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Editor

Thv. Krohn-Hansen, The Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences and Letters,
Munkegt. 5, 7000 Trondheim, Norway.

Publisher

Universitetsforlaget, P.O. Box 307, Blindern, Oslo 3, Norway,
American office: P.O. Box 142, Boston, Massachusetts 02113, U.S.A.

Manuscript address

Manuscripts conforming with the rules on page 3 of this
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On Quoting

An Essay on the Ontology of Words

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Johannessen, H. 1976. On quoting. An essay on the ontology of words. *K. norske Vidensk. Selsk. Skr.* 6, 1–54.

The essay tries to blend diverse strands of thought. First comes a criticism of Quine's view(s) on quotation. This develops, somehow, into an ontology for linguistic items. Out of this, again, grows some more general reflections on the notions of speaker and speaking the same language: the identification of someone as a speaker becomes a central task, and the recognition of someone as speaking is of crucial importance in the acknowledgement that something is said. Running through it all, more as ghost than spirit, is the seam of holism.

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Preface

The essay was drafted in 1970, left until July 1973, and then written out in four hectic weeks.

For discussing it with me I thank most gratefully Michael Dummett and J. A. Foster.

For financial support I am indebted to The Norwegian Research Council for Science and the Humanities.

Introduction

The work is meant to be an essay, not an academic treatise. In this way I hope to escape certain restraints on form. I make no claims to a comprehensive survey of an academic field, whether of problems or of earlier treatments. My list of references, for instance, is one created by fancy, not by the demand to give a full list of contributions to an academic topic.

What I have done has been to take the problem of the nature of quotes, syntactic and semantic, and use it for my own purpose. But I believe my treatment of the problem of quotes has yielded something, namely that the use-mention approach ought to be buried. However, I do not claim to have given an alternative theory, one that will be recognized by the tradition as meeting the same needs and working under the same restraints as the use-mention theory.

Section 0 gives some background to the traditional treatment of quotations. I believe this sufficient for the present purpose. Some of the points arising from the criticism of the classical theory of quotations are used to shape an ontology for linguistic items. I believe what I say here is of some interest. One target is an understanding of types and tokens that is more adequate than the one too often voiced.

The ontology presented makes it necessary to introduce speakers. Also, we have to realize that language is, partly, something external to speakers, – since the identities of linguistic items stem from features of the perceptible vehicles of meaning.

I am therefore led to consider how we individuate languages, and what it amounts to to recognize different ones. The stress here is placed on the recognition of speakers of other languages. To help the reader I have supplied each section with a heading, – not always a very apposite one I fear.

0

Theories of quotation

‘We ought to be far more puzzled than we are by quotation marks. We understand quotation marks very well, at least in this, that we always know the reference of a quotation. Since there are infinitely many quotations, our knowledge apparently enshrines a rule. The puzzle comes when we try to express this rule as a fragment of a theory of meaning.’ [Donald Davidson: *Theories of meaning and learnable languages*; in Bar-Hillel (ed.): *Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science*, p. 388.]

Comment: ‘[W]e always know the reference of a quotation’: at least in the sense that we know, say, that ‘not’ and ‘elsewhere’ are different – whatever they are.

The classical exposition of quotation marks is found in Tarski: *The Concept of Truth in formalized languages*; in [Tarski: *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics*, pp. 154–65.]

Tarski there disclaims that quotations are anything but names. ‘Every quotation-mark name is then a constant individual name of a definite expression [...] and in fact a name of the same nature as the proper name of a man.’ [*op. cit.*, p. 159.]

And, due to paradoxes, at best, and nonsense, at worst, quotations cannot easily be taken to be syntactically composite names, consisting of the quoted expression and the quotes themselves, the latter called ‘name-functors’.

This would otherwise be the natural view to take, and the one which squares best with our intuitions. But, in light of the paradoxes that ensue if we develop those natural views we seem forced to accept that quotations are like single words: syntactically simple.

In what Davidson calls ‘apparently the same vein’, Quine develops the idea of quotations as syntactically simple names.

Here is a long quotation from Davidson, it includes quotations from Quine: ‘Quine writes in [7], p. 140, that an expression in quotation marks ‘occurs there merely as a fragment of a longer name which contains, besides this fragment, the two quotation marks’, and he compares the occurrence of an expression inside quotation marks with the occurrence of ‘cat’ in ‘cattle’ ([7], p. 140) and of ‘can’ in ‘canary’ ([9], p. 144).

The function of letters in words, like the function of 'cat' in 'cattle' is purely adventitious in this sense: we could substitute a novel piece of typography everywhere in the language for 'cattle' and nothing in the semantical structure of the language would be changed. Not only does 'cat' in 'cattle' not have a 'separate meaning'; the fact that the same letters occur together in the same order elsewhere is irrelevant to questions of meaning. If an analogous remark is true of quotations, then there is no justification in theory for the classification (it is only an accident quotations share a common feature in the spelling), and there is no significance in the fact that a quotation names 'its interior'. Finally, every quotation is a semantical primitive, and, since there are infinitely many quotations, a language containing quotations is unlearnable.' [Davidson, *op. cit.*, p. 389. His article contains the references to Quine's work.]

Davidson declares that this conclusion goes against our intuitions. In that he is surely correct. But it is not easy to see that the conclusion is entailed by the classical theory, any more than that a language containing in (de)initely many proper names would also be unlearnable. It is surely perverse to claim that one has learnt a language only when one masters all the names in it. Names aren't considered (ordinary) words of a language, they aren't, usually, in the dictionary. {Note also that the long quotation from Davidson would be a name, and the sentence embedding it would be ill-formed, as the reader can easily verify himself.}

What Davidson means comes out when he writes: 'There is no problem in framing a general rule for identifying quotations on the basis of form [...], and no problem in giving an informal rule for producing a wanted quotation (enclose the expression you want to mention in quotation marks).' [Davidson, *loc. cit.*]

We do not possess an analogue rule for ordinary proper names. We are able to form as many new names as we wish simply by arranging letters in ways hitherto unused, and then use the resultant sequences *as* names. But the name-object matching is *ad hoc*, and the names are not generated, in a rule governed way, so as to be of one form.

Davidson, by stressing these divergences, is of course putting forward an objection to accepting the classical theory.

Tarski only constructed the sparse classical theory. He didn't endorse it, and he furthermore hints that quotations may possess significant structure when he writes: 'It is clear that we can correlate a structural-descriptive name with every quotation-mark name, one which is free from quotation marks and possesses the same extension (*i.e.* denotes the same expression) and vice versa.' [*op. cit.*, p. 157.]

Davidson's comment is: 'It is difficult to see how the correlation could be established if we replaced each quotation by some other arbitrary symbol, as we could do if quotation-mark names were like the proper names of men.' [Davidson, *loc. cit.*]

Quine, also, doesn't merely work in the classical mould, he develops Tarski's hint by saying that though quotations are logically unstructured, and expres-

sions, of course, have non-referential occurrences inside quotation marks, the latter feature is dispelled by a notational change which leaves us with the logically structured devices of spelling and concatenation. The formula for this notational change can apparently, says Davidson, be given by a definition. [References to Quine are found in Davidson's article.]

'If this suggestion can be carried out, then the most recalcitrant aspect of quotation yields to theory, for the truth conditions for sentences containing quotations can be equated with the truth conditions for the sentences got from them by substituting for the quotations their definitional equivalents in the idiom of spelling. On such a theory, there is no longer an infinite number of semantical primitives, in spite of the fact that quotations cannot be shown to contain parts with independent semantical roles. If we accept a theory of this kind, we are forced to allow a species of structure that may not deserve to be called 'logical', but certainly is directly and indissolubly linked with the logical, a kind of structure missing in ordinary proper names.' [Davidson, *op. cit.*, p. 390.]

It is not easy to assess this possibility, what it would mean to have non-logical (i.e. semantically void) linguistic structures.

I share the qualms of the quoted authors in forsaking our intuitions about what quotations are, and in disregarding our rules for constructing such bits of language and incorporate them into our discourse.

I wish, however, to point out that all the difficulties created by the classical theory seem to stem from one single fact: the holding of the opinion that quotations are names, proper names, though not, as Davidson puts it 'ordinary proper names'.

One way of putting that opinion is that quoted expressions are mentioned, but not used, while the whole quotation, and it alone, is used.

This distinction, of mutual exclusivity, between use and mention, has been denied an application on linguistic matters, and we shall have opportunity to debate the issue below.

In the following pages no attempt will be made to construct a formal semantics for quotation marks.

1

The objectives

My interest is twofold in the following pages. Primarily I seek a schematic understanding of the speaker–hearer (or, speaker–speaker) relationship, and of how human beings, (aptly called 'finite minds'), can get across to each other, and understand each other, through the medium of linguistic representations.

* To be a finite mind implies existing within a limited temporal and spacial framework; to possess only partial insight and understanding; to have only a strictly limited time in which to execute any plan, the latter based on scanning and processing of data got at through imperfect sensory channels. (This description, applied to human beings, will for many signal

an attempt to 'computerize' the human mind, and the human being. Perhaps therefore, it is well to have in mind that computers available to us do not feel, have not got emotions, and perceive only in an analogous sense of the word. Furthermore, they have been equipped with relatively trivial and down to earth programs.)*

Secondly, the aim is to present a theory of quoting, keeping in mind the possibility that the feeling of puzzlement is there to stay.

Hopefully the first objective will be illuminated by focusing on the second.

2

Rock bottom

Quoting is, strictly speaking, a way of singling out the *orthographic representation* of a string of letters. The string itself is an abstract entity of *grammatical* nature.

Linguists, if they wish to refer to the orthographic representation of, e.g., the word consisting of the second, ninth, and seventh letters of the Roman alphabet, in that order, use the device of italization, thus: *big*. (*As is obvious from the sentence we are now in the middle of, we mostly use italics, or underlining, for a different purpose.*)

Quoting, strictly speaking, is but an alternative convention. Like most we wish to speak a bit more loosely, and allow ourselves to refer to the word itself by employing quotes.

Words, as said above, are objects for grammar – highly abstract in their being.

Being abstract, words need to be represented. Linguistic intercourse is performed through two media: speech and writing. The *physical* units present in these media are acoustical sounds, *phones*, and scratched marks, *graphs*, respectively.

One level up in abstraction, away from the physical realm, we encounter *phonemes* and *graphemes*. These are reached by slurring over, as it were, observable differences between certain units of the lower level. ('observable': speakers of (some) other languages perceive them). The operative criterion for slurring over is a functional (language relative) one: are these physical differences making a distinction as to which linguistic item we have? If not, don't register the physical differences.

When units from the lower level are grouped (which most, of course, are not), as being of one group and not another, as one unit and not another, of the level above, they are called 'allophone' and 'allograph'. (To revert to the linguist's italization device: *D* and *d*, two graphs, are both allographs, and so for that matter is *d*, of the fourth letter in the Roman alphabet.)

Any of these, indiscriminately, represent the grapheme which is the fourth letter in the Roman alphabet. But exactly which graphs do represent that grapheme is not easy to settle. Physical differences we easily spot, but not physical similarities. Some graphs representing one grapheme look more like

some graphs representing another grapheme than they look like some other graphs also representing that first grapheme. For argument, and examples, see [Nelson Goodman: Seven Strictures on Similarity, in Foster & Swanson (eds.): *Experience & Theory*; pp. 20–21.]

There is, consequently, a problem in identifying the grapheme represented, and this problem will take the form of seeing which letters are produced. The murky possibility coming up is then that two virtually indistinguishable graphs represent two graphemes, more precisely: two occurrences of what looks like one graph represent different graphemes.

This is a murky problem because it can lead us astray in the position we ought to take on the problems we are now to discuss. But it oughtn't be allowed to do so because it is *not* true that the murkiness means that there is *one* way of representing *two* graphemes. There would be just the sad fact that our early training in calligraphy weren't exacting enough.

One problem not taken note of so far relates to whether or not the graph-level is the physical rock bottom level: that is, are D and D two *occurrences* of *one* graph, or are they *two* graphs? $D =_{\text{graph}} D$ or $D \neq_{\text{graph}} D$?

Against the second proposal is the fact that linguists, in that case, could just *count* graphs, and needn't describe them (and describe them they do) in order to say they are different graphs. Against the first proposal is the fact that it takes an amount of indifference not to perceive *physical* differences between D and D . If no two numerically different physical entities are *exactly* alike, then on the first proposal the linguistic rock bottom level: the graph level, will *not* be the physical rock bottom level.

I believe linguists will say that D and D are occurrences of one and the same graph. The reason is that we cannot otherwise construct representational systems for language. And this can be gleaned from what follows. (This also shows why it is catastrophic to allow the murky possibility mentioned above to be anything but local mismanagement.)

Graphs are of the same allo-group because they are representations of the same linguistic unit. Consequently, they contribute the same towards an identifiable meaning, or set of such – since some words are ambiguous. But this contribution is consequential upon the identification of what unit we have, it doesn't criterially fix which unit we have.

Now, what if we were to turn this around and hold that graphs are constituted as representations of one (common) unit *because* they contribute the same towards an identifiable meaning. (Note, in this case there will *not* be a *set* of such meanings, that is one major difference from the above stated point of view.) Graphs are separated, are representations of different units, because they contribute towards different meanings.

But, different occurrences of (what we above claim is) the same unit can, and do, carry different meanings, and occurrences of (what we above claim are) different units can, and do, carry the same meaning.

