***************************************************************** * * Titel: Going Back to the Religious Beginning Autor: Michael *Lotti* (University of Wales, Swansea University of Copenhagen, Denmark) Dateiname: 19-2-97.TXT Dateilänge: 52 KB Erschienen in: Wittgenstein Studies 2/97, Datei: 19-2-97.TXT; hrsg. von K.-O. Apel, N. Garver, B. McGuinness, P. Hacker, R. Haller, W. Lütterfelds, G. Meggle, C. Nyíri, K. Puhl, R. Raatzsch, T. Rentsch, J.G.F. Rothhaupt, J. Schulte, U. Steinvorth, P. Stekeler-Weithofer, W. 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Those articles and excerpts from * * articles which the subscriber wishes to use for his own * * private academic purposes are excluded from this * * restrictions. * * * ***************************************************************** This essay is more about Kierkegaard than Wittgenstein. I intend to show that two philosophical principles of Wittgenstein's are carried out very clearly in Kierkegaard's writings, particularly in the two attributed to Johannes Climacus the EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES. The principles are procedural in nature. The first has to do with the way one's philosophical attention should be focused. It can be stated like this: pay attention to the concrete, the physical, and the particular when doing philosophy. The second principle might be called "the stopping principle". In ZETTEL *1* Wittgenstein writes, "Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical investigation: the difficulty -- I might say -- is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. 'We have already said everything.--Not anything that follows from this, no, THIS itself is the solution! "This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it. "The difficulty here is: to stop." (§ 314) As principles, these two are stated rather easily. As is clear from Wittgenstein's writings, however, they can be very difficult to put into practice. There are many, many examples of Wittgenstein putting these principles into practice -- or, at least, struggling to do so. In order to get to Kierkegaard, I will limit myself to one example. It is from ZETTEL, and it provides the context for the above quote. It should be familiar to anyone who has read PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. Wittgenstein writes about following a rule, and focuses his thoughts on a rather straightforward example of this: continuing a series of digits. He suggests that this act initially happens ONLY in reference to examples and not to any rule. (§295) For example, a teacher begins, "2, 4, 6, 8...what's next?" The student says, "13". The teacher responds, "No, it goes like this: 10, 12, 14, 16...". The student writes it down and the teacher tries again and again until the student has grasped the rule and can continue the series on his own. Now in order to account for this, it looks like the rule must have primacy over the teacher's action. Being guided by an action seems to be a less reliable form of guidance than a rule.(§ 296) The rule seems to GOVERN the actions of the teacher and the student, and it seems odd to think that an unjustified action could accomplish this feat. So now it seems that the investigation must focus on the unique, transcendent "existence" of this rule. From whence does it come, and from whence does it get its rare power? Wittgenstein brings us back to earth, back to the actions of the teacher and the student. With regard to the "guidance" of the rule, he asks if recognizing this is in any way separable from the actual writing of the numbers in the proper order.(§ 296) And THIS only occurs by example. The action of showing someone which number comes next establishes the rule, or "forms the substratum for the meaning of algebraic rules or what is like them".(§ 300) Any appeal to the rule only occurs after one has learned to go on in this way by rote: "I teach him to continue a series (basic series) without using any expression of the 'law of the series'". (§ 300) The action is not itself the product of reasoning, nor can it be categorized as "reasonable" or "unreasonable"; it establishes the basis for what we call mathematical reasoning.(§ 301) By focusing on the actions and reactions of the teacher and student, Wittgenstein has reversed the normal philosophical priorities. The rule gets its sense from the unquestioned and unjustified action, not the other way around. As he says, "at THIS level the expression of the rule is explained by the value, not the value by the rule." (§ 301) This leads to the second principle. Suppose someone pressed the issue. "How is it possible for human beings to grasp rules?" It seems like the answer better be good, for it has to account for the remarkable consistency of the application of the rule among many different individuals.(§ 299) For Wittgenstein, however, there is no further justification than the learned operation and the shared ability among human beings to "go on in the same way". This may seem like a statement of the obvious, but perhaps it is profound just because it does not try to say more. Any attempt to get behind the action to find the "real" rule will fail, for the only thing that counts as the rule is the action of putting numbers on paper in the proper order. So that is where one must stop, and all one can say is something like "THIS is how we think.THIS is how we act. THIS is how we talk about it." (§ 309) This stopping point is a philosophical one. To explain what I mean by this, let us first note that all sorts of other questions CAN be asked at this point. What kinds of teaching enable students of mathematics to grasp and apply rules more quickly? Is there a correlation between the grasping of a rule and a student's language-development? Is there any discernible brain-chemistry that accompanies the ability to grasp