Report on the Project:

Recollection of References.
Wittgenstein on the Language-Game of Remembering
(RR)

by Dr. Gerhard GELBMANN

at the

Wittgenstein Archives (WAB) at the University of Bergen (UiB) /
Wittgensteinarkivet ved Universitetet i Bergen

from January 2003 until mid March 2003

funded by

European Commission’s 5^th Framework Programme
"Improving the Human Research Potential and the Socio-economic Base:
Access to Research Infrastructures (ARI)"

I. APPLICATION: THE PROJECT'S IDEA⁰

I want again to pursue research on Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy at the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen ¹ in order to dedicate myself to the study of the theme of "memory" ("Gedächtnis") and "remembering" or "recalling" ("Erinnern")² in an epistemic and semiotic field, references to which are scattered throughout Wittgenstein's life-long writing, but might also be useful for interpreting his late conventionalistic phase in thinking about certainty, doubt, belief and knowledge.

The (biographical) background for my interest lies in an article I wrote for a semiotic journal and on a semiotic subject,³ dealing mainly with the conception of "reference" in Gottlob Frege and Umberto Eco. Eco's famous "model Q"⁴ does not only refer to Ross Quillian's early idea of how to model a semantic memory⁵ with a computational programme but also makes use of the Wittgensteinian concept of "family resemblance"; the "model Q" is basic for Eco's philosophy of culture, yet he is not very precise about the term "memory".

Since Eco uses Wittgenstein, who is far more precise in the use of such terms, I shall primarily investigate this concept in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Eco's talk⁶ about a "semantic universe" corresponds to the totality of language-games connected to conventions, practices and forms of life in Wittgenstein's way of talking, if I am allowed to employ an analogy; yet how then can Eco's term of a "(semantic) memory" be understood without running over the trenches put up by the "private language argument", i.e. without reading the term "memory" as a "solipsistic ability" (my wording), disengaged and completely freed from any social (or socio-semiotic) conceptualisation?-⁷

Even though I cannot dismiss my semiotic approach and my semiotic socialisation,⁸ I intend to concentrate this time more on aspects of, firstly, conceptual questions, secondly, of the developmental structure of Wittgenstein's thinking within these issues,⁹ and thirdly, of an attempt in reconstruction within a conception of a certain pragmatologic model-theory¹⁰ in order to

carefully study Malcolm's half-forgotten interpretation¹¹ from the outset as a profound and genuine contribution which shall help in clarification on sole Wittgensteinian grounds;

investigate whether memory can be described as a function of referring to sign-processes which itself is modelled¹² by our language-gaming in such a way that "remembering" is performative;

find out what role memory plays for a conventionalistic¹³ conception of "liquidity" and "solidity" of knowledge.¹⁴

My current idea is to take a certain statement-view of knowledge according to sup. point 3. within the frame of memory understood along the lines of a non-statement-view¹⁵ in such a way, that the relativity and changes of conceptual and empirical constituents of knowledge and conventions depend (also) on the form of performance of remembering. The interrelation of the concepts of knowledge and convention might be elucidated by a clarification of such a conception of "memory" and "remembering", not the least into the direction of conceptualising "historicity".

I hope to find textual evidence for this roughly outlined thesis in Wittgenstein's writings as presented in the Bergen Electronic Edition ¹⁶ and in the PastMasters series of the InteLex Corporation, which both are easily accessible at the WAB, besides all the other valuable sources and editions I am still not sufficiently and completely acquainted with.