It seems therefore, on this turned-around-view, proper that graph-occurrences should be sorted in such a way that their perceptible physical properties do not carry *any* weight in the identification of the unit they individually

represent. (So this occurrence of 'horse' goes with this 'idiot', and that 'horse' goes with that 'idiot': the first two express the same meaning, and so do the last two, and there are two meanings expressed, one by each pair.)

We can see how this bears on the issue of graph-identification, and we can also see why linguists say that D and D are the same graph. (It would be hopeless to try to construct a system of linguistic representations where the meanings expressed had a fully unstable relationship to the units of the system, and where these latter carried no identificatory force as to which meanings they did express on any given occasion. It would be non-linguistic aspects of the situations that identified the expressed meanings, and only consequently upon this could we say that the representations used expressed such and such a meaning. If D and D were two graphs this would be the consequence.)

* David Kaplan, in his essay: Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice, in [Hintikka, Moravcsik & Suppes (eds.): *Approaches to Natural Language*; pp. 490–519], has a puzzle, Homework Problem # 6, where he asks: 'Do the verb 'paint' and the noun 'paint' have distinct types?' Given that type and linguistic item is here the same, our answer will be: No, because type identity precedes the manifold of grammatical roles. (See Appendix B.)*

By saying that D and D are the same graph we establish the rock bottom level of representational identity. This rock bottom, of, we can say, quasi-physical substances, is necessary, because, to repeat, *meanings* are incapable of providing well defined identity criteria for linguistic representations.

By forming particular phones or graphs we produce a representation of whatever words are used. But this choice of allo-s is only a representation of whatever words are *present*. For the linguist, words are entities at least twice removed from physical nature.

It must be mentioned here that some psycholinguists stress what they call the 'control from above' on words. What we see the words as (or, what words we see) depends upon the semantic structure 'we have in mind' when reading the text [See Rommetveit: *Språk, Tanke og Kommunikasjon*; p. 212.] I am tempted to describe this as cases of dulled wit and rapid reading. What it doesn't manage to do, it seems to me, is to negate the basic fact that in getting speech and writing going as representational systems of language, we must take these representational identities for granted. Identities, moreover, criterially settled by that which represents, and not by that which is represented.

3

When is a word what it is

The practice of quoting is presented as a way of *using* words: the quoted expressions, *qua* quoted, consist of words, and *qua* quoted, these are used.

Indeed, how *could* the quoted expression *be* (consist of) words and not be *used*? It may not when quoted be used in such-and-such a way, e.g. to assert

something with, but how can it, when involved in communication (that is, when it consists of words), not be used: full stop?

*[1] I do not deny that words are words even when they are not in use: that is, there are times, for any word, when no phones or graphs representing it are being produced, but even so, it will still be a word. (It shall be left unsaid if this is so because we cannot tell which word without bringing it, somehow, to mind.) There are situations, there comes a time, when we rather say: it was a word, but is no longer since it has fallen into disuse.

The paradigmatic case of word use is the vocal one, where one produces sound waves that last a short time, and then dissolve. The use of the word is then existentially localized within this temporal frame, perhaps also within those spatial borders-outside of which the sounds aren't caught.

This paradigm case oughtn't blur the important differences between speaking and writing.

If speech products were recorded, listened to through the playback *and* the tape kept, then speech and writings would be structurally similar media for the use of language.

As things stand I will not count the existence of copies of Plato's *Republic*, especially in translation, as a proof that Plato is presently using the words occurring therein. Whichever words Plato used were used by him quite some time ago. So, to say that certain words occur in the *Republic* must not licence the inference that some one is now writing down (using) those words. (Plato is dead, so how come his words still speak to us? Not through any action done by him.)

[2] I also do not deny that we may refer to, talk about, words in their represented absence: while they are not produced inside quotes in our discourse about them. (I shall not take a stand on whether or not the words be mentally represented when they are brought to mind but not through the production of one of its representations.)

[3] I also do not deny that a word may, *qua* physical marks (*misidentified* as marks one may say), occur as part of another word: as 'to' does in 'together' (or properly, as *to* does in *together*).

But this it not a case of the *word* 'to' being used, – or mentioned – for that matter. The occurrence of the word 'together' doesn't produce an utterance of the word 'to'. (If it were the case I might be accused of saying, and stating, 'The key is red' whenever I said 'The monkey is feared'. But in order to avoid that unpleasant consequence one needn't adopt Quine's drastic measure. His 'the word 'not' doesn't occur in "not" ' would be necessary only if quotes were letters.)

This verbal whole-part problematic is one case where language is badly served by its representations. (Even if the senses of 'to' and 'together' were closely allied, and etymologically traced back to kinship, we would still have the overruling factor that, as used, the grammatical role of 'to' doesn't contribute to the role of 'together'.)

[4] What I do deny is that a *word* (or longer phrase) may be represented (occur), in speech or writing, in such a way that it is not there as a word, but

as an integral part of a *syntactically simple* name (or what have you) of that word.

This denial I share with proponents of the classical account of quoting, but we draw different conclusions from it.

They claim that “to” is a syntactically simple name and that the *word* ‘to’ therefore does not occur in it. They assimilate its occurrence there to its occurrence in ‘together’.

But doing this goes against our intuition of perceiving the word ‘to’ in “to” but not in ‘together’. (We could, of course, quarrel about the unanimity, and value, of our intuitions. But remember, at stake is not only the perception of ‘to’ in “to”, but also the perception of syntactic complexity in “to be or not to be”.)

So, I am of the opinion that quotations are not syntactically simple names, and that their interiors are bits of language – working as such.*

4

The use – mention theory of quoting

The use theory of quoting is rather unpopular among present day philosophers. Quine, among other influential people, opposes it, and the main proponent, P. T. Geach, seems to have had little support. My ambition is to supply at least *some* support to a use theory.

How then, does the opposition look at things?

Among use/mention theorists it is common, when introducing quoting, to use the above dichotomy as denoting mutually exclusive cases of occurrence. Within quotes something is *mentioned*, whatever this something is, outside of quotes it will be *used*. And outside of quotes this something will *be* there, not so within quotes. The word is not inside of quotes, but *whatever* is there would have been a word outside of quotes. (Providing we are not putting nonsense within the quotes, something that would have been nonsense outside of quotes that is: Quine cannot make that discrimination between what he finds inside quotes.)

It is a shared assumption that the acceptance of the mutual exclusiveness of use and mention entails something to the effect of the mentioned being a part of an unanalyzable *whole*.

So everyone takes the view that if a *word* occurs, it is *used* (with full syntactic honours).

The dispute concerns the use/mention dichotomy: are the two mutually exclusive properties or not? Quine says they are, and infers correctly that a word when quoted doesn’t occur inside the quotes as a word (and therefore *it* doesn’t occur at all). Whatever syntactic cuts, and embedments, we could involve a word in, if it were used, are not available to our syntactic perception while the word is mentioned (in quote’ese).

This double status point of view, amounting to an ontological double status, on items declared capable of both use and mention, I consider unfortunate,

and uncalled for. (Remember that the *word*, according to Quine, is capable of being mentioned, only it disappears when mentioned, so something – mentioning – happens to something not there (the word).)

Even for Quine the consequential wholeness of the quoted, its impregability towards being cut up into well formed parts, has limits: not every smudge, or dust speck, positioned in the linear physical space *between* the quotes are considered parts of the quoted expression.

Quine can claim easily enough, I suppose, that he isn't forced to consider smudges and specks parts of the quotation.

The Why is harder to explain. But, one might try, why cannot Quine, like everyone else, be allowed to operate with our identity criteria for linguistic item-representation? The point is just that. Quine, like the rest of us, employs the identity criteria for the graphs occurring: but *these graphs represent the word he doesn't wish to see involved in the representation of the quoted.*

5

Its rationale

Why then, this persistence? To understand that I believe we have to look back to the accepted implication: from being a word to being used, that implication (and *not* the converse: from being used (properly restricted) to being a word) is the operative one.

We are left with the puzzle why use/mention theorists exclude mentioned items from being (at the same time) also used.

The theory of use and mention has its initial starting point, and its *rationale*, in a misplaced analogy.

The analogy is the one drawn between using words to talk about words, and using words to talk about (ordinary) *nonlinguistic* items.

When talking about ordinary things we do not *use* these things, we *only* talk about them, we mention them. So, the analogy goes, when talking about words, we likewise do *not* use these words, we talk about them, we *mention* them.

And just as an object talked about simply does not, and indeed cannot, exist there among the words used to talk about it, so a word mentioned cannot be there either. A quoted string of *words*, therefore, is not in the quotation. Note that the reason why an object mentioned cannot be among the words used to discuss it is simply that non-linguistic objects cannot be among words, at all. But that reason doesn't work in the case of *words* mentioned. They do nicely among other words.

If the string were in the quotation it would be there *as* a string of words, and if it were a string of words it would be used as such. But it is not used as a string of words and is therefore not a string of words.

So, there would be no *reason* to think that the quoted expression, plus the quotes, were anything but one simple, unanalyzable, *name*.

Thus the attitude to the quoted expressions as being syntactically simple gets its impetus from the applied analogy.

It is worth stressing that not only the quoted expression, but also the *whole* quotation will be an unanalyzable unit according to this view.

We could therefore be accused of falsifying that view by concentrating on the quoted expression, since we *from that* (seem to) reach the quotation by simply adding the quotes. It must be stressed that, according to the classical view considered, this procedural account is misleading. I am also wrong in claiming as a part of this view that the quoted expression is an unanalyzable whole: it is a formationally ill-formed extract of one. The only excuse is that if the quoted would otherwise be complex it is natural to talk about it and say that it is, in quotes, not analyzable as a complex. Quine doesn't separate the cases of quoting just one word from quoting more than one. And he needn't, since the simple-complex difference we note is inoperative.

Quotes, on the classical view, are not pairs of separable units *addable* to all and sundry. Quotes come readyfixed with the quotation. They are endless in number, and only graphically similar, otherwise different. Quotes, for the classical camp, are like letters of the alphabet, and not like functors or operators.

('Not' does roughly the same to 'I like walking' and to 'You like walking', when fitted; what 's' does to 'lob' and to 'top' are incomparable. (When 's' is prefixed that is, the verb modifier 's', suffixed to stem, is *not* a letter.))

6

The keeping of words

Proponents of the classical position (words suffer an identity crisis when quoted) have a point, but they have misplaced it.

Instead of claiming the non-existence of words when quoted, they ought to claim that the difference between quoting and (otherwise) using words is one of *semantic force* (I owe this phrasing of the point to John Foster), not one of ontological status, or syntactic identity. And *if a word* can be used with a difference in semantic force how can this situation entail a difference in word *identity*?

It is the contention here that the application of the analogy sketched above has invited trouble.

Ordinary things can only, by linguistic means, be mentioned, they cannot be incorporated into syntax. On the other hand, bits of language, capable of linguistic use, can only be used, *if* they are to be classified as bits of language. For words, mentioning, exclusive of use, is no category of handling.

Whatever distinctions we make as to how words *function* when quoted, must be constructed within a horizon of use.

To establish word identity is the major philosophical problem a theory of quoting has to face; and its solution is the main demand put on such a theory.

Another worry to bear in mind is whether we must *talk about* words when we quote them.

The classical theory, with its insistence that quotations are names, will say of course, that when we mention, refer to, *name*, words we do also talk about them. If the quotation *is* a name, which it must be on the classic view, then the rest of the sentence embedding the quotation must contain predicates true or false of what the quotation names: words.

These two contentions partly stand and fall together. If quotations needn't be names then the rest of the sentence needn't contain predicates true or false of the quoted expression either. But, even if quotations were names, the most natural parsing of the sentence might give a predicate attached to some other name-expression, that predicate might have the quotation as part – as will be the case e.g. if the quotation were in a referentially opaque position.

Let me close this account by insisting that it cannot be imperative upon this critique to survey the whole field of what 'linguistic use' can possibly denote. The crucial point is whether use and mention are mutually exclusive categories of word handling.

7

The ontology of words

It will be seen below that my solution to the problem of word identity is to erect a three-tier semantic ontology. It distinguishes between occurrences on the *paper*, occurring on the *page*, and being (part of) a *text*.

The quoted expression is not fully a part of the quoter's text. Or rather, since paradigmatically he quotes someone, the quoted has full semantic force in the text quoted from, but loses this while transferred into the quoter's text.

The main distinction carried by something having full semantic force is, we could say, that of being original *for* the mind expressing itself. The expression is put by someone in order to make his point of view.

When we quote we allow ourselves to be taken over by that way of expressing oneself, but the putting into words of that way of looking at things wasn't done by *us*.

Quotation marks are iterable (for a denial see Geach [*Logic Matters*, p. 208], but for a distinction on the issue, see below), and thus quotable, they must, consequently, in one sense at least, be linguistic items. But, they are capable of losing that status while employed in discourse – the loss is incurred when they work as quotes.

Quotes, I shall say, are only on the *paper*, demarcating a bit of a *page*. The quoted expression is on the *page*, and this occupancy signifies that we are dealing with *linguistic* items. Non-quoted items occurring on the page will have their full semantic force, and thus be a part of the text. These are the items expressing speaker's own mind.

The way of words

The strategy here is first to clarify quoting as a way of referring to an item, such that both the item and the quotation are used.

