***************************************************************** * * * File: 09-1-95.TXT Dateilänge: 35 KB * * * * Autor: Robert M. Seltzer, Albany - USA * * * * Titel: Wittgenstein on aesthetic practice: * * A critique of Weitz and Mandelbaum * * * * Erschienen in: WITTGENSTEIN STUDIES, Diskette 1/1995 * * * ***************************************************************** * * * (c) 1995 Deutsche Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft e.V. * * Alle Rechte vorbehalten / All Rights Reserved * * * * Kein Bestandteil dieser Datei darf ganz oder teilweise * * vervielfältigt, in einem Abfragesystem gespeichert, * * gesendet oder in irgendeine Sprache übersetzt werden in * * irgendeiner Form, sei es auf elektronische, mechanische, * * magnetische, optische, handschriftliche oder andere Art * * und Weise, ohne vorhergehende schriftliche Zustimmung * * der DEUTSCHEN LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN GESELLSCHAFT e.V. * * Solche Dateien und Auszüge davon, die der Benutzer für * * seine privaten wissenschaftlichen Zwecke benutzt, sind * * von dieser Regelung ausgenommen. * * * * No part of this file may be reproduced, stored * * in a retrieval system, transmitted or translated into * * any other language in whole or in part, in any form or * * by any means, whether it be in electronical, mechanical, * * magnetic, optical, manual or otherwise, without prior * * written consent of the DEUTSCHE LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN * * GESELLSCHAFT e.V. Those articles and excerpts from * * articles which the subscriber wishes to use for his own * * private academic purposes are excluded from this * * restrictions. * * * ***************************************************************** * * * Abstract:*1* * * * * This paper is an attempt to clarify some misconceptions of * * Wittgenstein concerning his views on definition in * * traditional aesthetics. I argue that Weitz fails to note a * * fundamental ambiguity in Wittgenstein's discussion of the * * encompassing similarities of games, which is related in a * * similar way to the issue of why an encompassing feature * * common to all artworks is confused. I then criticize Weitz's * * view that the following of rules is basic to Wittgenstein's * * thought, for Weitz has ignored the vital role of practices * * in the INVESTIGATIONS as well as throughout our aesthetic * * discourse. I have also argued against Mandelbaum's claim * * that the notion of family resemblances in Wittgenstein * * concerns aspects of ames which are "directly exhibited," and * * another claim (similar to Weitz's) which assumes the notion * * of family resemblances to be a justificatory aspect of * * Wittgenstein's thought. I then offer what could be called an * * introduction to an examination of the aesthetic practice of * * our culture. * * * ***************************************************************** * * * Seltzer, Prof.Dr. Robert M. (1995) Wittgenstein on aesthetic * * practice: A critique of Weitz and Mandelbaum; in: * * Wittgenstein Studies 1/95, File: 09-1-95; hrsg. von * * K.-O. Apel, F. Börncke, N. Garver, B. McGuinness, P. Hacker, * * R. Haller, W. Lütterfelds, G. Meggle, C. Nyíri, K. Puhl, * * Th. Rentsch, A. Roser, J.G.F. Rothhaupt, J. Schulte, * * U. Steinvorth, P. Stekeler-Weithofer, W. Vossenkuhl * * (3 1/2'' Diskette) ISSN 0943-5727 * * * ***************************************************************** I. Wittgenstein and Weitz: Wittgenstein, in the initial passages of the INVESTIGATIONS, attempts to make two general points about language. First, he wants to emphasize the connection between language and the human activity in which it is embedded, and, second, he wants to stress the different roles and uses that words and expressions have in this form of life.*2* The analogy Wittgenstein uses for recognizing these two points about language is expressed through what he calls LANGUAGE- GAMES -- situations in which words are employed in certain, specified ways.*3* The game analogy, however, is not intended by Wittgenstein to promote a theory of language, for he explicitly denies that there is an ESSENCE of language, something common to all languages. Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, -- but that they are related to one another in many different ways.*4* In order to elucidate this view, he examines the use of the word "game." This examination culminates in the view that there is no single feature common to all games, and that they are instead linked together by a complex and indeterminate set of overlapping similarities which he describes as "family resemblances."*5* He warns that it is a mistake to assume that all games must have something in common, or else they would not be called games. He advises us, rather, to "look and see" whether there is, in fact, anything that they have in common.*6* Wittgenstein also attempts to demonstrate this by reminding us how concepts are taught (say) to children. One thing we always do when discussing a word is to ask how we were taught it...you get a rough approximation to what kind of language game is going to be played...