II. WORK GIVEN

From Thusday, 23^rd Jan. 2003, onwards I almost regularly attended a local seminar for graduate students on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, given in Norwegian by Alois Pichler and Richard Sørli. Of the many themes worth remembering I only want to mention the controversions about 'text-immanentism' (Savigny) against 'contextualism' (Binkley, Stern, Pichler), on the different ideas about (Wittgenstein's) notion of language, of a menta-linguistic reading of certain parts of the Philosophical Investigations (especially the Preface).¹⁷

On Friday, 24^th Jan. 2003, I attended a so-called "Philosophical Pub" (at a local restaurant), to discuss a paper on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics, to be prepared by Alois Pichler for a conference in Paris (2003). Present were, besides me and Alois, Edoardo Zamuner and Kevin M. Cahill. The latter dominated the evening in a Wittgensteinian manner, and I left earlier since I felt it was a waste of time after a first exchange of thoughts on Wittgenstein's philosophical thinking about mathematics. In particular I do not agree with Kevin on the notion of "proof" in the private language argument, since I see it related to Wittgenstein's notion of proof in the "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics". I am not going to develop this here any further. If I get funds, I might spend time on researching this.

The paper I was writing was provisionally re-titled in February 2003:

"Recollection of References. With Wittgenstein on the Language-Games of Remembering";

I might stick to this title. At the time of this slight change, I had already drafted more than 45 pages, probably too long for a paper or the planned chapter in contribution to the volume planned to be edited by Ballhausen & Wittmann. Still -- a large part of my thoughts on memory in connection to Eco's "model Q" and Stachowiak's GMT¹⁸ was not taken care of.

On Thursday 27^th Feb. 2003 Edoardo Zamuner gave a very good lecture at the Department of Philosophy:

"Wittgenstein on the Objective Core of Psychological Statements. The Case of Believing"

The discussion which this lecture arose was vivid and fruitful.

On Tuesday, 4^th March 2003, another occasion of a "Philosophical Pub" was held in a even smaller circle: Edoardo Zamuner, Alois Pichler, and I. Topics of our conversation where 'Moore's Paradox', 'Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy', scholars like Kevin Cahill or Michele Ranchetti, furthermore 'Attitude, Dispositions and Will',¹⁹ and we also exchanged, views, hopes, and thoughts about the future of the WAB.

I personally refused to give a(nother) lecture due to lack of time for extra preparations and due to a heavy cold I caught at the end of February. One should not overlook the fact that I, as usual, was spending 60 hours a week at the Archives, often until late after mid-night, at least this is my experience from my research sojourns in 1997 (about 2 months), 1998 (half a year), 2002 (half a year), and 2003 (about 70 days), not to forget the time one might read in bed or on the week-ends. Compared with this apparent engagement in one's project the amount of money in subsistence, diets or scholarships one receives is ridiculous (per hour it is by far lower than any of the lowest wages in industrial countries are, and in the case of EU scholarships it does not even cover a form of public or national insurance).

But I agreed to follow an invitation for the end of March or in April 2003, to give a presentation in the seminar of Pichler and Sørli at the Department of Philosophy, when my EU ARI WAB project would be finished (cf. sup.); currently I have no idea what exactly I will do at this presentation, probably I just let the students discuss MS 115: 176f. (of which I give a new and complete translation in my paper "Recollection of References. With Wittgenstein on the Language-Games of Remembering") and this passage's edition in the "Brown Book". From that one could go on to talk about 'memory' and what Wittgenstein says about the language-games of remembering, mainly with attention to "Philosophische Untersuchungen" I.-

A final and partly self-critical report on my achievements can be found below, cf. inf.

III. WORKS USED

IV. WORKS RECOMMENDED TO PURCHASE²⁰

The stock of books and other sources currently held at the WAB as available for scholars and visitors is listed at "wabbooks". These works are primarily supposed to be read and used at the WAB, but permission to take books outside the archive can be granted by Alois Pichler via personal contact.

I furthermore propose to use the Internet-data-base "Sammelpunkt" as an Open Archive for making one's conference papers and proceedings, articles, essays and other philosophical texts easily available at virtually low costs or even at no costs at all.