Secondly, I intend to put the *practice* of quoting into a wider setting of conditions regulating linguistic encounters. This way, it is hoped, the theory of quoting ties in with the main interest of the essay.

Summarily, the outline is this: I go from the nature of the quoted, inside quotes, to the quoted as belonging to a text, trying to argue that only if the quoted paradigmatically does come from a text can we bestow on it a certain nature, viz. that of an item of language.

Furthermore, a text belongs essentially to a speaker, it is the content of his particular act on a particular occasion. And, it is necessary to the exercise of language that bits of language are presented in such a manner: to be the *property* of an agent is the manner in which language *shows itself*.

Status as a linguistic item means to have the possibility of being used with full semantic force.

One minimal demand put on such a bestowal is that there must be texts where the item possesses full semantic force. But more seems needed than the mere *existence* of such texts. We therefore *link* the *quoted* expression to another text, the one we quote from. So, a *causal* bond exists between the two texts.

This connectedness is often underplayed when one tries to account for the problem of how words *mean* something to us. Words can be forgotten – and remembered. It will then be a truism that they have been used often before. But more is needed if these words are to take their place in a meaningful, connecting, activity. If, on the contrary, prior usage were all that were needed, then speech acts would exist, acts whose only claim to meaningfulness were that they shared linguistic items with other speech acts.

Speech acts must be bound to, and by, other speech acts. I believe this is because language is used to express human thoughts, we reveal and express ourselves. The most explicit way by which we *learn* to do that is by *imitating* others, by taking their *words*, their means of expression. We are inclined to focus on another's act in order to act ourselves.

This dependent status of quoting we press home by insisting that we paradigmatically quote from someone's text, thus making quoting into a communicative action between people.

* The link between quoting and interpersonal communicative action is further gleaned from the fact that mechanical operations, like iterating quotation marks, cannot be pursued long before the activity loses all contact with reality. And this loss is not incurred because one operated illicitly, but because the *human* interest, and control, operated upon a domain void of communicative content.*

Interlude

I shall talk exclusively in terms of language as used for cognitive purposes – used in judgements as to how the world presents itself.

If language is employed, by particular agents, for the purpose of judging, then the proper response for the auditor is to evaluate the truth claims put forward.

In the following pages, when talking about the use of language, a restriction to the written word is made, this restriction is a mere convenience (due to this being a written exposition). But the words ‘speaker’, ‘hearer’, ‘listener’, and ‘auditor’ are kept, to indicate that the relevant speech situations contain two parties.

10

Analyzing the material

By ‘expression’ is meant an inscribed pattern [sequence of graphs] visible to the eye, strung out linearly on the surface of some suitable material.

Alternatively, as grasped from context, ‘expression’ will refer to a sequence of well formed marks, or to a meaningful sequence [of lexemes, or words].

This triple denotation should not cause any trouble. Only the last use applies in the context ‘quoted . . .’.

One way of directing attention to expressions is by the use of the displayed line, the display is a displaying line displaying the (displayed) line (or string) of expressions. [Mates: *Elementary Logic*, p. 19.] It is also called ‘displayed text’, text centered on a new line. [Quine: *Mathematical Logic*, p. 24.]

Another way is to use quotation marks, things like these:

thus showing the *materials* of the second device by using the first.

I shall, in the main, use quotation marks, and talk about *their* use, but for functional purposes the use of these marks is a mere proxy for the device of displaying.

Given the usual presentations of these two devices they are made to seem diametrically opposed: a quotation *names* the object, the displaying line *exhibits* it.

* I don’t hold with this opinion on the two devices, and chose to talk about quotes because they are seen to be iterable in a way the display device is not, quotes are, in addition, easier to exhibit than the displaying line.*

Quotes are difficult to handle. It is virtually impossible not to slip into a habit of confusing quoting and displaying.

Let us look at a scheme like: ‘. . . refers too ---’, and fill in the empty spaces in a standard way: ‘‘A’ refers to A’.

Non-formally we would like to say that the two occurrences of ‘A’ are occurrences of the same item, so that the first occurrence, as clothed in quotes,

specifies not only which item occurs last, but also which occurs first (inside the quotes).

But, while the scheme filled in can identify, in the case of the second occurrence of 'A' the specification as being a reference to the item, it cannot do so for the first occurrence, since: "A" *refers to whatever is inside the quotes*, is not an acceptable reading.

This is because the fill in of a scheme like the one above is the expression of a relation binding the *referents* of the phrases filling in the two empty places.

And in our fill in of the scheme there are no quotes in any of the referents, e.g. the first, the letter 'A', contains no quotes.

The underlined reading in fact says something thus: whatever is inside the quotes refers to whatever is inside the quotes: ill-formed or false, take your choice.

The mistake is spotted easily enough if we pay attention. Let us now change our example scheme to one where items are referred to.

When philosophers operate with schemes like: 's refers to t', where 's' is then replaced by a structural description of a term, and 't' by that term itself, then 's refers to t' must in quote'ese be written as: "A" refers to 'A'.

If we wish an acceptable informal reading of what that sentence states, it is: *whatever is inside the first pair of quotes refers to whatever is inside the inner quotation marks and refers also to whatever is inside the second pair of quotes.*

But, since only outermost quotation marks are *quotes* (see below for this assertion), we can *never* systematically, i.e. in quote'ese, state that a *quotation refers to whatever is inside the quotes*. (Inside its *own* quotes, that is. In "A" refers to 'A', the reference of the first term obviously refers to what we find inside the quotes of the second term. But quotations are traditionally said also to refer to what we find inside their own quotes. If so were the case, the quotation would correctly read: the first term-display refers to second term-display, and this is identical with what is inside quotes of first term-display. We are no longer talking about *the referents* of quotations.)

In quote'ese, only that which we *use* (term-displays) has quotes, the *mentioned* never has.

What goes into a quotation?

'The name of a name or other expression is commonly formed by putting the named expression in single quotation marks; the whole, called a *quotation*, denotes its interior.' [Quine, op. cit., p. 24.] (Quine's preference for single quotation marks is here adhered to.)

Quotation marks work in pairs (a complete pair is displayed on page 14); one half is put in front of the named expression, the other half is put immediately after it. (Note the straightforward action language: 'put in front'.)

When thus applied, the whole, including the marks, is called a name of that which occurs between the marks.

This use of quotation marks is called 'quoting', and the marks, when used in that way, are called 'quotes'.

The marks used in quoting are called 'quotation marks', but that label refers to the marks as orthographic items (after they have been earmarked for such a use), and not to the marks when actually used in quoting, i.e. when used as outermost pair.

A quotation consists of the named, the so-called '*quoted expression*', and the pair of quotes.

Let it here be stipulated that an expression, inside quotes, shall be called 'the quoted expression', while that same expression, considered as an expression *of* that text we quote from, shall be called 'the expression quoted'. As defined, the two things are two occurrences of one graphsequence.

As a name a quotation is rather peculiar, the quotes work as pointers, directing attention to what lies between them. *Quotes* can *only* form a part of a name of that which lies between the quotes, they cannot be a part of that which is named.

'A quotation is not a *description*, but a hieroglyph; it designates its object not by describing it in terms of other objects, but by picturing it.' [Quine, op. cit., p. 26.]

A quotation is a name, and not a description, of its object. But it names its object, not through having been correlated with it by a particular conventional set-up (*this* name and *that* object), but through a *general* convention of *displaying*, or, as Quine would say, picturing, that which is named.

And this generality makes quotes seem more like functors, or words, than like letters.

*Use/mention theorists may counter, indeed it is their only move, by claiming that we recognize the work of a general convention of quoting in all these syntactically independent quotation-names *because* quotation marks distinguish a unique class whose members are all quotations. A situation on par with every lexical fill in of 'x . . .' being, say, common nouns.*

And, as the quoted expression is, orthographically at least, a part of its quotation-name, it has to be argued why the quotation cannot have, minimally, the syntactic complexity had by the expression quoted: i.e. why should the quoted expression not have the complexity of the expression quoted? These two are, if nothing else, faithfully matching counterparts of each other – orthographically.

12

Meta- and object language

This brings us to the vexing problem of meta- versus object language.

The quotation belongs to the metalanguage, the expression quoted to the object language.

But what of the quoted expression, as it sits there, between the quotes?

Let us assume that all the expressions quoted are items also of the metalanguage. We are, in other words, picturing a (meta)language capable of quoting parts of itself. (In the present debate this is an innocuous assumption.)

Now, the quoted expression will be parts of the metalanguage, either as improper parts (by orthographic accidents as Quine will have it) or as proper parts (by virtue of syntactic rules). Which is it to be? If the first is the case then the quoted expression \neq the expression quoted, if the second is the case then the quoted expression = the expression quoted.

For my money it is a red herring to talk of orthographic accidents in this field. Quoting is a way of incorporating material into one's language, and its products must be subjected to the relevant rules of acquisition: that which one takes *becomes* part of one's language. As such it is well formed.

One might complain about the position taken here, since it talks about, seemingly, something different from that which we started out with, viz. quoting as a way of talking about items already part of one's language.

The distinction used in the objection will refer to items already used by us, versus those *not* used by us. But what one achieves by quoting is a demarcation of what one finds to be governed by one's linguistic system, and it is to be taken for granted that other items than those used already can be found *usable* (to have meaning). By quoting these (that, as the objection will have it, aren't parts of one's language), one shows that they are governable, and are, or can be, of one's language. If this weren't feasible, how could one increase, or add to, language?

If our syntax governs the incorporation, and its device: quoting, then the quoted material *is* taken up as part of the metalanguage.

The obvious retort to this is that we do also quote items *definitely* not belonging to one's own language. Indeed we do and this is merely a consequence of something we shall take up later, namely the speaker's knowledge that there are other languages than his own. The point here, however, is this: if we quote an item, and we are not in effect detailing a language to which it belongs, for instance by trying to find its *real* meaning, then we do tackle it as something we are free to incorporate into our sentential structures. From that the step is not long to give it *a* meaning. *That* meaning will make the item *of* our language.

I haven't done much clarification of the concept of [semantic force] applicable in varying degrees to items. People who wish to give a specific account of quoting might therefore feel that, if the semantic force with which an item is used can vary also in other types of speech acts then something more is needed to account for quoting.

This could take the following form. The quoted expression and the expression quoted are not the same item. The relation between them is properly conceived to be one of translation: we intend them to have the same meanings – or meanings systematically related. The stress is upon taking seriously the idea that the meta- and the object language are *two* languages.

I wish to discredit that approach by trying to argue that items of, indub-

itably, the same language can also be used in such a way that identity of meaning becomes a problem. And that therefore more than one language could be said to be involved.

The quoted expression and the expression quoted hopefully match in phones and graphs.

But *these* respects are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for establishing that they are the same item. They are not necessary because an item is written with orthographic variations to such a degree that we might differ as to which word is written down. They are not sufficient because saying the same expressions at the same time doesn't entail *meaning* the same, that the expressions were the same item.

Sameness of meaning is something altogether different from the foregoing identities. But while, given the others (roughly), it *might* establish mutual understanding, and thereby a language identity going beyond the surface of shared expressions and syntax, it is also useless as a *criterion* for such identity. And *without* expressional identities, meaning the same counts for nothing since people speaking different languages can very well *mean* the same. How were translation otherwise possible?

There is a way of speaking the same language: use the same words in the same senses, and still not understand each other, viz. if we didn't believe the other to use one's own words with one's own meanings.

In order to decide whether or not two sets of utterances belong to the same language, or whether an utterance is an utterance of a given language, we are left with the identity of our written marks, and the rules for combining them. Whatever else we might have becomes a matter of interpreting and trying to understand what is written.

*The perceptive reader will have noticed that I equivocated between two senses of 'meaning the same': one where item identity were sufficient, the second where one with different items could mean the same – and implicitly where one could mean different things with the same items, to wit if these items were of different languages. This equivocation stems, I believe, from two things: {a} we wish to identify languages by their items, and {b} it is *so* easy to identify items by their expressions. And in one language, what could be more natural than to put our trust in the second practice? We must only face up to the difficulties this practice creates for us when more than one language is considered.*

The position I take is uncompromising: when we are in a quandary, not understanding what is said, then till we know *whether one or another language is involved* our difficulty is indifferent to the two senses of 'meaning' spoken of in the note above. That is, we do not know whether a different language was spoken (different items) or whether the (familiar) items carried a (speaker's) meaning we just didn't catch – even though the language used were our own.

It is reasonable to say that meanings – items' meanings – from different languages aren't related in semantically systematic ways, there is no syntactic marking of such relations.

Therefore, since it is agreed by proponents of the classical theory of quoting that the quotation, the quoted expression, and the expression quoted, are semantically related in a systematic way, two languages are *not* joined by the quoting device in the surface manner envisaged by these proponents. Two languages of some sort meet in the act of quoting, yes, but these are speakers' languages, not natural ones.

The situation is consequently not describable as one of one expression being used as two items (to employ the first sense of 'meaning identity') nor one of one item having two unrelated (sets of) meanings (in the second sense of 'meaning identity').

Our uncertainty in relating *item* and *language*, especially with both speaker's language and natural languages in the picture, give a considerable leeway as to what is the proper relation between the quoted expression and the expression quoted: such a relation being a measure of the relation between meta- and objectlanguages.

I will claim that there is no ground for denying that the same relation also exists between utterances from different idiolects (speakers' languages) belonging to people speaking the same natural language.