and apply a rule? And so on. With regard to brain chemistry, Wittgenstein says that "this is not our concern" (§ 304), and I suspect that he would say the same for the other questions. He does not say that they are NOBODYS concern. For a philosopher, however, they are beside the point. Such questions are only asked if the concepts associated with following a mathematical rule are in place. The answers to such questions -- even ones associated with brain chemistry -- do not provide a ground for the rule. Giving an account of the logic of the rule, at least in Wittgenstein's instance, is the domain of the philosopher, and that means an examination of the rule itself and not the questions that can occur POST FACTO. But such a practice comes to an end. The difficulty, according to Wittgenstein, is in recognizing that you are at the end, philosophically speaking. If you go on -- as you can -- then don't confuse the new questions with philosophical ones. This brings me to another point, which will figure into my next two sections. Underlying this examples is a particular view of the philosophical enterprise. To go back to ZETTEL § 314, Wittgenstein emphasizes the need to be satisfied with a description rather than an explanation. We might call this approach to philosophy CONTEMPLATIVE. *2* It is the attempt to see and describe things clearly as an end unto itself. The idea goes all the way back to Plato, who talked about the importance of "giving an account". Unlike Plato, however, Wittgenstein had no pretensions about what philosophy would do for him or for anyone else. The struggle to "give an account" is not necessarily intertwined with ethical struggles (as in the PHAEDO) or the ability to rule (as in the REPUBLIC), nor is it foundational for anything. The practices of teaching basic mathematics, learning language, developing musical taste, and so on do not DEPEND UPON philosophical clarification. If anything, it is the other way around: accounting for such practices depends on them already being in place. The philosophical attitude must be one of wonder, or something akin to it. Again to go back to ZETTEL §317, the point is to produce the appropriate description and "dwell on it" -- not get behind it by attempting to justify the practices in question. We can now turn to Kierkegaard. I will first look at the POSTSCRIPT, where Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus presents a similar view of the philosophical enterprise. Then I will turn to the UPBUILDING DISCOURSES, where I think these principles are applied in startling fashion. Johannes Climacus and Philosophy In the POSTSCRIPT, Johannes Climacus is primarily interested in thinking about human ethicality and religiosity, and not about what might be described as the issues of logical analytic philosophy: the meanings of words, the foundations of mathematics, the "logic of our language", and the logic of logic itself.*3* Like Wittgenstein, however, he emphasizes the need to focus on the concrete when thinking about ethics and religion in human life. Also like Wittgenstein, he is particularly suspicious of abstraction that forgets about the ordinary ways of speaking and living. It is in the light of such principles that he can get back to the religious beginning, philosophically speaking, without going further. Let us now see how he does this. We should begin with one point that is fundamental for Climacus: he thinks that each and every human existence can be "filled out", or formed according to a pattern.*4* What troubles him most is the tacit (and sometimes not-so-tacit) claim that the process of thinking, clarifying, and eliminating ambiguities -- in short, of philosophizing -- just is the struggle to form one's existence, with it also being taken for granted that the highest expression of such understanding is in terms of philosophical abstraction and objectivity. Such a picture never deals with the lone individual's question when confronted with what he or she understands: "How am I to relate to the knowledge and understanding that I have?" *5* As Climacus repeatedly complains, such an approach assumes that individual appropriation is then "automatically included as part of the bargain". *6* For Climacus, however, it is precisely the appropriation which we ought to pay attention to. The concrete individual, who needs to relate to his or her knowledge in some way, has been ignored. But to stop here is to see only part of Climacus' point about paying attention to the concrete. If the problem was simply that no one was attending to the difficulties of appropriation, then the solution is, well, academic: some philosopher needs to fill in this gap, and someone needs to cheer the rest of the philosophical troops on so that all of the individuals concerned about their subjective existence can get the objective truth that they need. But Climacus not only thinks it important to attend to the concrete human life, but also the concrete IN human life. Only then can we hope to understand human religiosity and get back to the religious beginning. For Climacus, that which is IN CONCRETO is that in which we all unquestioningly exist, what we might call the substratum of human life. The ability to think abstractly is JUST ONE of the many things that make up this substratum. In particular, Climacus emphasizes that the human passions, emotions and their accompanying vocabulary are just as basic to human existence as the ability to think abstractly. As such, they are not meant to be surmounted or supplanted by abstract thought. Abstract thought which forgets the concrete in which it itself occurs is inevitably "absentminded". It is no surprise, then, that Climacus is critical of the claim that abstract thinking can eliminate doubt and provide the grounds for meaningful discourse. *7* Climacus asks, where does such abstraction