V. AIMS ACHIEVED (TEXTS WRITTEN)

During my EU ARI WAB sojourn, I i.a. worked on a text directly connected to my project, as proposed (cf. sup.), titled:

"Recollection of References. With Wittgenstein on the Language-Games of Remembering"²¹

This text is in its current version rather long, stretching over about 71 pages and painstakingly deals with my theme in a rather wide frame. In some points I deviated from the proposed idea, and I describe the reasons for it, but also give annotations and explanations to my text as follows:

the discussion of semiotic implications and traits accompany the text's enfolding from the beginning, yet there is no separate and explicit devotion to their study;

to Eco and Quillian or to the idea of modelling a "semantic memory" via the "model Q" was not that explicitly referred as originally planned, yet under the term of "recallability" it was at least implicitly thematized and explicated more paratextually in certain footnotes and towards the last sections of my paper;

I tried to stick to Malcolm's account, thus meeting point 1. (cf. sup.), and I more implicitely developed point 2. (cf. sup.) throughout the essay. I seem to have failed to explicate point 3. (cf. sup.); I do not regard it as that important for my theme, and I have not completely made up my mind in what sense exactly I consider Wittgenstein as a "conventionalist".

While my text in its second version was proof-read,²² I started with overworking two former papers on Hintikka by putting them together in an essay still untitled, one of which has its core in a lecture I gave in Bergen in summer 2002,²³ the other was derived from two e-mails²⁴ I had sent out to scholars I got to know as being interested in Wittgenstein's philosophy (to say it in most general terms). The plan might lead to the publication of a volume of my Bergenser Essays.

Among the obstacles I met I only want to mention that computer-access, especially to the BEE, was not always as it should have been, besides the fact that the screen I was using suddenly shrienked without me being notified. The computers depicted a problem in another direction, too: Privacy was not guaranteed, one could not store one's data in a way that was only accessible for oneself. I think, improvement in this direction is urgent.

VI. EPILOGUE: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A final report on my experiences during this research sojourn at the WAB, as far as not already done so in this web-site, was delivered under exclusion of the public to the corresponding office of the EU, by quoting this web-site.

The databases of the Bergen Electronic Edition (BEE) and the PastMasters series of the InteLex Corporation were useful tools (and I largely relied on the first in dating certain sources). Both institutions, the WAB as well as the EU, shall be acknowledged with the best wishes for a prosperous future and a furthered cooperation.

My project's roots lie in several conversations I had with Thomas Ballhausen in Vienna, especially from the time of winter 2001 until autumn 2002; I am indebted to him for many reasons, foremost for his steadfast belief in the path my life has taken, devoted to Writing and Philosophy, a belief whose strength often outdated my own. Other roots of my project, if I can undig them all and safely, have to be thought in my study-long contacts with Prof. Herbert Hrachovec from the University of Vienna, who at several occasions supported my academic work in a very uncomplicated and enlighted manner.

Among my research colleagues at the WAB, at different times and occasions in the last six years, I am indebted to Alois Pichler, Wilhelm Krüger, Dino Buzzetti, Kevin Cahill, Simo Säätelä, Aleksander Motturi, Michael Luntley, Edward Vanhoutte, Ludovic Soutif, Anat Biletzki, Thomas Binder, and Edoardo Zamuner for discussions, hints, helpful mutual critique, for a grand and diligent attitude in our spread tasks, and for their various philosophising. As I vividly remember, I have in many ways profited from them, and from others in the academic surroundings of the Universitetet i Bergen (like Knut Ågotnes or Ralph Jewell), due to a climate of open-mindedness in scientific spirit, which I found inviting and elucidating.

I would also like to thank among the Wittgenstein scholars Allen Janik and Kristóf Nyíri for their positive reactions to my philosophical work. Herbert Hrachovec deserves to be mentioned for all the support throughout the last 10 years or so, for numerous letters of support, contacts, invitations to participate in projects, seminars, discussions, all of which helped in bringing me where I am now.

Eldbjørg Gunnarson and Christina Therese Brunner shall be thanked for their support in bureaucratic and administrative matters, they untiringly took care of several troubles of a sort unbearable for philosophers gifted with a free mind. What would we academics do without them!

Last but not least Zhihong Gong has to be mentioned for her inspiring activity in her own masterful project in Solid Earth Physics at the University of Bergen, for her patience when I could not stop talking about Philosophy while Bergenser rain did not ever seem to stop, but in addition to that she deserves being mentioned for something which in itself is an artful semiotic matter, namely her fabulous cooking.