Ultimately, whatever unity one bestows on the material of linguistic activity (sc. being of the same (natural) language), the *grounds* for the bestowal stem from the fact that different speakers are willing to employ the material in a fashion indicating the goings on of a particular (sc. linguistic) give and take activity where the people engaged stand in mutual relations of comprehension – of varying degrees.

If I am willing to incorporate into my share of such an activity expressions lifted from other texts then I show a willingness to say that such material is, at least potentially, a part of my contribution also to our common language. I might have to do some explaining as to exactly what that part *means*, but then I often have to do just that.

13

The location of the quoted

A quotation, because it possesses syntactic complexity, need not be a description, 'John Brown', or at least 'Harland & Brown' are *complex* terms because the parts 'John', 'Brown', and 'Harland' are themselves *complete* terms, but neither of the two examples is a description, since no predicates are involved.

Quine's assertion that quotations are hieroglyphs seems mistaken, if for no other reason than because words are too abstract to be picturable. (Hieroglyphs are pictures, they denote by depicting.)

Here is an interpretation of what Quine could mean: one finds between the quotes, in a pictorial *conventional* sense, the *identifying properties* of that one is referring to. That which is referred to is not between the quotes, but, one might say, the criteria for recognizing it are laid bare between the quotes.

This seems to be what Quine wants, and intends, with his account, but it causes him embarrassment.

First of all it doesn't square with Quine's view that quotes obliterate the structure of the quoted. How can the quoted expression lay bare the structure of the expression quoted as long as the quoted expression doesn't *really* possess any structure itself? (The pictorial convention works against luck.)

However, let us for the sake of the further argument, disregard that obstacle. So Quine, through the existence of the hieroglyph, has the means for an identifying reference to the expression quoted.

But, *where*, and what, is the pictured object? It is not between the quotes because the pictured object is not *in* the picture that is a picture *of* it.

But can Quine allow that? It doesn't seem to square with his statement that a quotation denotes its interior. [Quine, *op. cit.*, p. 24.]

Quine can now say one of two things: either the pictured object is *in* the picture, or the interior of a quotation is not there between its quotes!

Both these choices share one important limitation: the reference of the quotation will have to be an abstract object. That is, otherwise perhaps attractive choices as to what a quotation referred to are out. These choices would be things like: one other particular graph, set of graphs, set of *relevant* graphs.

Quine's loss of the physical angle is not very great, no one would like to say either that the quoted expression were between the quotes, *and nowhere else*, or that the pictured object is some physical thing, outside the picture.

Quine can now turn towards the abstract, and claim that, since the abstract isn't anywhere in particular, it might as well be considered to be *in* the picture, and *between* the quotes.

This way of talking is just fine, but it is also short for saying that, at this point, we have an *adequate representative* for that abstract entity. And, for linguistic items, adequate representation is had only when an expression is *used* as an item. So, that quoted expression is used after all.

14

Item and mark

Quotation marks cannot be put outside something that just is not there on the *page*. Only items of a language are on the page.

In the sentence 'An item is on the page.', we have simply said what it is to *be* (or, *how* it is to be) an item – in addition also how the quoted expression exists.

But if the sentence is given as an answer to: 'Where is that which we quote?', this question, and the above answer, must be separated from another, and different, issue.

Suppose we are confronted with the following piece of reasoning: 'Expressions, *qua* physical marks, are on the paper, i.e. on the physical surface of the inscribed material. Furthermore, only marks are on the paper. Items, which

are what we quote, are all members of a sub-class of expressions, so, that which we quote is on the paper – i.e. items are physical marks.’

I do not wish to evade this conclusion by pleading that the triple denotation of ‘expression’ is possible due to an ambiguity in the word. On the contrary, these three denotations are closely related in a manner not detectable on what we may loosely call ‘one level of existence’. The more physical, or material, ones are *representations* of the more abstract ones. This relationship is obscured if we claim that ‘expression’ is ambiguous and that is all there is to it.

The inference presented us above is illicit because it concludes *from* a mere fact of class inclusion: items are expressions, *to* a similarity of existence: items are marks on paper. That reasoning ignores the fact that having a different existence just is the distinguishing mark between items and mere physical marks.

*This is a sounder demarcation than saying that the distinction is one between two classes of penned figures such that membership of each class is decided by physical shape. Such an inscriptional shape distinction, *even if possible at any given stage*, would only have synchronic validity.*

We have to realize that the difference is precisely one as to how these entities exist, and we can then go on to claim that this is the *same as saying that one is a representation of the other*. (I shall later say more about being on paper versus being on the page as different cases of transcendence.)

15

Defining quotes

A definition of ‘quote’ would run somewhat as follows: a mark working in (surveyable or recursively checkable) conjunction with another mark of its kind, displaying what lies between them, *and without being part of the display*.

‘What lies between them’: this phrase denotes only relevant material, bits of language; it demands conventions for identifying and writing down items: directions, linearity, spacing, counting of items, in other words, it demands the page.

We have to take *note* of the quotes in order to identify the displayed item (pick it out), but the character of the marks used as quotes is incidental to our recognition of the character of the quoted expression.

By this, I do not advocate a conventionalism for quotation marks only, but point out merely that while the quoted is on the page, the quotes are not. They interfere with the status of something on the page, the force it has there, but for this they needn’t themselves be there.

Quoted quotation marks will be on the page, since they have then taken the character of an item. They are, in that position, more abstract than the quotes themselves are, even though quotes are somewhat abstract objects (being marks-used-such-and-such).

The size of quotations

Only items that can be put *between* marks can be indicated by quotations. Does this requirement entail *any* restriction on the length of possible quoted expressions (and items)?

If sequences of items are defined syntactically there doesn't seem to be an upper limit on their length.

*Length is one case of sentential complexity. Another is the number of argument-places found among the largest possible predicates.

James McCawley, in his: *Where do noun phrases come from*, reprinted in [Steinberg & Jakobovits (eds.): *Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader*; note on p. 221], claims that natural languages will have, at most, 4-place predicates. He doesn't state any reasons.*

If sentences are regarded as *meaningful* sequences there does seem to be an upper limit in operation, viz. the one registering too great a strain upon our ability to *understand* item-sequences.

The analogue for quotations, to the syntactic criterion for sequences, would simply be to start with the first quotation mark and keep ticking marks till we find one paired off with it. The only problem is the technical one of matching marks correctly.

If we submit quotations to the second criterion there would also be an upper limit on their constructability, namely the one demarcated by the strain put on perception, we would have to *see* that something were *between* two quotes.

(If this formulation of the second criterion, as applied to quotations, doesn't look sufficiently like the formulation applied to item-sequences, *see* versus *understand*, then remember that *to understand quotes* (in this respect) *is* to see two marks linked up as matching quotes.)

*On the classical view the penultimate paragraph makes little sense. The *length* of a quotation, something considered a name, doesn't worry the proponents of that view, since the syntactic role of the quotation is thus fixed. What little sense the use/mention theorists find in the paragraph relates to their difficulty of identifying the *object* referred to by a *very* long quotation.*

When is there more than one language?

Whenever we quote we refer to something that carries, or can carry, sense. (We scrutinize the quoted expression as a (potential) sense-carrier.) So only bits of language are quoted.

What then is one language, in contrast to another. It is going too far to say there is none, that all the difference is found in the speakers. But basically, I would like to answer that one language is that spoken between two persons

who understand each other, and between any of these two and a third person such that mutual understanding also reigns here.

But this, even though it is a demarcation along sound lines, will not do as it stands. There is no reason, if the persons involved speak more than one language, why several languages shouldn't enter the communicative situations *without breaking our descriptive claims*.

We could try saying that no speaker must be using, or in command of, more than one language, but this, of course, is hopeless since it smuggles in the sought requirement – that they speak the *same* language.

Natural languages seem likely candidates for language-hood, and only in rare cases are they well defined.

Natural languages seem placed half way between a universal language (the correlate of universal grammar) and entities distinguished simply as different utterance-outputs.

Some men speak more than one language. The truth of that proposition cannot stem merely from the fact that some people understand only some of his utterances. People are, notoriously, ignorant about some parts of their own, natural, language.

The utterances not understood must belong to a language which the speaker can place vis-à-vis the language of these people. If they are his people, and don't understand him, then he is using a foreign language, if they are not of his people, and don't understand him, he speaks a language foreign to them, either his own or a third language.

But, since people may both understand a foreign tongue, and fail to understand (utterances in) their native tongue, the above description may apply *without being known to do so*.

If so, then Ego doesn't know he speaks more than one language. The following proposition will, under this lack of knowledge conditions, hold true: All the items a man understands, and can use, are of his *language*.

This proposition, and the one that some men speak more than one language, are near-contradictories, but only because we fail to calculate with some possibilities.

To sum up, if one doesn't know one speaks two or more different languages, and can sort items accordingly, then all one's items belong to one and the same language. In the mind, transparent daylight shines but dimly.

The nature of quotes

We have so far carefully distinguished quotation marks, as marks of a particular typographic shape, from the occurrences of these marks as name-forming devices, as quotes.

As with all marks employed in communication there is a general reason for such care: when the marks occur in non-communicative contexts, or for non-communicative purposes, then they simply aren't what they are in occurrences with communicative intent.

For quotation marks we have the additional fact that syntactic propriety allows iteration of quotation marks. We may quote an item, the quotation-name of that item, etc.

As said before, with such an iterated employment a complication occurs: only the outermost pair of marks are *quotes*. The other pair(s) of quotation marks are simply *parts* of item quoted.

*Take the quotation consisting of a mark, the first and second letters of the alphabet, and another mark, *in other words*: "ab".

'a' and 'b' are parts of "ab", and "" is also a part of "ab". But these three differ in the role they have. "" not only makes "ab" into *that* name {name of the first two letters}, but makes "ab" into a *name*. {Granting that 'ab' is not one.}

'a', and 'b', only makes "ab" into that name: by detailing of what it is a name.

Now, if we look at the name we so far have been *using*: ""ab"", the marks immediately adjacent to the letters play exactly the same role as these do. The function of a mark, therefore, depends on its position.

{On reading these paragraphs, remember the last line of section 10, above, p. 15.}

This conclusion is entirely proper, granting the propriety of quoting quotations.

(If we *could* have a sequence containing more than one pair of *quotes* then the item displayed would simply be whatever sequence we found between the innermost pair of quotation marks. *All* marks, if working as quotes, would cooperate in naming that sequence. We would thus, contrary to hypothesis, be unable to quote quotations.

To allow iteration is more than merely allowing for proprieties otherwise without consequence. Iteration is part and parcel of theoretical profits reaped by using quotes. {Not that these profits loom largely.} If we have a set: object, name of that object, name of name of that object, etc., then we wish to know, for any one of these, what it is a name of, if it is a name at all, and what its name is. Such a set is easily ordered if every name is formed by putting the named object inside quotes. The number of marks will then give unique answers to the questions above. {With the usual set-theoretic counting of members.} Ordinary naming procedures do not accomplish this: for ordinary names, we could say, the naming relation is *opaque*.

Interestingly, so will the quotation device turn out to be on Quine's account of it.

According to him, the quotes are in reality, and in theory, an integral part of the quotation. So we cannot typographically *see* what object is named. The theoretical profit can only be gained by letting the quotes show what they pick out, and also, going beyond mere ordering, when the quoted marks show what they would name were they quotes. Quotation marks must be transparent in this sense, otherwise there would be no merit in using them.*

We can thus give a sense to Geach's denial that quotes are iterable, a sense agreeable to the view put forward here.

The reason Geach gives, however, is that quotes provide an intentional context. [Geach, *loc. cit.*]

I take this as, *perhaps*, a way of putting the point I express by saying that quoted expressions lack their full semantic force.

Geach's opinion is of interest since an interesting parallel to iterated quotation marks exist with iterated modalities. It is of interest since some, at least, of the modalities are intensional, or intentional, adverbs, verbs, or operators. (Modalities include here so-called 'propositional attitudes'.)

Hintikka, in the first few pages of his *Logic, Language-games, and information*, contrasts personal modalities, or, as they are also called, propositional attitudes, with descriptive content, as they are typically marked in sentences.

The descriptive content describes, or is expressed by the description of, a (part of a) world.

The personal modality registers a personal attitude, of some individual, either towards this description or towards that described (part of a) world.

Let us start off with a sentence not containing any personal attitude: or rather, one not *marked* with any, say 'p'. We then tack onto it an attitude operator 'B', which, subscripted with a name, will result in a designator for a personal attitude. If the name is 'a', the result is 'B_ap'.

Let us now prefix another attitude designator, say 'H_b' (a ≠ b), the sentential result is 'H_bB_ap'.

If 'H' is read as 'hopes that', then the sentence 'B_ap' now expresses the descriptive content towards which b stands in the propositional attitude of hoping (true).

In the context of 'H_b . . . 'B_a', therefore, will *not* designate an attitude towards a descriptive content to the *exclusion* of expressing a part of such a descriptive content. And, if it cannot play that role, exclusively, it is part of a *descriptive* content.

Thus attitudes, which we like to think of as expressing attitudes towards claims as to what is the case, can themselves be described as being the case.

Hintikka therefore concludes, [*op. cit.*, page 7], that the two sentential components cannot be distinguished as 'simply as might seem'.

*It is also difficult to display displaying lines. It may be thought necessary, in order to explain the display convention, to display, and not simply use, the displaying line itself. We might, consequently, try to do just that, by, for instance, *doubling* the space between ordinary lines preceding and succeeding the assumed *displayed* displaying line.