*7* In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning of this word ("good" for instance)?*8* We do not in this sense teach children the concept of "game" by giving them definitions or a set of criteria which they may then use to identify games. Wittgenstein claims, rather, that we impart this concept by providing them with various examples of games, and that they then learn to call other things games because they are similar in one respect or another to some of those examples. How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine that we should describe GAMES to him, and we might add: "This AND SIMILAR THINGS are called 'games'."*9* And Weitz similarly agrees: If one asks what a game is, we pick out sample games, describe these, and add, "This and SIMILAR THINGS are called 'games'." This is all we need to say and indeed all any of us knows about games.*10* The application of these views of games to the problem of definition in traditional aesthetics seems clear. That is, if we cannot, in principle, provide a definition of "game" as something prior to the identification of games, then (perhaps) we do not need such a definition of "art" in order to identify art.*11* The word "art" would thus be applied to an object because it bears some resemblance to some pre-approved standard, just as "game" can be applied to an activity because it possesses a resemblance to some example of game.*12* Weitz thus concludes: The problem of the nature of art is like that of the nature of games, at least in these respects: If we actually look and see what it is that we call 'art', we will find no common properties - - only strands of similarities. Knowing what art is is not apprehending some manifest or latent essence but being able to recognize, describe, and explain those things we call 'art' in virtue of these similarities.*13* However, one should take a closer look at Wittgenstein's discussion of games before one makes this conclusion. That is, it seems right to deter those who demand that there MUST be something common to all games or they would not be called games. However, Wittgenstein's advice that we "look and see" whether there is anything common to all games requires further analysis. If its meaning were clear, the question, "Do all games have something in common?" could very well be asked. But it should be noted that according to Wittgenstein's own criteria this question as it stands is ambiguous. To Wittgenstein, in order to understand a question (or sentence), one first must know how to use it, and, second, know what it is being used to do in a particular situation. For a LARGE class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.*14* The question which asks what a group of things has in common is one that is perfectly possible to understand, so long as a particular context is recognized; for the sense of a question (to Wittgenstein) is a function of context. Do I understand this sentence? Do I understand it just as I should if I heard it in the course of a narrative? If it were set down in isolation I should say, I don't know what it's about. But all the same I should know how this sentence might perhaps be used; I could myself invent a context for it.*15* These remarks on the importance of context are intended to raise doubts about the sense of a general kind of question which asks for similarities and differences in games. That is, if all games DO have something in common, then it would surely be intelligible to ask what that is; and if ALL games have something in common, then any TWO games must have something in common, which would again always lead to an intelligible question. It would always be in order, then, to ask how game A is like game B.*16* However, consider two examples. Imagine an Englishman who knows rugby well, but who has only a rough understanding of American football, and who is asking for some similarities and differences between rugby and football. We would answer this inquiry by noting similarities (such as running) for both games, and pointing out certain differences (such as football permitting forward passes). That is, there would be enough points of contact between both games to adequately understand and answer this question. But now suppose that we are asked how football is like Pachisi.*17* The question as it stands possesses no clear sense, and most likely stems from the misunderstanding that Pachisi is some type of Hindu football. That is, the type of explanation given to the Englishman would not suffice here. It would not make much sense to respond, "In football a team is given four attempts to advance the ball ten yards, but in Pachisi..." It would rather be appropriate to respond, "But it's not that type of game." In other words, we would explain enough about both games to understand why the question was confused.*18* It may be objected that an answer could well in fact be given, such as to point out that both involve winning and losing. This point might be granted, although a context would have to be specified in which such an answer would be appropriate. In the absence of any such context we might as well ask how the number two is like the ocean.