All these names shall be kept in a dry and homely place: my memory.--

Notes:

⁰ This version of the application was slightly improved as far as minor linguistic, expressional or grammatical mistakes and its appearance are concerned. (back)-

¹ Hence abbreviated as WAB. A part of my doctoral dissertation was written there (funded by Austrian sources and an ERASMUS stipend), and recently I enjoyed a postdoctoral grant of the Royal Norwegian Government (The Norwegian Research Council / Norges Forskningsråd). (back)-

² This might also touch (the originally German) terms like "vergessen", "Erinnerungsbild", "Gedächtnisbild", etc. (back)-

³ Cf. Gelbmann, Gerhard (1998): "Zum Problem der Referenz: Frege versus Eco. Zwei Pole im Universum semiotischer Gestaltung", S - European Journal for Semiotic Studies 10 (1, 2): 73-158. (back)-

⁴ Cf. Eco, Umberto (1968): La struttura assente. Milano: Bompiani; Eco, Umberto (1976): A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press. (back)-

⁵ Cf. Quillian, M. Ross (1968): "Semantic Memory" in: Minsky, Marvin L. (1968): Semantic Information Processing. Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press: 227-270. (back)-

⁶ In Eco 1976, op. cit. sup. (back)-

⁷ In contrast to others, yet clearly on the lines of, e.g., Eike von Savigny, I take the fundamental concepts of Wittgenstein's post-tractarian philosophy as socially constituted in such a way that the social element is essential and indispensable. This holds as well for my understanding of Pragmatics. Cf. Gelbmann, Gerhard (2002c): "Pragmatics and the Conceptual Constitutivity of the Social (contra Hintikka and Luntley). Semiotic Subjectivity I", Guest-Lecture at the Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen, Norway, May 2002; Sammelpunkt. Elektronisch archivierte Theorie et http://h2hobel.phl.univie.ac.at/~yellow/projects/lecture1.htm. (back)-

⁸ I see my project as conducted under the auspices of the Austrian Association for Semiotics (Österreichische Gesellschaft für Semiotik, briefly ÖGS), but let me mention that I am also a member of the German Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (Deutsche Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft, DLWG). I am already invited to contribute with an article to a planned compendium of works within the field of the addressed subject, which shall be co-edited by my colleague, the semiotician Thomas Ballhausen (Vienna), and by Matthias Wittmann (Vienna). I personally plan to collect my essays and lectures on Wittgenstein in a separate volume within the next five years the latest. (back)-

⁹ At least from the "Blue Book" onwards until the times of abandoning his project of what later was edited as "Philosophische Untersuchungen", and probably also later on, Wittgenstein entertained the term and concept "memory" (and words and ideas near to it, think of "remembering" and "forgetting"), he frequently reused already formed phrases and thoughts, and he appears to have had a particular relationship to this term without ever placing it in such central a place as has happened to terms like "private language", "practice", "form of life". (back)-

¹⁰ I refer here to Herbert Stachowiak and my work of the last years, cf.: Stachowiak, Herbert (1965, 1969): Denken und Erkennen im kybernetischen Modell. Wien: Springer; Stachowiak, Herbert (1973): Allgemeine Modelltheorie. Wien: Springer; Stachowiak, Herbert (1983b): "Erkenntnisstufen zum Systematischen Neopragmatismus und zur Allgemeinen Modelltheorie" in: Stachowiak, Herbert (Hrg.) (1983a): Modelle – Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. München: Fink: 87-146; Gelbmann, Gerhard (2002a): "Sind Zahlen Attribute?"; Sammelpunkt. Elektronisch archivierte Theorie et http://h2hobel.phl.univie.ac.at/~yellow/Stachowiak/attribut.htm; Gelbmann, Gerhard (2002b): "Skript, Text, Werk, Album. Zu Alois Pichlers Umgang mit Wittgensteins Schreiben"; Sammelpunkt. Elektronisch archivierte Theorie, Sammelpunkt. Elektronisch archivierte Theorie et http://h2hobel.phl.univie.ac.at/~yellow/Wittgenstein/Pichler.html; Gelbmann, Gerhard (2002d): "An Outline of Pragmatologic Model-Theory (sec. Stachowiak). Semiotic Subjectivity II", Lecture at the HIT Centre, Bergen, Norway, June 2002; Sammelpunkt. Elektronisch archivierte Theorie et http://h2hobel.phl.univie.ac.at/~yellow/projects/lecture2.htm. For Stachowiak's term "Allgemeine Modelltheorie", which he frequently abbreviates with "AMT", I came use the english abbreviation "GMT" for "General Model Theory" when writing in English. (back)-