But in such a case the displayed displaying line would no longer occur after a *colon* on the line above, but after a displaying line (which itself would follow, in such a fashion, after a colon).

And this would constitute a change of convention since the convention we wished to display is one where the displaying line contains (has on it) the displayed item. (And not, as here, precedes it.)

Perhaps, instead of this, we could simply display the displaying line by leaving it open, empty of any items. In this case we cannot distinguish between

a line (supposedly) displaying itself, and a line displaying nothing, a line not being a display of anything. Since both devices (doubling (iterating) lines, and leaving line empty) fail, we conclude that the displaying line cannot be displayed.*

19

The syntactic nature of the quoted

I have stated that by quoting we incorporate *the quoted expression* into our language (our texts), by subjecting it to our rules of grammar.

Formally, a quotation looks like a name, but it is a delicate question whether every occurrence of a quotation need, or can, be taken as the occurrence of a name. A quotation may be capable of filling a space between two full stops, one between two commas, down to that between two words.

The interesting feature is that any given quotation needn't fill only one of these spaces, in other words, we do not have to take it as of a constant syntactic form, but can choose how to conceive its internal composition, and how we wish its composition represented. And we seem able to vary this. This is what I mean by saying that we incorporate it according to our syntactic understanding and preference. (The expression quoted has one form, but it doesn't enforce that form on the quoted expression or the quotation.)

*Perhaps we are, in this respect, misled by the quoting device: instead of looking upon the quoted expression as on a par with sequences, not associated with any form, the presence of marks tend to make us think that it is the *quotation* that is incorporated into our text, and language. (And quotations, like orders and questions, seem to possess one particular form.)

But, it is, in any interesting sense, the quoted expression which is taken up, and neither the seeming form of the quotation, nor the form of the expression quoted, must be allowed to force our hand here.*

20

Tokens and type

The only restriction stated so far on quotable items is that they must be items of a language, and therefore exist on the page, subjected to the rules for orthographically represented objects.

I now wish to go back to a remark on page 21, and take up what was there called different cases of transcendence.

It is common, when discussing the existence of linguistic items, or the orthographic representations of items, to introduce Peirce's distinction between *type* and *token*. [See his *Collected Papers*, especially 4, 537.]

Peirce's exposition is much subtler than most discussions indicate. I shall have occasion later in this section to point out one distinction he makes which shows this clearly.

The type is considered to be the item, and occurrences (or inscriptions) of that item are tokens (of that type).

Tokens are located, physically so, on the paper, they are there as marks embedded on the surface. Tokens are concrete entities, designed visual patterns made of some material stuff.

Tokens seem excellent candidates for that which is displayable on paper. If we have two pieces of paper, with a token (of the same type) on each piece, then these tokens are numerically different. Something on this piece of *paper* is *only* on this piece, ontologically: tokens are *particulars*.

If we count two tokens, we count two things. Being two particulars, and hence two individuals under the same criteria of individuation, they cannot, as two things, *both* be *that* individual which the linguistic item is, and of which these particulars are tokens. (Universals are construable as individuals, hence the distinction between [particular] and [individual].)

The problem left us by the type/token dichotomy is how, or as what, we identify the type.

*It is possible to stop at the tokens, and not go beyond them in this identification of the type. We would identify, more or less arbitrarily, the type with a *particular* token, an ur-token of some sort (like that metal bar in Paris which used to be the standard metre), or we could employ a rule, e.g. to the effect that the presently used token is the type (like the presently used ruler being the metre). This latter suggestion has a familiar ring to it, and seems intuitively correct.

It is worth some reflection why we, when confronted with the type (the present token), and thinking of (not: confronted with!) one that sometime ago was looked upon as the type (say my last but one production of a word, this, when used, was itself looked upon as the type), tend to retract our current judgement that the presently used token is the type, and instead conclude lamely that both are tokens. Why shouldn't the token in actual use, that which at that moment, uniquely among tokens, exists as a representation of a mental object, be the type? (We would even get out of the 'there are five tokens on the same page' by claiming that as readers we really scan one only at a time.)*

It is usual to go beyond the tokens in the theoretical identification of the type.

Once we take this step beyond the token, beyond both the particular one, and the representative one (see note above), two, broadly different, lines of attack seem available to us.

The first is to identify the type as the class of tokens, either the class of past and present tokens, or the class including also future tokens. For want of a better word, we call this the class-theoretic approach.

As it stands this approach is vulnerable to the charge laid above against tokens as type.

We shall therefore expound rather on a cousin of this approach. We construe classes in a nominalistic spirit, that is, classes become *wholes* of some kind. For purposes of individuation, the type will be identified as such a whole,

and would be, like the particular tokens, a *concrete*, but physically disconnected, entity. Such, in its final form, is the first approach, the *nominalistic* one. (We shall make light of the fact that tokens as such are more of a kind with other tokens of the same type, than is necessary for parts that make up a whole.)

The second approach, the *platonistic* one, will take types to be non-concrete, abstract entities, which, by the nature of things, will transcend whatever concrete objects we display.

The item will simply not be there, displayed on paper. The relation between the type and its tokens will be one of manifestation or embodiment. The type appears in the token.

If what we display are items, then, according to the nominalist what we display is on the paper, according to the platonist it would (perhaps) be located on the page. (It is certain, I take it, that it would be in the text.)

The nominalist is seen as a man who denies what we have been asserting all along, viz. that types (items) are on the page. But, at the same time, he commits himself to a venture beyond the particular token, and this is a venture of a form not recognized by the platonist, since the platonist goes from *any* token to his type. The nominalistic venture is, of course, to recognize the *identical* claims of several tokens. This seems a venture it is essential to make room for.

The platonist keeps in mind that objects, dignified as vehicles of communication between minds, have more than a localized space-time physical existence.

The position taken up here is therefore a combination of the two sketched above. (Which goes to show either my muddle or the proper value of labels in philosophy.)

I think both approaches involve a venture beyond the particular token in respect of fixing the type identity and the manner of type existence.

According to the theory put forward here both are incomplete. They each catch on to one way in which the type transcends the token, and each one sticks to the way best suited to its overall philosophical tone.

The nominalistic venture beyond the token I shall call 'the transcendence of the *enclosed*' {'enclosed' doesn't mean enclosed inside quotes!}; the platonistic venture I shall call 'the transcendence of the *embodied*'. Both of the terms 'enclosed' and 'embodied' are intended to be used in fairly obvious senses.

*I wish to be perfectly understood on one point. When I say that tokens can be seen as occurrences of the type, are on the paper, this leaves open the possibility of talking about the type occurring also in another sense. We can say, e.g., that the word 'soandso' occurred on such and such pages of Goodman's *Languages of Art*, we therefore, in that terminology, allow (or seem to allow) occurrences of types to be themselves also on the page – as the type is.

The uncertainty here is reflected in the uncertainty with which we characterize the relation between types and tokens. We have provisionally said that this relationship is stated in 'a token is an occurrence of its type', we have furthermore, when expounding the three-tier ontology, reserved the word

'occurrence' for what was found on the paper, to wit tokens (see page 12), for what we found on the page, the *verb* 'occur' was used.

Without some legislation here, the situation is, as the example above shows, indiscriminative: 'occurrence of type' can refer to something existing either on paper or on page. In my terminology, which we hopefully will stick to, 'occurrence of type' shall refer to tokens – something on the paper. Whenever a word (type) is used, it itself occurs on the page (see page 27 for claim that, as part of page conventions, only one token at a time is scanned, that we use 'token' to formulate conventions for the page only shows how paper and page are related).

If we refer to something occurring on the page then the token would not *there* be called that which occurred. Token-nominalization is constructible only from 'b occurs (on the page)' to 'c, the occurrence of b, is on the paper', and not from 'b occurs (on the page)' to 'c, the occurrence of b, is on the page'.

We would construct an ontology of items where they had occurrences on the page, these would be of a *kind of* token, but a different one from the one in the type/token dichotomy.

Historical note. I claimed, on page 26, that Peirce's type/token distinction belonged to an exposition much subtler than that indicated by the slogan 'type/token'. All I knew of Peirce's account when the above was written was that slogan. I had later occasion to look closer, or I should say, look, at Peirce's text. Peirce has, not only types and tokens but, also what he calls an 'Instance', which in type/token terms would be a token, when, or insofar, it were a token of its type. The type is *instanced*, not tokened.

This, as I see it, is a focus on our refusal to nominalize tokens onto the page, and it furthermore does so by introducing the second kind of tokens hinted at above. I have abstained from that ontological construction, not knowing how to tackle the relationship between types and instances conceived as a type/token relation.*

21

Embodiment and enclosure

In the present theory, tokens become both the enclosure and the embodiments of types. Types (items) are enclosed and embodied. We can construct their ontology by starting off with some other kind of entity – the tokens. Since tokens are physical objects we reckon their existence as unproblematic, for them we have proper criteria of individuation and identity. (That is, we can identify *p* as a particular mark, I do not mean that we identify the token as such *as* a token (instance) of the letter (i.e. that the letter is instanced).)

Given that certainty, we are left the problem of accounting for the existence of that very different kind of entity which the type is. (And *this* problem can take form of asking how marks like *p* can be tokens of the letter 'p'.)

The theory employing [enclosure] and [embodiment] is meant to articulate

at least an awareness that, contrary to appearances (tokens), we do have grounds for disbelieving that types are nothing but tokens.

Such an awareness seems justified enough on reflection. For instance: in logic the chema 'P \supset P' is valid, either as a theorem or as a rule of introduction. That is, once 'P' is introduced we may go on writing 'P' down, once *it* is introduced we may go on writing *it* down. 'It' here refers to something that is *enclosed* in the different occurrences of the letter 'P'. The identity of that which 'it' refers to demands a transcendence from these different particular occurrences that are the enclosures of the letter 'P'. The relevant properties of the enclosed extend beyond any particular enclosure. (Note that one cannot, in order to get the point, say that what 'P' refers to demands, in order to be referred to, a transcendence of this occurrence of 'P' : 'P'. Any occurrence refers to something that transcends that occurrence. 'P' cannot be used because it refers to the type, not the token. A reference to the latter is demanded to bring the point out. But we haven't yet found a way of referring, by display, to *tokens*. (An *instance*, yes, but token, no. I tried, in first two paragraphs of present section, to refer to tokens by employing the linguists' italization device.) Were that display feasible we would have incorporated something not of language into something of language: a fragment of discourse.)

The above example of something enclosed is also, as it happens, an example of something embodied.

If we wish an illustration of the notion of embodiment we might consider the problems involved in managing to display tokens in discourse: as a consideration of how marks are transformed, from mere physical marks, once we see (and have) them as items of language. These added, or different, properties we then impute to the marks are not perceptible as aspects of any sensible appearance. (Unless we wish to say that being part of discourse is open to the senses.) We need to *know* of the marks that they are items.

Perhaps it is not merely by chance that the example above is also an example of embodiment. It is tempting to try to sort out whether the two transcendences are mutually ordered, or ranked, in the construction of item existence.

We can say that items are enclosed *because* they are embodied, it seems wrong, moreover, to say they are embodied because they are enclosed.

In type-token terms the enclosure would correlate with the comparison between one token and another (or several others, separately), while embodiment would be like going from the token to the type.

It is worth noting that going from one token to another is possible only because they are recognized as tokens of the same type, that is, prior to their internal relation stand the relation to the type. (See reference to Goodman on page 6.)

This seems to recognize some priority, in favour of embodiment, however difficult it is to pin down what form it takes. (Causal?, temporal?, hardly.)

Pulling the other way, in favour of declaring enclosure basic, stand the considerations underlying the discussion on pages 5–7, where we ended up

giving linguistic representations their dominant due in sorting themselves into groups, dependent upon what they represented.

The issue will rest here.

Tokens *individuate* items for us in the sense that sets of tokens are sets of tokens of the same type. And any token (provisionally) *identifies* the type for us in the sense that it is a token *of* that type.

Such an account leaves it fairly open how we are to present the relation between the physical mark and the item. We are *definitely* not forced to conceive it as a relation between two individuals, both *individuated* in advance.

It is perhaps wise at this point to interject a warning: the construction of the item is not seen as an analysis of what language users do when they learn to master linguistic intercourse.

22

What is an item?

The differences to bridge are those between tokens and types. The first on the paper, the second on the page and in the text. The page, in contradistinction to the paper, is non-material and does not preclude any entity on it from being in more than one place.

The ambitious way of bridging the gap is by trying to fix proper criteria for telling us *what* an item is, and how it exists. As this attempts to identify types independent of language, I consider it, apart from being ambitious, hopeless also.

Instead, I shall say that the issue is whether we *recognize* an item, and recognize the same item, as that item, when it re-occurs. Our interest is in whether two items are the same one, no matter what it is. Or rather, if we do that, it doesn't matter what more it may be. If re-identification is feasible then individuation and identification are done.

The one thing we need for this achievement is the existence, and application, of a *minimum convention*: our ability to recognize, and individuate, pieces of our *own* language. (I call this a convention, even though it comes out as a capacity of individual speakers, because it depends upon coordinated (as far as they go) judgements by the plural we.)

If we can find and individuate items of our own language, then we can say they exist where we find them, to wit, on the page.