*19* For [such a question] makes no sense without some more precise determination. One cannot tell from these words alone whether any [question] at all is meant -- nor what kind of [question].*20* But someone who asks such a question is overlooking the fact that [this] only makes sense in a language-game. Hence, that we should have to ask: what would such a [question] be like?, and don't understand this straight off.*21* Thus, it is not always sufficient just to compare two games in search of similarities or differences. But it follows that if THAT type of comparison is not always intelligible, then doubt is raised concerning the intelligibility of the claim that ALL games have something in common. And this latter point is important, for it also raises doubt concerning Wittgenstein and his DENIAL that all games have something in common.*22* That is, if we are supposed to "look and see" whether all games have something in common, then there must be some further specification to the looking that would determine what would count as a candidate for "something to be in common." Without specifying this, we would neither know what we are looking for, nor what would count as finding it.*23* Thus, were we to deny that all games have something in common, it is not clear what we are denying without this determination -- i.e., this kind of looking cannot be some contextless activity, as Weitz assumed. Weitz is therefore confused because he has assumed an answer to a question which itself was confused. That is, it would not be expedient to answer the question whether all works of art have something in common in the negative until the sense of the claim being denied is made clear, which is overlooked by Weitz. There is also another criticism of Weitz to consider -- namely, that of ignoring the relationship of language to activities and practices.*24* Consider the view expressed by Weitz: Indeed, the root problem of philosophy itself is to explain the relation between the employment of certain kinds of concepts and the conditions under which they can be CORRECTLY applied.*25* Thus, in aesthetics, our first problem is the elucidation of the actual employment of the concept of art, to give a logical description of the actual functioning of the concept, including a description of the conditions under which we CORRECTLY use it or its correlates.*26* I can list some cases and some conditions under which I can apply CORRECTLY the concept of art but I cannot list all of them, for the all-important reason that unforeseeable or novel conditions are always forthcoming or envisageable.*27* Specifically, the [primary task of aesthetics] is to describe the conditions under which we employ the concept CORRECTLY.*28* Now contrast this view with Wittgenstein: We talked of a correctness. A good cutter won't use any words except words like 'Too long', 'All right'. When we talk of a symphony of Beethoven we don't talk of correctness...*29* A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not COMMAND A CLEAR VIEW of the use of our words. -- Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing INTERMEDIATE CASES.*30* That is, Weitz's concern is still with the inherent LOGIC of concepts and directed towards describing the CRITERIA of use for such expressions -- i.e., when we apply the concept "correctly" -- and the result of this is the NEGATIVE outcome.*31* On Weitz's interpretation, the concept of an aesthetic practice would be neatfully defined by so clearly circumscribed rules that they should be appealed to in teaching how to engage in practices and correcting behavior of those who take part in them. That is, instead of describing the language (thus the aesthetic practice) in which we engage, Weitz instead drew very narrow boundaries for WHEN we could say WHAT with WHICH expression -- and this account does not contribute to something which Wittgenstein thought to be a "perspicuous representation" of the use of language in aesthetic situations and practices. (If I had to say what is the main mistake made by the philosophers of the present generation, including Moore, I would say that when language is looked at, what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made of the form of words.)*32* In order to get clear about aesthetic words you have to describe ways of living.*33* What belongs to a language-game is a whole culture.*34* In other words, Weitz overlooked the fact that playing games is a human ACTIVITY, and its existence presupposes common reactions, abilities, and faculties. The activities may be RULE-GOVERNED -- a move in the game may only be understood as a move within the CONTEXT of a game -- but the PRACTICE, not the rules themselves, is elementary in Wittgenstein's thinking.*35* Yielding to the temptation that the following of rules is a primary function is an all too narrow conception of Wittgenstein's idea of grammar.