¹¹ Cf. Malcolm, Norman (1977): Memory and Mind. Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ. Press. (back)-

¹² Cf. sup. This implies, as I cannot become tired to emphasise, that this understanding of the term "model" is quite different from the formal-semantic understanding (which ends up with a "model-theory" which is nothing but a formal theory of interpretation whereas the pragmatologic approach theorises about representation and presentation of representation). (back)-

¹³ The performance of remembering (sec. sup. point 2.) itself rests upon and exerts influence upon conventions. (back)-

¹⁴ Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein's "Über Gewißheit" §96ff. and Pollok, Konstantin (2001): "Aggregatzustände des Wissens. Die Grundlagen der Wissenschaft im Lichte Wittgensteins Bemerkungen Über Gewißheit" in: Haller, Rudolf & Puhl, Klaus (Eds.) (2001): Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy. A Reassessment after 50 Years. Papers of the 24^th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel 2001. Vol. 2. Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft, Kirchberg am Wechsel: 193-201.
Just a side-remark, sketching now my current "solution" to the addressed problems: A Solipsist could then be understood as having nothing but memory and only solid knowledge (because rules and experiences would come up to a depiction of the same fixed system of conventions which cannot be shared with anybody), whereas completely liquid knowledge would require no memory at all (and hence no remembering could perform conventions as the common and mostly not explicit ground for social life and an agreement in forms of life). In this sense the possibility of language-games presupposes a balanced functioning of the memory. (back)-

¹⁵ This terminology fits into my philosophical work of post-doctoral rank, so that this project of mine belongs within a larger task to which I have committed myself in the hope to gain some academic credits.- Memory then is of a quite different category than (sets of) sentences or statements (as knowledge, too). (back)-

¹⁶ In short: BEE. (back)-

¹⁷ At the end of Jan. 2003 and in February I argued a bit in Alois Pichler's and Richard Sørli's seminar on Wittgenstein's "Philosophische Untersuchungen" also against the more recent theory of Wittgenstein's dyslexia by pointing to the argumentum ad hominem hereby raised against Wittgenstein in Hintikka & Hintikka 2002, more than I had done in private conversations with Anat Biletzki and Ludovic Soutif in late summer 2002 which already was about Hintikka's ideas about the interpretation of "Philosophical Investigations" I §109, cf. inf. But in summer 2002 I still had not read Hintikka & Hintikka 2002, and I had not been present at the Kirchberg Conference 2001 where this paper was presented; I read the Hintikkas' paper in Feb. 2003 and devoted a part of my time and thoughts to the preparation of a critique.
During February 2003 I also discussed this matter mainly with Edoardo Zamuner, and I sent out a draft of my critique per e-mail to colleagues. If I remember correctly, I sent such an e-mail first to Anat Biletzki (Tel Aviv), Herbert Hrachovec (Vienna), Ralph Jewell (Bergen), Harald Johannessen (Bergen), Alois Pichler (Bergen), Edoardo Zamuner (Bologna, but at that time my research colleague at the WAB in Bergen), later on in a slightly different version to Allen Janik (Brenner Archives, University of Innsbruck), Kristóf Nyíri (Open University, Budapest), Ludovic Soutif (Sorbonne, Paris) and Antonia Soulez (Collège International de Philosophie, Paris).
Zamuner was the first to react with some oral comments, Janik reacted incredibly fast with an e-mail of precise shortness: "great stuff", and this and also some other e-mails exchanged with Nyíri gave me the strength to commence as described. Ludovic Soutif promised a reaction via e-mail, the same holds for Alois Pichler who agreed with me in a short conversation, but with beginning of March 2003 no such reactions, whether promised in any sense or not, have reached me. Kevin Cahill gave me at the beginning of March 2003 moral support, although I had not e-mailed him my draft but only mentioned that I was writing a bit against Hintikka; this trait in Kevin's character I found especially estimable and philosophically sincere.
In the meantime I decided to put my critique of the Hintikkas' into in a seperate publication under the working title "Contra Hintikka" (here I have to add that I greatly admire Hintikka and that my criticism concerns only a few points). Work on this started with end of Feb. 2003; the idea is, to collect my Bergenser Essays on Wittgenstein, Watzlawick, Malcolm and Stachowiak in a volume (as already considered in my proposial, cf. sup.), and one of the contributions should at least partly consist in the critique drafted in my aforementioned e-mail. (back)-