This is a justification of views like Quine's where it is occurrences (inscriptions) that carry truth values – and presumably also sense. Our differences arise over the fact that I take items occurring to have much more of an abstract existence than Quine seems to do. But we agree on consequences I take to ensue from this basic orientation: possible difference in sense from one usage to another of the same item, the separability of idiolects, and indeterminacy of translation. I have tried to hint, in some formulations, at the importance of this empirical slant to the semantics for linguistic communication.

Let us now provisionally declare that the operative criterion for item-hood is *to be a part of the expression of thought*.

Quotes, on this criterion, do not qualify as items since they are merely demarcating a page location but exist themselves on the paper.

So this account sharply contrasts quotes and items. When items are used (to express *our* thoughts) they are properly items according to the operative criterion; but we also say they are items even when they are quoted (and do not directly express *our* thoughts.) And, paradoxically, even marks, when quoted, are judged items.

The situation leaves two questions: firstly, why call something quoted an item?, and secondly, why separate items and quotes?

The first question will have been (partly at least) answered by remarks like 'we incorporate the quoted into our text', I shall say more on this topic.

As for the second question, several considerations are involved here and some of these will be apparent later. Let it suffice to say here that ordinary items are items *in spite of* being quotable (quoted), while it is *because* they are quoted that (quoted) quotation marks are items. (Marks are not substances like letters of the alphabet are, so their item-status, when they possess such, is due to role behaviour.) For both marks and items it is unrepresentative to be found inside quotes. This shared position does not, therefore, go very far towards assimilating them as two of a kind.

23

The point of quoting

An item exists, as an item, on any location where it is found. The concept of [page] is the concept of the locations that items take.

The quotation is there on our page, as a product of our quoting, its location is in the quoter's text.

The preliminary task in quoting is to single out, and identify, that which exists inside the quotes.

This, the quoted expression, comes from another location and exists there as the expression quoted, but *what* that is which exists somewhere else than in quoter's text has to be found out by seeing what we find inside our quotes, in our textual pages.

The ultimate point behind quoting is to get at the speaker's intended thoughts, and thus have those thoughts ourselves.

And behind the struggle to get at that point lies the fact that when we introduce the speaker's words into our words, *his* words, as vehicles of *his* thoughts, are not located in our text. (We say either *that* or we will have to say that our thoughts, what we would mean by those words, *are* by definition speaker's thoughts, what he meant by saying those words, or, the words express two thoughts, one in each text, and these two just happen to have been expressed in the same words.)

But first of all we have to *present* speaker's words; whether we then

succeed in *placing* these mis-placed items depends on what we do with them, and what they do with us. That is, whether we get at speaker's thoughts depends on what we do with those quoted words of his.

How to quote

To quote is, on the face of it, merely to display certain items, and secondly, to ascribe *an* utterance of these items to someone. The second is incidental to quoting in this view, and done, as it were, simply by noting down the necessary facts as to where and when that utterance came.

As seemingly clinching reason for such an opinion is the practice of quoting mere words, items not of any *other* text: examples abound in the teaching of grammar.

If such a practice is both possible and actual, often done, and believed to be quite rule-conforming, why then this harping on the necessity for an operative link between the practice of quoting and the quoting from somebody?

Firstly, we don't quote mere marks, *they* are unanalyzable, opaque to grammar and lexical understanding: we cannot ask what were meant by using mere marks. To stress it once more, it is the quoting of items that is in question.

*Since 'quote' here carries the relevant sense of 'cite', it also takes the Latin root word of the latter verb: '*citare*', meaning to put in motion, to call forth. It is tempting to gloss this as: we put marks into motion and (then) call items forth.*

But items are messengers, they exist in order to bring something else – something specific – to our attention. How is that done? Sentential items, by themselves, do not mean any single thing – since they are used to mean so many things. It is therefore no empty gesture to demand to know who speaks before we pronounce on the meaning of the spoken. Perhaps we can go so far as to say that a speaker is necessary every time items are used to express a thought.

If we are agreed so far then it is feeble to go on insisting that we still quote words without quoting from anyone's text.

The issue arose *au fond* because we recognize that thoughts and items belong on different levels in the ontology of words. The necessity to put speaker in the picture is felt precisely when we wish to identify the content carried by the items.

Thanks to the many-many relations between thoughts and items, it depends upon diverse factors in the utterance context whether a specific thought were carried across to the audience by the use of a specific item.

In order to identify the intended thought we need, especially if we are out of utterance context, the availability of bracketing off, within our response to speaker's text, the final and decisive identification of his expressed thoughts. To achieve such a suspension, we need to be clear about that whose identification is more easily settled, namely the *words*.

The workings of the minimum convention implies an attitude in the quoter of venturing beyond items quoted to thoughts expressed. And the convention makes this a workable task, equipped as we are with a range of possible uses for our words. The venture beyond words must heed the distinction between words and thoughts, and certain courtesies must be shown the text we quote from, if the venture is to be a success.

25

How not to quote

In short, the courtesies are there to mark the formal limits beyond which we cannot rightfully claim the freedom to move, when finding out what the speaker meant. The limits are obviously formal, and not material ones, since we may well happen to make the correct identification by transgressing. In such cases, however, the justification is not to be found in general grounds.

The courtesies observe limits intended to preserve speaker's judgements on the identity of his thoughts: their identity as a whole – and as cut up in parts. Furthermore, the structure he imposed is kept: including divisions into arguments, lemmas, and conclusions.

Dis-courtesies are of three basic kinds:

- [1] we change the *order* of items, either by interchanging parts within a sentence or by changing the order of sentences;
- [2] we do not quote the *whole* text, either through leaving out words within a sentence or by leaving out larger chunks;
- [3] the expression quoted is incorporated into, and presented as part of, a larger quoted expression, we thus distort the identity of the text quoted from, by a misrepresentation of it as an event in speaker's history.

Comments. I don't suppose anyone will defend doing what [1] spells out except in material terms, by claiming, for individual cases, that their discourtesy to the text brought out better the sense intended.

[2] is different, one might here say that, if a text contained several points, then, surely, if one wanted only to bring one point out one needn't quote the whole text. The answer to that is that whatever indication there is as to what is a complete text must lie in the text quoted from. To determine what a complete text is, is a burden not easily shouldered. (See below, under comment on [3].)

The malpractice described in [3] parallels that in [2], in both cases it is the concept [text] whose unclarity opens the way for private enterprise. The consideration which might lead a quoter to commit acts falling under [2] is an approach to define the concept of text somewhat as follows: a text gives someone's opinion on a demarcated topic. Obviously then, within one speech, a speaker may deliver several texts, conjoined in different ways. That concept of text carries with it a certain requirement we like speaker to heed, namely that his statement on the topic is consistent. But such a concept is not easily

carried over to cases under [3]. Consistency is a virtue, but the enlargement of text, in order to find speaker's complete text, is carried too far when, as often happens, one changes one's mind in life. The given text-concept would then impute selfcontradiction to the speaker: as if a person's complete *corpus* of utterances, say, constituted the only viable text attributable to him. The problem here is that one person, taken as individuated by his lifespan, is no more a reasonable conception of what a speaker is than is that of two people in dispute. And the moral reproach of inconsistency is not levelled against their joint effort even though their dialogue possesses the dialectical unity of thinking *pro et con*.

On the other side of consistency we find that other troublesome virtue making text identification a difficult job: completeness. A text has a topic, and if we wish speaker's thoughts on it, we ought to have his *full* opinion.

While inconsistency is bred by text enlargement, the search for fullness is largely instrumental in generating oversized texts. {Being what we are, creatures valuing consistent poverty above inconsistent richness, it is no wonder many cultivate silence as a path to virtue.}

The search for complete opinions is surely carried beyond the reasonable if *being on the same topic* is a sufficient condition for *being of the same text*.

There doesn't seem to be any sure criteria for textual identity: one may pick up a train of thought later, is one then making a continuation *in* the same text, or is one producing a sequent *to* it?

If our quoted expression is textually mis-matched, according to any of the three criteria, it cannot any longer be classified as necessarily coming from (being of) the text we supposedly quoted. We cannot automatically substantiate claims of quoting someone.

The speaker has the right to demand that his words, the words of his choice, shall express his thoughts. If we tamper with his words, we tamper with his text and thereby with his accredited thoughts. (With apologies to Quine and Mates, for being someone else, the reader is left to find out when he can safely claim to have quoted someone.)

26

The justification of malpractice

There is one line of reasoning that might be used to justify quoters in being dis-courteous – on principle – to speaker's text in order to quote *him*.

A speaker addresses an audience, his words are chosen with the objective of conveying his thoughts to that audience.

The speaker may do badly in this set task: as far as his audience is concerned, his thoughts were not getting to them, they did not reach the surface of his words (as these were taken in that context, by that audience).

This situation does not mean that the thoughts he intended to convey are incommunicable. Two possibilities are open, first, that audience might get the thoughts if they are expressed in other words, second, those very words may

convey the intended thoughts to another audience. So success, or lack of it, is relative to audience and choice of words.

With this in mind, we, as quoters, might come across cases where we feel that such an unfortunate choice of words were employed.

In such cases, we feel, we would be more successful in our venture beyond speaker's words *if* we did violence to his words. (Of course, in such a case, mere dis-courtesies of the three kinds outlined wouldn't necessarily do.)

This reasoning loses much of its plausibility once we distinguish cases where, on any account, the speaker simply did not succeed in expressing his thoughts {in identifying, as expressed by his words, thoughts acceptable to him as that which he meant}, from cases where the speaker chose words poorly fitted to that audience.

In quoting, and thus speaking in our own right, *we* also have an audience to which our quotation, among other items, is addressed.

If that audience is the one actually addressed also by the speaker we quote, then, by changing his wording, we have committed ourselves to the judgement that his chosen words were incapable of conveying his thoughts to that audience.

What we then get is a situation where two texts are delivered to the same audience with the intention, on quoter's side, that they express one and the same set of thoughts. Whether the two texts *do* express the same thoughts is a matter for that audience to decide. The quoter is to blame if he pre-judges the issue on their behalf. The quoter can hardly win: if the texts express the same, why bother giving a second version, if they do not express the same, quoter has falsified speaker's text.

The quoter is either a member of speaker's audience, or he is not. If he is a member then *he* certainly believed he grasped speaker's intended meaning: speaker's words, therefore, succeeded for one member, at least.

*The quoter can change speaker's words only because he considers them ill-suited to clothe speaker's meaning. Quoter's ground can here range from the minimal one that the meaning conveyed is *too* grotesque to be intended, and upwards; but even on the minimal ground quoter needs *some* inkling as to what speaker intended. And from where does that arise?*

Whatever information helped can also help other members of the audience, why should quoter alone successfully decode the text?

If the quoter is *not* a member of speaker's audience how can he tell what *they* will understand by speaker's chosen words?

At this point I expect levelled against me the charge that the wrong concept of *audience* was at work in the last paragraphs. What I used was the notion of an actual group of people present on some occasion, what I should have used, says the accusation, is the concept of linguistic community (since the problem is: who understands certain remarks?), members of which can interchangeably partake in the same situations, actual and possible. So, according to that view, the quoter can very well pronounce on the meaning of speaker's text, even though quoter wasn't in the audience.

Well enough, but thoroughly irrelevant since quoter would then have to be

on the *receiving* end of a quotation giving the original speaker's text. The only situation quoter would be authoritatively speaking about would be a subjunctive situation.

The most common situation is more complex: the speaker's actual audience may not be the one he had in mind when choosing his words. The quoter may be part of the audience only in this actual, but non-intended, sense. Furthermore, quoter's audience, actual or intended, is likely to be different from any of the two just mentioned. We then have a set-up where speaker's words are conveyed finally to an audience that may be far removed from any audience speaker could have had in mind when wording his text. (The extreme case is of course when speaker and audience are far removed, in space and time, and use, even on the crudest criteria, very different languages.)

What we, as quoters, prefer to do in such cases is largely an irrelevant matter.

If these faraway audiences were not the intended audience for speaker, if his words were not formed so as to express his thoughts to such audience, then we cannot *quote* his *text*, for speaker wouldn't have had a text for that audience. We are simply left with his words, and therefore, if quoting is intended, and not elucidatory, so-called, translation, it seems reasonable that it should be *his* words we present to *our* audience.

27

Recapitulation

Let us sum up some positions stated so far.

- {1} As far as physical appearance goes, words are just marks on paper. But physical appearance is misleading, they are linguistic items.
- {2} For the community employing them items are more than physical marks.
- {3} Apart from accidental, and ornamental, scribbling items will be used as items, and consequently *be* items.
- {4} It is because they are involved in communicative acts that items are items, and normally looked upon as such.
- {5} It is of the essence of a communicative act that individuals present themselves as *speakers*. If the act is a cognitive one, then they present their thoughts to an audience.
- {6} Items carry the content communicated in an act, and this property invests the items with character as such.
- {7} Quoting is a kind of communicative act, and to quote is to use items.
- {8} The uniqueness of quoting as an act lies in the fact that it demands the existence of two texts, and that the quoted, as it exists within quotes, for its content is parasitic upon the quoted as it exists in the text we quote from.
- {9} The notion of speaker and his thought-expressive act, is involved in the definition of the text we quote from. If we quote words of our own language and restrict ourselves in what we do simply to note items used, then we have cut off features necessarily available to us. (Only in the

marginal cases where we quote words of strange tongues can we claim that to note items is all we *can* do. But in these cases we are also hard put to justify our claim that we quote items.)