*36* II. Wittgenstein and Mandelbaum: The belief that there is a problem about determining what is to count as a candidate for all games having "something in common" is also suggested by Mandelbaum, though Mandelbaum argues rather differently. For him the problem is not a matter of intelligibility, but rather of where to look for the defining property. If, then, it is possible that the analogy of family resemblances could tell us something about how games may be related to one another, one should explore the possibility that, in spite of their great dissimilarities, games may possess a common attribute which, like a biological connection, is not itself one among their DIRECTLY EXHIBITED characteristics.*37* Mandelbaum believes that Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance is inadequate to explain the application of general words.*38* He notes that in his description of games Wittgenstein refers only to aspects which are "directly exhibited" and on this basis of "directly exhibited" aspects there are no grounds for distinguishing, say, fortune-telling from specific games of patience; that is, something else must be present. What would seem to be crucial in our designation of an activity as a game is, therefore, not merely a matter of noting a number of specific resemblances between it and other activities which we denote as games, but involves something further.*39* In the case of what he believes to be a real family resemblance there is a "nonexhibited" link that connects all the family members, namely a genetic relation.*40* In the case of games an analogous nonexhibited feature may be found, perhaps, in the purposes and intentions of those who invent and play games.*41* This view, however, misunderstands Wittgenstein in two ways. First, Mandelbaum assumes that the similarities compiled under the "family resemblance" label must be directly exhibited ones. His only justification is the examples Wittgenstein mentions when he describes games. Mandelbaum, however, fails to recognize that Wittgenstein also applies the family resemblance metaphor to NUMBERS. And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has a -- direct -- relationship with several things that have hitherto been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things we call the same name.*42* That is, even if the idea of a directly exhibited property is a vague one, and regardless of where we decide to draw the line designating exhibited properties, it would seem as though numerical properties would surely lie beyond these; what would, after all, be an exhibited property of a number? To suppose that the various kinds of mathematical entities that are called numbers are so-called without reference to their abstract and theoretical concerns simply misses the point.*43* Mandelbaum's second misunderstanding concerns the role that the metaphor of a family resemblance plays in Wittgenstein's thinking. He believes that the notion of a family resemblance is supposed to provide a CRITERION for the application of a general word to a particular instance, which is shown in his example of laying out cards to tell fortunes. Were you to see me shuffling a pack of cards, arranging the cards in piles...etc., you might say: "I see you are playing cards. What game are you playing?" However, to this I might answer: "I am not playing a game; I am telling (or reading) fortunes." Will the resemblances between what you have seen me doing and the characteristics of card games with which you are familiar permit you to contradict me and say that I am indeed playing some sort of game?*44* Mandelbaum seems to be thinking of a specific type of case on the analogy of identifying members of a family -- i.e., where "family resemblance" is employed in reference to ancestry. The criterion of belonging to a certain family is, of course, the blood heritage, and that is what allows one to distinguish those who are really descendants from those who are not. It is only because we have this criterion of family membership that we can begin to map out specific family resemblances. That is, we can look for a "family resemblance" among the members of some family only if we have a criterion of what would count as membership to that family; and the family resemblance itself clearly cannot function as that criterion. However, as we have seen in the case of family resemblances, what constitutes a FAMILY is not defined in terms of the manifest features of a random group of people; we must first characterize the FAMILY relationship in terms of genetic ties, and then observe to what extent those who are connected in this way RESEMBLE one another.*45* This criticism might be correct for family resemblances of certain kinds, but it does not apply to Wittgenstein. That is, Wittgenstein does not use the analogy of family resemblances as a criterion for recognizing individuals as members of a class, or as a rule for "extending" a concept to cover new cases, as Mandelbaum assumes. Instead, the use of a common name is GROUNDED in the criss- crossing and overlapping of resembling features among otherwise heterogeneous objects and activities.