end? In and of itself, it never does. At some point, he says, "resolution" must come into the picture: people stop justifying their thinking (if they started justifying it in the first place) and go on living. As usual, he gets this across while having some fun: "It is very odd -- the Hegelians, who in logic know that reflection is stopped by itself ..., know for daily use, however, when they are pleasant people, when they are like the rest of us (only more learned and gifted, etc., something I shall always be willing to admit) -- they know that reflection can be stopped only by a leap." *8* Climacus makes the same important observation as Wittgenstein: none of us has to stop and justify our everyday thinking and speaking, and philosophical abstraction will not do it for us. There is no justification: we simply go on, like "pleasant people" -- not a very academic category, to say the least. The starting point of thinking, then, is not "nothing" or "being" or "doubt", but the range of concepts, passions, and emotions with which we are all familiar in our concrete existence. Climacus' thinks that communicating about the ethical and religious with attention to this concrete framework requires a particular type of writing. For him, the other books in the pseudonymous corpus meet this challenge by having pseudonymous authors who speak as existing individuals within the context of existence.*9* They are not didactic nor are they prescriptive. Rather, they are like portraits of people reflecting as existing "I's". Their thoughts cover a wide range of topics and often involve a considerable amount of abstraction, but this always takes place in and among a rich panoply of passions and emotions. They bring out the "dialectic" of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious modes of life in a kind of literary way by showing individuals in the midst of these modes. Climacus' own PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS is an example of such "existential" thinking which is specifically meant to make clear the religious beginning. He begins by engaging in a "thought- project", but after Chapter 1 he begins writing a "poem" of sorts. He describes the non-Socratic (and obviously Christian) hypothesis in terms of a king's love for a lowly maiden and his desire for her to love him in return. It is tempting to think that this "poem" is, like many philosophical examples, an aid to the understanding that can be disposed of once the point is understood. But it is far from this. By using such a story, Climacus brings the claim about the god-man back to its concrete, existential roots. There is NO SENSE to this claim apart from the emotions and passions of falling in love, discovering that you are loved, being willing to sacrifice everything, feeling guilty, and so on. If these possibilities are not alive for a human being, then the claim about the god-man, and all of the associated vocabulary like "sin", "rebirth", the fulness of time", etc. -- will be similarly dead. Likewise, one does not need to be a philosopher to understand such terms and their implications. One needs to understand the poem. This brings me to a point that is not really addressed by Wittgenstein, but was of great importance, I think, to Kierkegaard and Climacus. The primacy of the "poem" in FRAGMENTS does not mean that there is no intellectual rigor that can, or even ought, to accompany the "poem". *10* Chapter 3 and the Interlude of FRAGMENTS are densely philosophical and very difficult to follow, but both are intimately related to the possible truth of the "poem". In Chapter 3, Climacus attempts to show that the claim about the god-man is "paradoxical", which means at least that it cannot be conceived as an ERGO at the end of a long chain of speculation. In the Interlude, he argues that there is no necessity in history, which strengthens Climacus assertion that the claim about the god-man is paradoxical, for it is precisely the claim that God, who by definition is "necessary" and eternal, became a particular man, which by definition means that he was historical, unnecessary, and contingent. But with both of these rigorously intellectual sections of FRAGMENTS, Climacus goes out of his way to label them so as to make them seem unimportant. Chapter 3 is "A Metaphysical Caprice", and the Interlude is just that: an "interlude" to pass the time. *11* This subverts the expectation that the intellectual work ought to be primary, establishing the objective truth of a claim and leaving everything else to follow "as a matter of course". The philosophy or "metaphysics" does not establish anything on its own. Rather, it takes place within a context where passions and emotions like love and the need for redemption are in fact primary. The same thing can be said of the POSTSCRIPT. Climacus is often very abstract and intellectual in this work, but this always occurs with reference to the passions and emotions familiar to all human beings. At times, one might even say, Climacus is not just content to talk about the passions and emotions, but wants to invoke them. Two of the longer vignettes -- one about a man mourning his son, the other about a religious person going to an amusement park -- explore the meaning of passionate faith by showing how it arises in such familiar emotions and ordinary pursuits. Over and over again (as in FRAGMENTS), Climacus reminds the reader of the very real passion lovers feel for one another as a way of illuminating the similar passion at the root of the religious life. Historical figures such as Lessing, Queen Elizabeth, Napoleon, and Socrates makes their appearance as Climacus attempts to unfold the rich and varied human context in which ethicality and religiousness have their meaning. There is room, then, for thinking abstractly and being intellectual with regard to