{10} I recognize certain items as items of my language, they are, for me, vehicles of thought. This property, *being a vehicle of thought*, belongs, naturally as it were, to those items that, if addressed to me, would tell *me* something (that is, would impart some thought to me in such a manner that the identity of items employed would be essential to the determination of thoughts imparted). The property is an abstractional one, bestowed because the item actually did impart some thought in the manner indicated above.

{11} The first sentence of {10} as it stands, needs amplification. It must not, without further ado, be taken to imply that I see my items as a proper sub-class of items.

28

How to meet the alien

The problem left us by the above account is how we, *as individual speakers*, can acknowledge the existence of foreign languages. We do this, but *how* can we, since item-hood in these cases is not bestowed because of, and justified by, communicative acts we enter into, or acts we can enter into.

The problem in short is how *we* can attach the property of being a vehicle of thought on items that never have been used to tell us anything, and which, on our present understanding, *cannot* be used to convey any thoughts to us. (Thoughts properly expressed by the items, that is, we can get any random thought into our heads through encountering these items.)

The solution propounded here will be that recognition of strange items, as being items, is possible *if we can identify the utterer as being a speaker*.

The stranger will not speak to me, perhaps he can speak to some persons that can speak to me, but I cannot believe that they can speak to him and me both, in the same way.

But first some words to paint the scene: the internal insularity and all-embracingness of language.

If someone uses *words* of mine, then *I* am told something.

*What I am told are the thoughts of the person using the words. Other informative aspects of the communication are transmitted by facts like: who the speaker is, his bearing, situation, the setting of the exchange, etc. These facts, in addition to exuding their own information, may assist towards the identification of the thoughts – without being parts of them. The aspects are controlled through the over- and undercommunication of the facts, these are *under-* and *overplayed*.*

If one who is *not* a speaker of my language uses expressions which I also use, then I am mistaken if I believe he uses *words* of mine. No non-speaker of my language can *address* me – so he cannot use my words either. It follows

therefore that not every occurrence of expressions that are words for me needs be an occurrence of (my) words, even though such an occurrence may be an occurrence of words. (For ease of expressing myself the terminological decision about 'occurrence' has not been kept in the last sentence.)

I regret the use of 'mine', 'my', and 'for me'. They are necessary for two reasons.

Firstly, not every occurrence of an expression that is in use as an item is a case of item occurring. And it is no way out of this unhappy circumstance to say that '. . . is an item' is true of *something*, viz. an expression, only in *certain* contexts: the object supposed to take that predicate *cannot be substantially introduced without the predicate being true of it*, if the predicate doesn't hold true of the object then the object doesn't *exist there* either. It is simply wrong to say that we have the physical mark – and then sometimes we have the item also, as if the latter appeared when something became true of the expression, namely being an item. These two, item and expression, are not *existentially* compossible.

Secondly, we recognize the existence of other languages, and that different languages may, and do, share expressions.

These two facts together, entail that if a particular language contains a particular expression – as an item – then, *even if* the expression is taken as an item, we cannot be sure that identifying that expression as an item (not: identify as *that* item) helps us to identify an item of that particular language. (See Appendix A for further comments.)

Whenever we talk about a language, having these restrictions in mind, we coin it 'my' language, though, of course, it is mine no more than anyone else's, nor one particular language more than any other.

*This is liable to misunderstanding since some people do not grasp the incidental ('confused' as some mediaevals would call it) use of 'my' and 'mine'. They believe riders like these are essential as means of tagging which language we are talking about, e.g. French. ('There is more than one language, isn't there?') Responses on this level are known.) But Wittgenstein's 'the only language which I understand' is not made inappropriate because he spoke both German and English. One bilingual speaker is not two separate monolingual ones. The best way could be simply to say we speak of The Language, or speak of a proto-typical language. That course is often taken, but it is liable to the misunderstanding that *any* language is *typical* of any other language.*

In the study of language, mine, the existence of other languages is, for ontological purposes, a theoretical irrelevancy. Their impingements on our language (on our consciousness), through the sharing of expressions, at most need riders like 'mine' for expositional purposes. At the level of ontological identification, ornamental use of expressions is more worrying.

Speakers of the same language

As individual speakers we face, with our idiolect, other individuals, with their idiolects. Formed, by nature and through co-living and co-acting, into dialect groups, we face the prospect of amalgamating into larger linguistic units. Sooner than comfortable we encounter people whose speech we do not understand. At the end of language something alien has arisen.

Among people speaking the same language one is *addressed* by the other speakers: in ways familiar to us we are asked to do things we know how to do. We are non-solipsistically involved with our fellow speakers, and we try, each and every one of us, to play down, for purposes of communal life, differences between our own idiolect and our common language.

In such a life a common semantics, and the inclination to say the same things at the same moments, signal our peak achievement of having reduced irremediable personal differences to a matter of different cultural positions, either expressible in language or expressed and communicated otherwise. Either way, the aim is to reveal something we find important such that other persons see it our way.

*It is difficult to assess how much substance must be put into the fact that people speak the same language. Take the point about having a common semantics as an example. Perhaps we here should say instead – bearing in mind that a semantic structure will take the form of projection rules – we need a common assent to a set of rules, the problem is then whether we in practice adhere to these rules, whether the rules are *common* rules.

I find myself somewhat out of sympathy with two often encountered approaches to speaker-hood and language. Out of sympathy because the approaches don't seem, to me, to get to grips with the *mechanisms* generating these results.

The first is the description of individual human beings as transcendental subjects – as if that explained how we could speak together, or our relation to the world. The second is the heavy reliance on rules as constituting language – and adherence to which explains why a language exists and how speakers can use it as a shared medium of communication.

Among more empirically-minded linguists it is not uncommon to find a denial of the existence of rules behind linguistic activity, and instead a support of the view that all we have are regularities.

The above bears directly on what, in some quarters, is put forward as a Wittgensteinian thesis: a private language is impossible, argued for by: it is not possible to obey a rule privately, by oneself alone. [See Wittgenstein: *Philosophical Investigations*, § 201.] Let us accept the argument's protasis. In order to reach the desired conclusion one needs, however, also a descriptive premiss: we follow rules – or rules are followed; we also need a lemma: to have a language demands that rules are followed.

It is rarer to see an explicit defence of these last two propositions.*

The possession of a common language, and consequently the possession of a

shared understanding of what language is, does not give us criteria for identifying languages. Or rather, the identificational criteria we have as speakers are the ones applicable to our own language only. (This is behind the all-embracingness of language spoken of on page 38 above, the fact that our language, in outline, seems to be the medium that describes all things.) Again, if recognition of other languages is not entailed by the possession of a language then these are irrelevant for theoretical purposes.

The acquisition of a common language is a continuous process, the way we notice it is as a growing intimacy. This intimacy, or increase of it, seems connected with identifying more things to talk about, having a larger world transparent to us, and becoming aware of that fact also.

But, if we speculate on the processes by which a plurality of speakers acquire a common subject matter, one irony stands out. The creation of objectivity – the common subject matter – demands an elimination of private attitudes, some perspectives on the world – some ideas on how it is – are lost. As said by Karl Deutsch, the political scientist, only power can ignore knowledge. Perhaps God only knows what we gave up in order to achieve that power. (Genesis 11 is clear that speaking with one tongue has power consequences: ‘the people is one, and they have all one language; [. . .] now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do.’ [Genesis 11,6] A situation obviously not healthy for us.)

30

Speakers of different languages

Strangers to us will speak their own language(s), but the problem left us: how to speak to them, is not a problem about their language *as such*, it is a problem of realizing that they can come to speak ours, that we share the thing capable of making us understand others, namely the language. *Both parties share that perception and attitude.*

We do in fact often see something as a word, but of another language. Such recognition is very common, but nevertheless *extremely* sophisticated. One might be tempted to assert the contrary: why, we recognize alien languages all the time and there is nothing much to it. We can pick out e.g. French phrases without speaking French.

That is so, but what we do in such cases has been determined, and made possible, by *facts* we have been *told*. { There is of course a difference between recognizing that an alien language is spoken, and recognizing which language it is. My point is, first, until we know there are alien languages, and perhaps recognize some, there is no telling what we do when some spoken words are not understood by us, and, second, for only a very few languages do we place the words, French, yes, but what of Bulgarian, Swahili?, and until we place the words in another language they might just as well be in ours. }

We have been told that such and such phrases are French ones, and we then rely upon our ear for linguistic similarities, and sometimes wrongly. We

do not, usually, identify French *as* a language, this we assume it is – having been told so. Belonging to a language is not one of those characteristics items carry on their sleeve.

*There is a great difference between being greatly familiar with (one's) language, and having a working theory of what a language is. The latter would be what grammarians try to construct.

Elizabeth Anscombe, in her famous article *The Intentionality of Sensations* [in Butler (ed): *Analytical Philosophy, Second Series*, page 165], argues that concepts like [noun] are not automatically given through great familiarity with language – through being familiar with e.g. *nouns*.

It is reasonable to assume that a rudimentary theory of language is necessary if one is to acknowledge the existence of a plurality of languages. For what such a theory does is to categorize our own items, with the result that superimposed, as it were, upon our items comes a structure not identifiable with our language. The way should then be open to ask whether other things also exhibit that structure.*

As said before, the basis for a recognition of other languages is the realization that a stranger is a speaker. (This realization is, of course, also necessary in cases where our own language is employed, but here it is idling since we perceive directly the items – which are our own.) Such a realization dawns on us, to stress its role is to stress the kernel of this essay.

*One may object to my ordering here, making recognition of speaker a condition for recognizing an alien language. I may meet an alien, see him as speaker without knowing whether or not he *speaks*: he may be dumb, capable only of grunts, or he may not be speaking any language when we meet. So *his* existence doesn't seem to do much, one way or the other, for the recognition of an alien language. My actual phrasing of this relation, on pages 38, was that recognition of strange items, as items, is possible if we recognize the utterer as a speaker. This is a very complicated statement, perhaps unduly so, offering no easy rephrasing in conditional language. My whole approach goes against attempts to establish, or believe, that there is a sufficient or necessary condition here.

All I can do is refer back to earlier statements on how I see it possible for items to exist. (That persons are more important than words, in deciding (the importance of) what is said, is apparent from the fact that our reaction to a statement, even if it is a simple, argumentative, one, is dependent upon who gave it. This dependency reflects helplessness more than arrogance. For the practical weight of this dependence, see Moses Finley, *The Ancestral Constitution*, pp. 22–3.)*

As far as strangers are concerned, whether we wish to say that they may address us, or not, is a matter of terminological choice. We would, in any case, have to admit that 'address' here carries a different significance. (We *might* have been asked to do something, and we *might* know how to do it, but we haven't been asked in a manner familiar to us – nor do we know whether the first two are the case.)

Earlier I talked about the need sometimes to bracket off our judgement as

to thought expressed, and furthermore, that using quotes is a fair way of formulating such a bracketing. Now, when we encounter strangers, what we do by quoting them is to submit their talk to our grammar, and we signify that they uttered items.

By doing so, by pretending that the sign of our (linguistic community's) peak achievement is here employed, we likewise pretend, or show our willingness to believe, that the bond created between mutual speakers is also here possible to forge. In other words, we deny, by doing this, that there are, between us and these strangers, barriers making communicative understanding impossible. What *we* did between *ourselves* can also be done vis à vis these strangers.

31

Speaker identification

It is time to enlarge on the notion of speaker, and supply some unsystematic remarks on how something can be encountered as a speaker. It then becomes easier to see how strangers may become speakers for *us*.

Two factors that expedite such identification, inside or across language barriers, will be discussed. (On the negative side will these factors serve as excluders from the kingdom of speakers.)

The first factor concerns the media of language, it simply lays down that we cannot recognize the exercise of language in a medium unfamiliar to us. Media are, first of all, *speech*, and then *writing* (different systems of writing ought to count as different media). Under- and overplayed communicative aspects enter the picture since they are conventional gestures: posture, gesticulation, timing, stress, voice variation, they have a conventional, not a natural, impact.

*It is difficult to imagine someone having a language without having available speech as a medium. By 'speech' I here refer to acoustical sounds, that is the medium. (This leaves us free to avoid the problem of the organs of speech: do we, necessarily, eat and speak from the same organ?)

With writing the situation is very different, we can, and do, have cultures without any written material. People in such cultures, with prompting, may take the point of writing: 'we speak with these marks', but they have no idea that mastery of different conventions is necessary in use of that medium. (Levi-Strauss has a charming example in *Tristes Tropiques*, Chapter 28 in any unabridged edition; children also illustrate the point.)

It seems so obvious that the defence shall rest.*

The second factor explores directly candidates for speakerhood. (Due to speaker's under- and overcommunicative exudations the two factors will necessarily overlap.)

First of all, we exclude lots of things from the class of speakers, and this we do even though they might produce excellent speeches. Most of those excluded are not humans, some exclusions are fairly safe, some we do at our peril.

*Examples of the excluded here are the famous monkeys, endlessly typing and finally coming forth with a complete and acceptable edition of the Shakespearean *corpus*; and the well turned out android with a voice like Garbo's and conversation *à la* James Thurber.