*46* Nonetheless, I do not believe that his doctrine of family resemblances, as it stands, provides an adequate analysis of WHY a common name, such as "game," is in all cases applied or withheld.*47* Wittgenstein's analogy of family resemblances does not provide an adequate analysis of why a common name gets applied or withheld because it plays NO JUSTIFICATORY ROLE in his thinking at all. It belongs, rather, to a DESCRIPTION of language, what could even be called a historical account of language. Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regularization of language -- as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistance. The language-games are rather set up as OBJECTS OF COMPARISON which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities.*48* That is, when Wittgenstein asks: Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has a -- direct -- relationship with several things that have hitherto been called numbers... emphasis has to be placed on the word "we" for here he is describing a PRACTICE, what we, that is, mathematicians, have done and do. In other words, to say that numbers, games, or works of art are linked by family resemblances is to say that if we examine the various things called by those names -- i.e., if we examine our PRACTICE in using those words, we find no feature common to all, but instead various patterns of similarity. It is to say NOTHING about how any individual is identified as a member of some class nor what would count as introducing or excluding a member.*49* Mandelbaum, in thinking that Wittgenstein viewed family resemblances as being a GROUND for making judgments, has (like Weitz) ignored the chief aspect of Wittgenstein's thought -- that of PRACTICES -- and how these relate to Wittgenstein's thoughts on examination, description, and understanding. A Wittgensteinian examination in this sense would not need an adequate ground because it would not be JUSTIFYING anything; i.e., Wittgenstein simply takes as GIVEN the practice, and then proceeds to describe the variety of ways in which we behave and act in our aesthetic discourse. III. Conclusions: It is clear that we call things numbers, games, and art for different and varying reasons, and I have argued that we do not have an independent criterion of membership that can be invoked in all cases. What we do have, however, is the fact that these things are CALLED numbers, games, art -- i.e., we do have the language and that means the practice of dealing with these things -- and for Wittgenstein that is enough to get an investigation going. A typical investigation of this sort would in part examine the aesthetic practice of our culture, and would erect an overall view of the conditions for the possibility of acquiring and using concepts in the aesthetical sphere of life. It would have to reveal what kind of fundamental structures are embedded in our ways of dealing with works of art, and what kind of categories are at work when we react aesthetically towards them -- i.e., when we talk of the evaluation and appreciation of particular objects. It would, in other words, investigate the variety of presuppositions, kinds of knowledges, skills, and attitudes that are constitutive of our aesthetic experiences. It would assume as given (and, through different contexts, would distinguish between) PARTICULAR aesthetic practices, particular KINDS of aesthetic practices, THE aesthetic practice of our culture, and the relations of family resemblance between the members of each level as well as between the levels. For the meaning of these evaluative concepts would be anchored in the language-game in which these resemblances would occur. This would not be a peculiarity of aesthetic concepts, but would be true for all words. Finally, it would completely dismiss any notion of some all- encompassing definition as being unclear. The very idea of a definition in this investigation would be a confused one; for, it would not be clear what would possibly count as a defining property of aesthetic objects, and we would not know what could intelligibly be said to be a candidate to play the role of an aesthetically encompassing property. To the PHILOSOPHICAL question: "Is the visual image of this tree composite, and what are its component parts?" the correct answer is: "That depends on what you mean by 'composite'." (And that is of course not an answer but a rejection of the question. The problems which definitions were supposed to solve would in this investigation be practical ones to which definition would not apply. Wittgenstein did not think that the evaluation and appreciation of art was a simple affair, and seeing the complicated ways in which we use our evaluative terms of our aesthetical language it might be even said that Wittgenstein wanted to save aesthetic evaluation from mere slogan using.