religiousness, so long as it is understood that this does not DEFINE the context of religiosity. In attempting to understand and communicate about religiosity in this way, Climacus shows that he has a conception of the philosophical enterprise that is similar to Wittgenstein's. Philosophy is always subordinate to existence in the sense that it is always answerable to it and the distinctions that arise from it -- with special attention to those things which arrive WITHOUT FOUNDATION OR EXPLANATION. The work of a "dialectician" (read: philosopher) is, at least, to pay attention to this framework that is irreducibly IN CONCRETO. It is not in the business of justifying concepts or the use of them. The dialectician makes absolute distinctions *12*, bringing terms and concepts essentially rooted in existence back to their existential roots. This is one reason why Climacus describes himself as a "humourist." Among other things, the humourist's goal "lies behind" in recollection. *13* His goal in writing is just that: to recollect that which is already there. One might even say "contemplate". It is not to create a system or to be part of a world-historical enterprise. *14* Such a conception of the philosophical or intellectual enterprise can be difficult to embrace, for with suc a conception, it seems as if philosophy establishes nothing on its own, is therefore unimportant or unnecessary. With great consistency, Climacus says that, indeed, his work may not be needed by anyone. He says that he wrote FRAGMENTS for others only insofar as they find it useful *15*, and in POSTSCRIPT he says that it was written only for himself. *16* He speculates that those who would be most likely to benefit from the POSTSCRIPT, then, are those who "... because of much knowledge...have entirely forgotten what it means to EXIST and what INWARDNESS is." *17* Similarly, Climacus says he wrote FRAGMENTS with people in mind who "know too much" and have thereby lost a "primitive impression" of Christianity. *18* But in the end, Climacus never claims to offer anything except a more existential understanding of human ethicality and religiosity, and again with great consistency, he never equates the possession of such understanding with actually being or becoming anything in particular (except, of course, more knowledgeable). Lest anyone misunderstand this, Climacus revokes the POSTSCRIPT at the end of that work. *19* There are lots of things going on here, but it at least serves to cancel any authority a reader might be inclined to bestow upon Climacus and his impressive intellect, and it provides a clear example of someone for whom understanding Christianity does not equal becoming a Christian. In fact, it does not equal anything in particular. The UPBUILDING DISOURSES and the Religious Beginning A. The UPBUILDING DISCOURSES are not philosophical in the way that Wittgenstein's and Climacus' works are philosophical. In 1851, Kierkegaard wrote that all of his works are religious in one way or another, but the UPBUILDING DISCOURSES are directly religious. *20* By this he meant that they obviously and straightforwardly try to engage the reader in a religious direction, so that faith -- or, at least, the possibility of faith -- is awakened. Wittgenstein and Climacus, on the other hand, certainly wish to engage the reader, but toward a contemplative end and not a religious one. *21* Another end is possible, of course. One can read the POSTSCRIPT or CULTURE AND VALUE (for instance) and, in coming to understand "the religious" better, also become a more religious person. But with reference to Wittgenstein and Climacus, this would be accidental. They do not write or design their works in hopes of converting their readers. It is my contention, however, that while the UPBUILDING DISCOURSES cannot be read as philosophical works, they can be read philosophically. And in this case, I mean that they can be read so as to see Kierkegaard's understanding of the religious beginning, and to show how he avoids "going further". Kierkegaard's "religious beginning" cannot be drawn out directly. Kierkegaard takes no direct position on this issue, nor does he argue for one. If he did, he would interfere with the religious aim of the UPBUILDING DISCOURSES.*22* In order to see where the religious beginning lies for Kierkegaard, we must then focus not on the direction the discourses point TO, but the standpoint FROM WHICH THEY BEGIN. We must keep in mind, however, these are not mutually exclusive endeavors. For as is evident in these discourses, Kierkegaard correctly perceived that directing a person toward religious development is often a matter of getting them back to the proper starting point. In this essay, I will refer only to three of the eighteen discourses compiled first in 1845, and available in the English-speaking world as EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES. *23* Specifically, I will focus on the three which begin with a short passage from the Letter of James in the New Testament. In doing this, I am not saying that these three discourses can be understood as three parts of a larger discourse. Nor is every point I make about the "religious beginning" evident in each individual discourse. I refer to these three only to avoid the inevitable complications arising from dealing with more than one discourse AND more than one Biblical passage in the same essay. B. I will begin by quoting the verses in full: "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above and comes down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no change or shadow of variation. According to his counsel, he brought us forth by the word of truth, that we should be the first fruit of his creation. Therefore, my beloved brethren, let every man be quick to hear, slow to speak, slow to anger, because a man's anger does not work what