Autoconciencia y agencia epistémica en Kant y P. F. Strawson

Gutiérrez, Pedro Stepanenko (2004) Autoconciencia y agencia epistémica en Kant y P. F. Strawson. Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía, 23 (1-3). pp. 5-16. ISSN 0210-1602

[img]
Preview
PDF
Dialnet-AutoconcienciaYAgenciaEpistemicaEnKantYPFStrawson-1087917.pdf

Download (182kB) | Preview

Abstract

In this paper I show that P. F. Strawson’s interpretation of the concept of selfconsciousness in Kant’s theoretical philosophy leaves out one of its basic features, namely, that the subject of self-consciousness is an epistemic agent, and not only a subject of self-ascription. Additionally, I argue that Strawson’s failure to appreciate this aspect of self-consciousness in The Bounds of Sense is motivated, on the one hand, by his rejection of Kant’s theory of synthesis, and, on the other, by his failure to appreciate the relevant differences between transcendental self-consciousness and inner sense.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XXIII (2004)
Depositing User: Sissi Kemp
Date Deposited: 09 Nov 2013 14:11
Last Modified: 09 Nov 2013 14:11
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2323

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year