*51* However, much is clear concerning his thoughts on what we should look for -- NOT the essential definitions of our evaluative terms, but the family resemblances between their diverse uses. NOTES *1* The following abbreviations are used: PI, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS; OC, ON CERTAINTY; LA, LECTURES ON AESTHETICS; Tilghman(1), BUT IS IT ART?; Tilghman(2), WITTGENSTEIN: ETHICS AND AESTHETICS. All of these works are cited by the abbreviation and then either the passage number or the page number. All other authors are cited by the author's name and then the page number of the work. *2* See PI, 1, 51. *3* Ibid, 7. *4* Ibid, 65. *5* Ibid, 67. *6* Ibid, 66. *7* LA, p.1. *8* PI, 77. *9* PI, 69. *10* Weitz, p.174. *11* See Tilghman(2), pp.11ff. *12* See Johannessen, P.111. *13* Weitz, pp.174-5. *14* PI, 43. *15* Ibid, 525. The sentence Wittgenstein refers to is: "After he said this, he left her as he did the day before." *16* See PI, 71-73; also Tilghman(1), pp.28, 34. *17* Tilghman(1) pp.28-9; see also PI, 66. *18* PI, 189, 513, 525, 527. *19* Tilghman(1), pp.27-8. That one would most likely take this type of question for a RIDDLE is clearly important -- for this sheds light on what is being asked for. *20* OC, 372. *21* Ibid, 24. *22* See OC, 4. *23* PI, 153. *24* I am for the purposes of this discussion defining a "practice" thus: "A habitual way of acting; a habit, custom; the doing something repeatedly or continuously by way of study; exercise in any art, handicraft, etc. for the purpose, or with the result, of attaining proficiency; hence, the practical acquaintance with or experience in a subject or process, so gained."(O.E.D) In addition, a practice would presuppose or involve the use of language in some way or other. *25* Weitz, pp.173-4, emphasis mine. *26* Ibid, p.174, emphasis mine. *27* Ibid, p.175, emphasis mine. *28* Ibid, p.177, emphasis mine. *29* LA, pp.7-8. *30* PI, 122. *31* Mandelbaum also offers a similar criticism of Weitz: "...[W]e must note that the concern of [such] writers has not been to show that family resemblances do in fact exist among the various arts, or among various works of art; on the contrary, they have used the doctrine of family resemblances in a NEGATIVE fashion."(p.187) *32* LA, p.2. *33* Ibid, p.11. *34* Ibid, p.8. *35* If one takes the rules as being elementary, one gets the following picture. The identity of (say) the practice of playing chess would according to this analysis be fully determined when all the rules of chess are listed and made known to the participants. But this is clearly not enough; for one is still lacking an answer to the question: How do we know that chess is a game? None of the rules of chess says anything to this effect. To get the answer to this question one has to look at the ways in which we behave towards those who engage in the practice of playing chess; see also PI, 54, 68, and OC, 139. *36* It would also have difficulty explaining the diverging aspects of language. That is, it would be hard to conceive of a language which could actually change, while at the same time sticking to strict accounts of what to say and when to say it -- i.e., it would seem any variant would automatically be labeled as being wrong and discouraged. *37* Mandelbaum, p.185, emphasis mine. *38* Ibid, p.186. *39* Ibid, p.183. *40* Ibid, p.184. *41* Ibid, p.185. *42* PI, 67. *43* Mandelbaum also thinks that Wittgenstein himself presupposed a genetic connection between family resemblances: "Although Wittgenstein failed to make explicit the fact that a genetic connection was involved in his notion of 'family resemblances', I think that he did presuppose such a connection."(p.184n.) But I believe this is very unlikely, for it would seem as though such a connection would entail an ESSENCE of language, something common to all things which we call language -- which I doubt Wittgenstein would accept. *44* Mandelbaum, p.183. *45* Ibid, p.185. *46* Ibid, p.182, emphasis mine. *47* Ibid, emphasis mine. *48* PI, 130. *49* Tilghman(1), pp.45-6. *50* PI, 47. *51* See LA, p.11. BIBLIOGRAPHY Johannessen, Kjell S. "Language, Art, and Aesthetic Practice," in WITTGENSTEIN: AESTHETICS AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY, Johannessen and Nordenstam, eds. (Massachusettes: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981). Mandelbaum, Maurice. "Family Resemblances and Generalization Concerning the Arts," in PROBLEMS IN AESTHETICS, Morris Weitz, ed. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1970). Tilghman, B.R. BUT IS IT ART? (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984). -----------. WITTGENSTEIN: ETHICS AND AESTHETICS (London: Macmillan Press, 1991). Weitz, Morris. "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," in PROBLEMS IN AESTHETICS, Morris Weitz, ed. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1970). Wittgenstein, Ludwig. LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS ON AESTHETICS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF, Cyril Barrett, ed. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975). --------------------. ON CERTAINTY (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1969). --------------------. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1968). --------------- e-mail: * rs5651@csc.albany.edu *