is righteousness before God. Therefore put away all filthiness and all remnants of wickedness and receive with meekness the word that is implanted in you and that is powerful for making your souls blessed." (James 1:17-22) *24* It is surely a correct assumption that the discourses purport to explain the meaning of this verse to the reader and to persuade him or her of its truth. Then the question is: how ought this to be done? How ought a writer help a reader understand this passage? In the prefaces to these discourses, Kierkegaard emphasizes that the discourses are not sermons. If we use Climacus' words as a guide here, a sermon is different from every other religious discourse, for it is delivered with apostolic authority. *25* In other words, the pastor does not merely talk about God's Word, but proclaim his words as God's Word. He binds his listener by virtue of his office. And it is precisely this office, along with its authority, the Kierkegaard says that he does not possess. Likewise, Kierkegaard also says that he is no teacher, which again implies an authoritative relationship with the listener or reader, and one that is commonly -- and rightfully -- presumed within academia. Although we have not advanced very far into the discourses, we should pause and consider the importance of what Kierkegaard has indirectly said in these prefaces. He is calling into question the fairly common assumption that in order to understand the Bible -- or even just this little passage from the Letter of James -- one FIRST needs some sort of external authority. Perhaps it will be "the Church" which first guarantees the apostolicity of the words and thus the authority of the passage. Or perhaps it will be the academy which first guarantees, on the basis of much learning, that the verses are, indeed, reasonable, and perhaps even that one is LOGICALLY COMPELLED to accept them as true. But in disavowing any authority that might be assigned to him or to the discourses, Kierkegaard makes the READER important. The reader, standing alone, can enter into a direct dialogue with James and, possibly, with God. The "indirect communication" here is that the religious beginning is only made by one soul at a time, and that beginning religiously is made without reference to any external authority, be it from the church or academia. If there is to be any authority here, it should be God. And this is precisely what Kierkegaard's withdrawal facilitates: the possibility that the reader will be alone with God. This lone reader is the "single individual" that Kierkegaard writes so much about. *26* But perhaps this is jumping the gun a bit, for God is in fact never mentioned in any of the prefaces to the EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES. So at this point I will just say that Kierkegaard does not simply want the reader to be alone, but to be ALONE WITH THE DISCOURSE. If the "single individual" is important, then the meaning of the discourse only flowers as it has meaning to an individual reader. And this only occurs as the reader engages in the discourse or "talk" (TALER) and thus begins to have a conversation with it, something which sermons and lectures do not lend themselves to. We can also see, then, that Kierkegaard subtly denies that the reader is in need of any information that would come from a specialist to understand these verses, which is surely another common assumption. The reader is ready to engage in the discourse and the passage from James' letter merely by qualifying as a thinking human being. The prefaces in and of themselves do not tell us much about the religious beginning. For even with the withdrawal of any real or presumed religious or academic authority, the "single individual", standing alone with the verses from the Letter of James, can still be considered to be in an rather difficult position. James makes certain claims about God, and they can certainly seem to be eminently UNJUSTIFIED. If the challenge is to understand the verses in question, then it seems like the first task would be to analyze each proposition as it stands and determine its truth value. "God is good and perfect" -- is thus true? "God only gives good and perfect gifts" -- is this possible? In these discourses, however, Kierkegaard does not do anything remotely within the framework of such propositional analysis. He does not begin by entertaining doubts. He does not even assert any kind of thesis or position and then proceed to defend it. Indeed, he does not, strictly speaking, analyze anything at all, including the verses themselves! Instead, he asks the reader to consider certain modes of existence in relation to the verses. Or, to put it another way, he calls attention to the human passions and emotions that are naturally associated with the verses. Consider the first discourse. Kierkegaard first quotes the passage and praises it, and then reminds the reader that the verses are words that "carried an apostle through a turbulent life". *27* He then considers not the verses themselves, but how they might be received. They might be a) ignored because one lives an easy, happy, unreflective life; b) treated as yet one more thing to study and be done with; c) read wistfully by one who has been battered by the vicissitudes and unhappiness of life; or d) rejected in anger because God seems indifferent to suffering, and especially to one's own suffering. Only after these observations are in place does he go on to consider the verses themselves. And even then, his position -- that to understand God as a good and perfect giver is to receive EVERYTHING as a gift from God and thus with thankfulness -- is not defended, but articulated in terms of the reader's hopes, desires, disappointments, and potential joy. Kierkegaard's second discourse unfolds in much the same way. He seemingly bypasses the verses