet not meaningful. It
becomes only meaningful if it is integrated into a new language-
game. The girl's behaviour was transcontextual -neither meaningful
nor meaningless outside the game - and therefore beyond the
boundaries of our rationality. It becomes a solution by reason of
the king's willingness to accept it as such, and also a new
paradigm, a new language-game for future situations. The language-
game between the king and the farmer's daughter is no longer
paradoxical; it can now be followed, played, because it no longer
contains any contradictory rules. On the other hand, the once
"lunatic" (transcontextual) behaviour has now been integrated in
the different grammar of a new game. The behaviour of the girl is
precisely what Bateson calls transcontextual and compares with
"lunatic" symptoms.
Regarding paradoxes, Wittgenstein gives a paradoxical piece of
therapeutic advice: "Something surprising, a paradox,is a paradox
only in a particular, as it were defective, surrounding. One needs
to complete this surrounding in such a way that what looked like a
paradox no longer seems one" (RFM Wittgenstein, 19 410).
Wittgenstein's comment can be understood as a rule which says: Pay
attention to the context in which lunacy arises. This very rule is
responsible for the development of family therapy as we know it.
The therapist therefore has to act as what Foucault calls an
archeologist of knowledge; he must analyse the long established
invariable ("unverrueckbar") certainties of the family's language-
game,i.e. those grammatical rules which guide the family's
thinking and acting. As soon as these rules are clear to him he
will be able to intervene in the discourse of the family, to
construct new semantic networks, to conceive possible worlds,
possible realities, to open up new options facilitating meaning
and meaningful behaviour for the family.


*Footnotes*

*1*
Propositions of the form "A believes p" can also be understood in
a non-psychological way, as soon as they are statements about the
belief of A. In this respect they are functional to trutz, because
if A does not believe p but may be q instead, tghe the propostion
"A believes p" is incorrect and such a proposition does not form
an exception to the theory of propositions in the Tractatus.
Wittgenstein explains this kind of propositions as being
intentional, as propositions about psychological states of A.

*2*
This specific idea of Wittgenstein's also results from his own
experience: in the attempt to become a different person he
experienced insanity himself (cf Fischer 1987a). Wittgenstein's
thoughts about insanity as a change of personality thus relfects
his own experience "to become a differnt person". These ideas
about mental illness have been developed in detail in Fischer
1987a.



*BIBLIOGRAPHY*

Bateson, Gregory
1981 Oekologie des Geistes, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Fischer, Hans Rudi, Simon, Fritz B.
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Themas bei bei Wittgenstein, Schapp zu Bateson. In: Grazer
Philosophische Studien, Bd 37/1988, S. 59-83.

Fischer, Hans Rudi
1984 `Die Sprache bezieht sich auf eine Lebensweise' oder wie der
Terminus Lebensform bei Wittgenstein zu lesen ist. In: R. Haller
1984, p. 250-254.

Fischer, Hans Rudi
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Fischer, Hans Rudi
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Fischer, Hans Rudi (ed)
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Fischer, Hans Rudi
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Fischer, Hans Rudi, Retzer, Arnold u. Schweitzer, Jochen (ed) 1992
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