¹⁸ Cf. sup. footnote ¹⁰. (back)-

¹⁹ Edoardo Zamuner identified attitudes with dispositions. I held against it that dispositions are objectively there (what reminds me know of Popper's concept of 'propensity', cf. Popper 1959 and Popper 1995) and given with a state of affairs, whereas attitudes involve a subject that has it towards a state of affairs. The expression of a (non-tautological) proposition about a state of affairs alone does not involve an attitude of this subject.
To have a propositional attitude towards a proposition or description of a state of affairs can involve having an attitude towards a disposition, e.g. when I say (p) "It is about to rain" I can take a propositinal attitude towards (p) by saying "I doubt that it is about to rain". When attitudes and personal subjects are involved, I would rather talk of a 'situation' containing a state of affairs, than of merely a state of affairs (I try to stick to this terminology in my recent writings, e.g. in "Recollection of References. With Wittgenstein on the Language-Games of Remembering"). That people can take attitudes and chose from a variety of attitudes, is objectively given, a disposition of subjectivity we might call 'will'.
So attitudes in the sense of propositional attitudes qualify the relationship the subject has to its expression of propositions; some of the instances one might think of are rather odd. E.g. "I believe (q)" where (q) is any tautology, like (q) "If Zhihong is the name of a Chinese, Zhihong refers to a Chinese". Yet this example nevertheless expresses a situation, although the proposition does not seem to say anything about the world and what is the case; the propisition expressing a propositional attitude is a case anyway, and this seems never to be a pure logical or tautological matter. If (r) says "It rains, if it rains" and my attitude to it reads "I can't believe in (r)", then I might have come close to being in an illogical situation, yet in this case "I believe" or "I can't believe" has a different and rhetorical meaning, it does not doubt the logical possibility of a tautology.-
One shortcoming of this analysis is that there might be aspects of 'will' and 'volition' which are not related to attitudes in the propositional sense, i.e. will and volition might be attitudes of some other sort as propositional attitudes. But I still hold that attitudes are the objective given dispositions of a subject, or attributable to a subject. And that attitudes in this latter sense can be (non-linguistic) performatives, have I already said in Gelbmann 2002c, op. cit. sup., and I will say it again in "Contra Hintikka" (working title), op. cit. sup. (back)-

²⁰ I have already suggested further purchases in a former project report, cf. ibid. So this list here supplements the former list; since the WAB has, so far, no means to buy these volumes and writings, I furthermore suggest that publishers and patrons give grants for this purpose and similar intentions related to the academic work of the WAB. (back)-

²¹ I changed the title into one which is a bit more careful and promises less. One has to learn a lot of diplomacy in the academic world, hasn't one. (back)-

²² Many thanks to Deirdre Smith, an American and graduate student in philosophy at UiB. (back)-

²³ Cf. Gelbmann 2002c, op. cit. sup. (back)-

²⁴ Cf. sup. (back)-

created by G.G. on December 17^th 2002
last update by G.G. on April 1^st 2003

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Report on the Project: Recollection of References. Wittgenstein on the Language-Game of Remembering (RR)