by calling to mind the emotional toll of doubt. Doubt, he says, leads people to a fragile arrogance in that they they begin to think that they can overcome all doubt on their own. But this is but a preliminary step toward a time when one learns that it is not possible to accomplish this. And then the possibility of goodness and perfection and of truth itself are called into question, and the result is anxiety and despair. He then goes on not to the verses from James, but to Matthew 7:11 and Luke:13, where Jesus asks, "If you, who are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your heavenly Father give good things to those who ask him?" *28* But this verse is not used to introduce God the good giver, but man the anxious and anguished doubter who, reflecting on the uncertainty of goodness in himself and the world, wonders if even God can give good gifts. Only then does Kierkegaard get to James 1:17-22 and articulate the claim that believing in God the good and perfect giver just is the opposite of looking at oneself and the world for goodness -- hence, it "comes from above". Nearly the whole of the third discourse is another example of beginning and remaining outside of a traditional analytical framework. Kierkegaard begins with the claim that all people are absolutely equal before God, but does not follow this up with the abstract discussion of natural rights that one might expect. Instead, he asks the reader to consider something rather mundane: the acts of giving and receiving. Kierkegaard then traces the many passions, emotions, and temptations associated with the many different ways of giving and receiving: the desire to set oneself above others via gift-giving, the bitterness one feels when being judges as inferior by another, the joy in receiving a gift, the peace in considering that God gives nothing but good and perfect gifts, the troubling doubts that surface when a gift turns out to do more harm than good, and so on. *29* Why does Kierkegaard think it so important to focus the reader's attention like this? First, it is obvious that for Kierkegaard, human passions and emotions are IMPORTANT. It is not just anyone who wrote these words, but someone who knew great "turbulence in life" (for example). And such turbulence is not set aside by the Biblical author in order to consider God. No, the verses have their sense WITHIN such turbulence. Only one who knows what a turbulent life is like can understand the verses -- or, at least, begin to understand them. The same would be true of knowing HOPE, DISAPPOINTMENT, PEACEFULNESS, BITTERNESS, ANXIETY, THANKFULNESS, and so on. And this is why such subjective modes of life are to be considered FIRST. They are ESSENTIALLY related to believing in God, not ACCIDENTALLY. The religious beginning is not made by quieting the passions, analyzing verses, and calmly seeking out the objective truth. Indeed, Kierkegaard indirectly states that if the possibility of being disappointed, the possibility of despair, the possibility of anger, etc., are not alive for an individual, then neither is the possibility of blessedness that might be bestowed via the verses. By focusing on the existential possibilities in relation to the verses instead of analyzing the verses themselves, Kierkegaard also draws the reader's attention back to "the single individual", which is of course the only category in which passions and emotions make sense. But he does something more. By vividly describing such possibilities for "the individual", he opens up the possibility that the reader's attention will be directed to himself or herself in self-examination: "How have I been relating to these verses? Am I wistful? Angry? Joyful?" This is shown to be no accident when one considers the frequent use of direct questions in all the discourses. As mentioned earlier, it is often presumed that the "objective" reader will engage himself or herself as soon as everything else is in order. *30* In the UPBUILDING DISCOURSES, Kierkegaard turns such a presumption around and indirectly states: it is only in the context of self-reflection that any genuine religious passion occurs. In other words, self reflection is an essential element of the religious beginning. The religious success of the UPBUILDING DISCOURSES -- or, for that matter, of any religious text -- turns not on the ability to analyze verses objectively, but in being able to ask, "Who am I?" There is a constant urgency in the texts, a perpetual sense that UNDERSTANDING the text is not the point of the text. The point is to change one's life religiously -- or, to be more precisely in line with Kierkegaard, to allow one's life to be changed by God. This nudges the reader back to the beginning which is self-examination, and self-examination does not start with an abstract theory, but with a whole range of concepts and, most importantly, a willingness to consider oneself in light of them. As Climacus would put it, Kierkegaard in this way does not allow God to become an object or a "third party" in the discussion, *31* for the religious beginning is precisely one where God is not someone or something to think about, but someone to whom one is answerable to -- and thus the emphasis on thinking about ONESELF IN RELATION TO GOD. We can also note that by calling attention to the passions, desires, and emotions, Kierkegaard does not use any concepts that would be foreign to any reader. In doing this, Kierkegaard has managed to put Johannes Climacus' principles into practice and avoid any "absentminded" abstraction. But it is also important to note that he is again indirectly saying that the religious beginning is available to everyone. One does not need to be especially learned or a specialist in New Testament Greek (to use but one example). One needs to be a human being and self-reflective. As such, we can again see why there is no need for external authority at the religious beginning. If such possibilities are somehow not understandable to the individual reader, then any appeal to an external authority will accomplish nothing with regard to the nurturing of the reader's religiosity. C. Kierkegaard goes to no pains in these discourses to defend this context of the emotions and passions, and that again may make it seem like his work is lacking in intellectual rigor. For example, Kierkegaard does not argue that there are or ought to be such things as a passion for that which is right and good, hope and despair, disappointment and anxiety, and so on. Nor does he go out of his way to define such terms. He does not defend the thesis that repentance before God is a genuine possibility. He does not argue that one OUGHT to have a heart disposed toward giving good gifts. Why not? One could say that in Kierkegaard's Christian culture there was no need to argue for such things: they were assumptions held by everyone. This is to some extent true, but it is also true that 19th-century Denmark had it doubters and sceptics as well. So I think that something indirect is going on here. Kierkegaard is leading his reader back to the religious beginning, and it is precisely a beginning where one has a sense of good and evil, where one knows what a giving heart is (or could be), where one knows how to repentant -- WITHOUT THE NEED TO ARGUE FOR OR DEFINE SUCH THINGS. And indeed we can ask: what would it mean for someone not to understand disappointment, anger, and hope? Or despair, anxiety, and love? Considering the third discourse, we can ask, what would it mean to not understand giving and receiving? To not know what it means to have hope or to be disappointed in such acts? And what would it mean to have to argue for such things? Or better yet: what would it be if such things depended upon argument for their force and validity? If someone really had no sense for such things, would argument help them? In other words, would this be a case of holding the wrong theory or having wrong information about human beings? By NOT arguing for such things, Kierkegaard is again subtly calling the academic paradigm into question. The desire to "go further" than that which is familiar -- even in the name of securing the validity of the familiar -- is a way of missing the religious beginning. This is not to say that there are no questions to be asked here, or no arguments that can take place -- nor it is to say that such things OUGHT NOT happen. The point is that the pursuit of such questions is not the religious pursuit. Moreover, the religious pursuit does not depend on answering such questions. The intellectual processes of laying out one's premises, justifying them, and drawing conclusions do not themselves define the religious framework, nor OUGHT they to define it. There is a point at which to ask more questions with regard to justification means that the possibility of "the religious" has been lost. This is closely related to my last point. Wittgenstein and Climacus both refuse to think of religious belief as reducible to an ERGO at the chain of reasoning. In other words, treating a passage like James 1:17-22 as propositions to which people either assent or dissent is to mischaracterize them. An assent divorced from considerations involving the concrete existence of human beings who are emotional and passionate as well as thoughtful -- is no religious assent. Consistently, Kierkegaard's UPBUILDING DISCOURSES are not ARGUMENTS FOR becoming religious. Being religious is not a matter of being compelled by premises and conclusions, although having premises and conclusions are certainly part of it. As Kierkegaard tries to show in these discourses, it is more a matter of possessing and exercising a passion for the good and the perfect in the midst of a tumultuous world and the accompanying doubts. It is better, then, to say that they are an "education in possibility". *32* Kierkegaard in effect says "consider James 1:17-22" while at the same time engaging the reader's intellect, emotions, and passions so that it can rightfully be considered. In this way, faith in James' words can be awakened as a possibility for the reader. As he says in THE POINT OF VIEW, this is ALL that one can do for another. *33* For essentially, where they direct their passion, or if they allow themselves to have any passion at all, is up to them. More deeply, I think, Kierkegaard also felt that he was leaving it in the hands of God -- for one who would be compelled by such a possibility would certainly credit God and not Kierkegaard. And by doing that, Kierkegaard again widens the distance between himself and the reader so that the reader is placed in a situation where he or she is alone with God -- in other words, at the religious beginning. *1* Trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, London, 1988. *2* D.Z. Phillips has written a book on this topic: PHILOSOPHY's COOL PLACE. I have had the good fortune to be a part of many of his seminars and lectures, and I am indebted to him for his many insights on this topic. *3* Such differences cannot be underestimated in the context of a more comprehensive comparison of Kierkegaard (and Climacus) and Wittgenstein. For the purposes of this small essay, however, I will leave such considerations aside. *4* CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT, trans. by Howard and Edna Hong, Princeton, 1992, 121. Hereafter POSTSCRIPT. *5* Cf. Michael Weston's study KIERKEGAARD AND MODERN CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY, London, 1994, especially Chapter 2. *6* POSTSCRIPT 22. *7* POSTSCRIPT 114. *8* POSTSCRIPT 115. The way Climacus fills out this notion of a "leap" is, to my mind, unsatisfactory. He is at pains to show that "faith", in a qualified sense, is at the heart of all knowing, and it alone (as opposed to more reflection) will put an end to the seemingly endless string of questions one can ask. This is a strange use of "faith", however, for this implies a kind of conscious assent. As Wittgenstein would have put it, when the chain of reasons comes to an end, we are left with human action. But we don't have "faith" in those actions: we simply do them. *9* Cf. His analysis of the pseudonymous corpus, "A Glance at a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature", POSTSCRIPT 251-300. He makes a possible exception of THE CONCEPT OF DREAD; POSTSCRIPT 268-70. *10* The "anti-intellectual" or "irrationalist" interpretation of Kierkegaard is one that crops up on a regular basis. Its most recent manifestation is hinted at by Michael Weston in his book (op. cit.) and made more explicit in a recent paper (in the Journal PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, summer 1998). According to Weston, Kierkegaard was trying to say that "the religious" cannot be presented in a book. Thus the POSTSCRIPT , according to Weston, is best understood an intellectual fiasco designed to get the reader to throw it away and so become genuinely religious. An obvious question is this: what about EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES? Augustine's CONFESSIONS? The Bible? Plato's dialogues? Luther's works? Should they be thrown away too? When does something become too "academic" or "intellectual" to be unhelpful, religiously speaking? The historical point is that Kierkegaard read and valued all of these "books" and often presumed his reader had done the same. Thus, it certainly would be strange to say that the same Kierkegaard wanted us to throw our books away so that we could become genuinely religious. Kierkegaard wrote in THE POINT OF VIEW that the central question of his authorship (up to that point) was the question about reflectiveness within Christendom. And then he appeals to Socrates as his model for his own authorship -- hardly the right person to use when one wants the reader to give up books and intellectual effort (41). In light of such considerations, it is rather hard to say that "the religious" cannot be presented in a book, or that rigorous intellectual thought is not a part of the religious life. It would be better to say two things: 1) As Johannes Climacus says over and over again in the POSTSCRIPT, being religious is NOT THE SAME THING as acquiring understanding from a book (or from anyone or anything else, for that matter). This is NOT the same as saying that understanding and reading and intellectual effort have no part in becoming religious; 2) The problem is not, in the end, with the form of a work but with the READER. If the reader has no religious passion and refuses to let it be awakened, then even the most indirectly persuasive religious discourse will fail to do the job; and for a reader with religious passion, even the most abstruse and abstract treatise can be mined for religious insight. *11* FRAGMENTS 72. *12* FRAGMENTS 108. *13* POSTSCRIPT 449. *14* Cf. The Prefaces of FRAGMENTS and POSTSCRIPT, and POSTSCRIPT's Introduction. *15* FRAGMENTS 7. *16* POSTSCRIPT 617. *17* POSTSCRIPT 242. *18* POSTSCRIPT 275fn. *19* POSTSCRIPT 619. *20* "My Activity as a Writer", a small piece actually published in his own lifetime. It is found in THE POINT OF VIEW FOR MY WORK AS AN AUTHOR, trans. by Walter Lowrie, London 1939, 145. *21* I realize that Climacus says that the UPBUILDING DISCOURSES can be seen as purely philosophical (POSTSCRIPT 256). His use of the word "philosophical" here, however, is very specific, and different than mine (and different from the way he himself sometimes uses the word). He is trying to distinguish the uniquely Christian categories, which are, for him, paradoxical and depend upon revelation, from those that are "immanent" or accessible to any human being. *22* Such a direct presentation would not be of much help anyway. As Kierkegaard writes in The POINT OF VIEW, direct presentation is usually perceived as direct confrontation, and this only serves to strengthen an opponent's defenses rather than open them to genuine conversation (25). *23* Trans. by Howard and Edna Hong, Princeton, 1990. All subsequent references refer to this translation. *24* This is the passage as it appears in the Hongs' translation. *25* Cf. POSTSCRIPT 273 and 605 fn. *26* I am aware that Kierkegaard often had Regine Olsen in mind when he used this phrase, and sometimes exclusively so. As the Hongs note in the Historical Introduction to their translation, however, Kierkegaard also thought that his personal concerns, when not described as personal concerns (as happens in EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES), gave expression to the universally human (cf. xvii-xxi). Therefore every reader potentially becomes "that single individual". It is in this spirit that I analyze these discourses. *27* EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES 33. *28* Again, this is the verse as it appears in the Hongs' translation, 129. *29* My "and so on" here does absolutely no justice to the exceptional insight that Kierkegaard has. One can only stare in amazement at his command of not only the many manifestations of giving and receiving, but also of the subtleties of the human heart in the midst of these activities. Such "existential" insight (one would call it "pastoral" insight in religious circles) is, in my opinion, the most consistently remarkable feature of all Kierkegaard's works, pseudonymous and otherwise. *30* POSTSCRIPT 22. *31* Cf.POSTSCRIPT 66: "God, however, can never become a third party when he is part of the religious; this is precisely the secret of the religious." *32* I borrow the phrase from the last chapter in THE CONCEPT OF DREAD. *33* Cf. THE POINT OF VIEW pp. 34-39.