In a true spirit of science fiction we might restrict this high-handed neglect to our own familiar monkeys and robots, we should hate to lose out on creatures from far away who simply happened to look like our monkeys or our robots. (These examples are not unduly farfetched. We usually conflate quite different features of our conceptual systems, to wit sortal concepts, phenomenal appearance of objects (descriptive terms of) and supposed scientific (systematic) knowledge about sorts of objects. If we pay closer attention to what is here empirical, and what are conceptual ties behind our conflation we might be in for some surprises when we try the same conflated account on objects hitherto outside our empirical range (in my essay *Mode of being* these connections are explored.)*)

The most *telling* case is, however, not the possible non-human speaker, but simply other human beings, not *quite* like us.

To see these for what they are is not so simple, as the following tale will testify to:

The late Doctor Stutterheim, Government Archeologist in Java, used to tell the following story: Somewhat before the advent of the white man, there was a storm on the Javanese coast in the neighborhood of one of the capitals. After the storm the people went down to the beach and found, washed up by the waves and almost dead, a large white monkey of unknown species. The religious experts explained that this monkey had been a member of the court of Beroena, the God of the Sea, and that for some offence the monkey had been cast out by the god whose anger was expressed in the storms. The Rajah gave orders that the white monkey from the sea should be kept alive, chained to a certain stone.

This was done. Doctor Stutterheim told me that he had seen the stone and that, roughly scratched on it in Latin, Dutch, and English were the name of a man and a statement of his shipwreck. Apparently this trilingual sailor never established verbal communication with his captor. He was surely unaware of the premises in their minds which labeled him as a white monkey and therefore not a potential recipient of verbal messages: it probably never occurred to him that they could doubt his humanity. He may have doubted theirs.'

[Ruesch & Bateson: *Communication*, footnote on pp. 204-5.]

The tale might have been a different story if the Javanese had known about the Roman alphabet, they might have reassessed their classification of the white monkey washed ashore. The apparent reason why they didn't see it possible for them to communicate with the white monkey was their refusal to see him as *human*.

The tale is a beautiful specimen of how decisions on this level (that is, decisions as to whether we have met a speaker, decisions factual and grounded on what we see), are fed back and colour other factual decisions as to what we see, 'he utters a lot of sounds, but monkeys do that'.

Criteria for what is to count as human vary from place to place. Members of any culture restrict it to things that look like them, behave like them, eat their kinds of food, etc. A complete list of criteria is difficult to specify and likely to be of little value, as a general proposition, since we can hardly claim that every item comes out with a value that is necessarily operative. (Why was the paleness of the monkey stressed, while the scarcity of bodily hair seemed overlooked? Was it because they had settled on its genus, *monkey*, and paleness could be a speciedeterminant while lack of hair would wreck the genus-ascription?)

The crucial feature of human beings is that they are seen to be thinking communicators. This, I would like to claim, is the trial test perception behind our operative system of likeness criteria. But this concept of likeness by itself doesn't determine the criteria we apply, nor which likenesses we register.

32

Speaker

In order to be a speaker it is required that one thinks. But to recognize that someone thinks, and is thus sufficiently like us, it is required that we share some thoughts.

If someone speaks *my* language then I know he thinks, whichever thoughts we share *show* themselves – couched in our common language. But if a stranger thinks, he cannot, by definition, express his thoughts to *us* through *his* language; his *language* cannot, for *us*, be *the expression of his thinking*.

(His sentence is the expression of his thoughts, but we cannot see the representational relationship.)

Nor can we, directly, see him as a speaker because he, say, exhibits expressive features typically shown in our countenances while we speak. Such features have for us a double function, they support the knowledge that something is meant by speaker, and they help to identify it. But the description under which they perform these functions is an intentional one. And since we don't know, in the cases discussed here, where, and indeed whether, aim is taken, we cannot presume to identify anything aimed at either. Such features would not be seen by us as meaningfully expressive unless we already, in Bateson's words, had seen their host as 'a potential recipient of verbal messages'.

The position we are left with is as follows: we realize that someone is a speaker if we find some thoughts lodged in him, but from someone not speaking our language this cannot be effectuated by materials, or features, peculiar to speech behaviour.

That is why facts, seemingly irrelevant to speech and thinking, like: do they look like us, eat our kinds of food, etc., play such a vital part in speaker identification.

The important point is that facts like the ones listed *casually* enable us to see someone's behaviour as that of a speaker. We are *conditioned* to react on those clues and frustrated by their absence.

But our successful reading of anyone, on this background, will only reach the stage where we perceive expressive features typically forming around speech activities.

We will not yet have developed a shared language, nor *exchanged* thoughts. All we find in him (and reciprocally: he in us) are thoughts already labelled and individuated in our language, and originating from us.

This reciprocal relationship of *inequality* is the starting point. If we wish to break up this *politically* based assignment of roles, and develop a speaker-speaker relationship, then we have to *create* a common language so that it becomes apparent that *both* have thoughts to utter. And for both to know that both have some things to say they must share a slice of something outside language: some activities, some reality. And the ethical synthetic a priori here is that each may have to drop some of his private obsessions.

If the initial inequality, on either side, prevails, real or felt, the blame must be sought elsewhere in the conduct of our affairs, or seen to reflect the limits of language.

APPENDIX A

With a modest purpose in mind I now offer some remarks on the relation between *being an item* (of a language), and the *unity of a language* (that language). The remarks will directly be about possible relations between different languages.

The view here tentatively explored and cast in form of adversary is conveniently presented by David Lewis in his book *Convention: A Philosophical Study*. I do not aim at the views of the historical Lewis, his remarks are only used to set up what is tentatively said to be the adversary.

On page 162 he says that 'there cannot be two interpretations of the same language; but there can be two languages with the same sentences.'

Sentences are, further down on the same page, identified as verbal expressions in some finite set. (See also page 152.) The restriction to finite sets is lifted on page 165. {Finite sets usually assumed are the set of sentences actually used, uttered, by speakers. Lewis's reason for denying their interest is that we 'have no hope of finding out which sentences they contain.' Interesting since it flatly denies the common reason for adopting these finite sets, namely that it is easy to find at least the uttered corpus of a language.}

And finally, on page 142 Lewis gave a characterization of verbal expressions: 'Let us define a *verbal expression* as any finite sequence of types of vocal sounds or types of marks.' Thus sentences, for Lewis, are what we find on the *paper*. A language, for Lewis, is an (infinite) set of sentences plus an interpretation (page 162). An interpretation consists of a *mood* and a truth condition. (This simple statement must be modified to account for ambiguities and the fact that truth conditions may depend upon utterer, his audience, time and place of utterance, previous conversations, etc.)

Now for inter-language relations. Is it possible for two languages to be so related that

- {1} they share some expressions?
- {2} they share all expressions?
- {3} they share some items?
- {4} they share all items?
- {5} every time an expression occurs in one language it also occurs (i. e. there is an occurrence of it) in the other language, and *vice versa*?
- {6} every time an item occurs in one language it occurs also in the other language, and *vice versa*?
- {7} every time a judgement is made in one language it is made also in the other language, and *vice versa*?

{2} entails {1}, and {4} entails {3}, but {6} does *not* entail {5}, and {7} does *not* entail any preceding member of the list.

Let us first dispose of {5}–{7}, which I assume Lewis, along with most, would also answer negatively on.

The odd feature with these three questions is the set-up they require. We must assume, in order for them to make sense that a speaker, using one language, at the same time is also using another language. This being grave enough, we needn't bother with the different quantifications over speakers, whether some, or all speakers can do this. This might have been of interest if the issue were one of pre-established harmony: whenever b, speaking L_b , says something, c, speaking L_c , also says something; in our problem we can relativize the language to individual speakers – if anyone insists on the importance of quantificational range.

The argument I shall put up against the possibility of {5}–{7} is simple. If one speaker, by the very fact of speaking in one language speaks also in another language, then we are at liberty to state that there must be two groups of hearers, one which understands what he says in the one language, and one which understands what he says in the other language.

For him to speak two languages these two groups must stand to each other in the relation of mutual non-comprehension. But, if the speaker truly speaks the language of each group, then the role of speaker can be taken by any member of either group. (We assume that this double language phenomenon occurs with all, or very many, of speaker's remarks: we are not interested in the possibility of the double set-up as a rare happening.)

By hypothesis then, any speaker can speak to people in either group. But that means that, for any speaker, both groups together make up the group of people to whom he can speak. But this is the situation describable as one where everyone involved speaks the same language. So the two languages were one after all; and whatever duality existed reflects no more than the question, if one may speak thus, existing within one speech community as to the unity possessed by their language. I further believe that Lewis gives negative replies to {3} and {4}, and rightly so. I suppose the reason he would give is that item-status would involve a correlation of expressions with an interpretation, or set of such since some items are ambiguous. This takes care of {4}, {3} doesn't seem to be necessarily covered by that argument, however, {3} is not needed for further argumentative purpose against Lewis.

I do, in other words, rely on a strong case of word identity. Words, as such, are identified relative to a language; if an expression is used in more than one language, it is as many words as there are languages employing it.

*Languages may be more or less similar, may share (in ironic quotes) certain 'words', 'phrases', and grammatical rules. But as long as something is different, nothing is really shared, it only looks that way. This is holism: parts take their identity from the whole they make up.

For linguists, languages are separated by the underlying grammatical system, and not by the produced utterances that merely reflect these systems.

Different persons, ostensibly speaking the same language, may go through life without adequately checking whether all utterances deemed of their common language have, in fact, been generated by, or conform to, one set of grammatical rules – the one governing their language.

If one specific grammar must underlie productions of sequences in a language, for that language to be *one* language, then perhaps there are no languages in the required unified sense. (It is interesting to note that for post-Chomskyeian linguists strong a priori conceptions as to how linguistic structures must look, make it easy for them to rule out lots of speech products as ill-formed – making it impossible that they were well-formed products of another grammatical structure.)

While this despair for unity might drive one back to idiolects, as surely providing the unified specimens needed, we are in fact worse off here. (The Kiparskys, in a joint article, *Fact*, something of a modern classic, felt it necessary at one point to register a difference in what respective idiolects could accept as valid.)

No one's idiolect has been produced by a consistent set of rules, since everyone, Macaulay excepted, has had their speech checked and corrected. (For points in this footnote, see [Householder: *Linguistic Speculations*.]*)

Lewis and I agree in giving a positive answer to {1}, but we differ over {2}. (See quotation taken from page 162 of Lewis' book.)

The argument I shall employ against a positive answer to {2} relies on a negative answer to {4} (thus if Lewis is misrepresented by our saying that he replies negatively to {3}, this doesn't matter).

We shall call the thesis that different languages may have all their expressions in common, for *Lewis' thesis*.

There is a crucial ambiguity in Lewis' thesis. Does 'all' mean all the expressions in the lexicon, or does it mean these plus whatever *complex* expressions our syntax allows us to build up?

If it means the latter then Lewis ends up with one language, thus losing his problem.

Any language separates well-formed expressions from illformed ones, and will count among its expressions only the well-formed ones. If two languages share all expressions in this second, inclusive, sense, it means they have identical syntactic structures. But as modern linguistics stresses, syntax and semantics are intertwined so as to make complete separation for theoretical purposes an impossible task. This is because well-formedness would demand

a detailed specification of the expressions concerned: e.g. verb, two-placed transitive verb, action verb, etc. We would end up having given it such a detailed categorical status that many of its semantic markers, to use Katz's phrase, would be in this descriptive buildup.

So Lewis would have his claim only at the cost of involving semantics, thus losing his thesis.

Let us drop therefore the claim that all complex expressions are shared, some will not be and the cost is that syntax differs in the two languages.

Has Lewis thereby established his point? On the contrary, because, losing identity of complex expressions, he loses the sought after expressional identity. So far, Lewis seems to lose either way, on definitional points.

But wait, there is one way out for Lewis. What if the range of interpretations competing for the same expressions is so small that the semantic structure imposed on the set of expressions, will in neither case disturb the syntactic structure. In other words, the alternative semantic interpretations, for any given expression, are such that the same syntactic contexts are open to the expression, in both languages.

(On the face of things this doesn't seem to be feasible as long as one semantic marker is available to demarcate the semantic content of the given expression.)

We have to explore this further. (But let us first note that such a narrow interpretational range might be felt, by Lewis, to be an unsatisfactory restriction on his thesis.)

The point at issue now is: will this difference in semantic markers result in syntactic differences, in other words, will one construction in one language be well-formed there but ill-formed when transplanted to the other language? For lots of sentences, obviously not, 'b runs' is wellformed both in L_a and L_b , even though 'b' means dog in L_a and cat in L_b .

The larger the range in which we refuse to credit a distinction between ill- and well-formedness, the larger will the options be to Lewis on the issue of interpretational variations. If *all* expressions are acceptable, as part of language, then, whether or not we give them semantic content, Lewis' thesis holds.

So Lewis can avoid the imposition of a very narrow range of interpretational options, at the cost of eliminating the supreme function of syntax: distinguishing complex expressions into well-formed and ill-formed ones.

The adoption of two concepts will here help Lewis in his task. Firstly, 'truth' is a semantic predicate, so Lewis needn't worry that expressions must share truth value when uttered by speakers of the two languages. Secondly, 'an expression belongs to a language' can be given a minimal interpretation of 'has been uttered (at least) once by (at least) one speaker as a sentence of that language', or 'would, if uttered by a speaker of that language, be recognized as a sentence of that language', or 'consists of lexical items'.

Against these two attempts to give the full meaning of the concepts [truth] and [sentence] I propose the following considerations: {a} Lewis needs to worry about truth because sentences are uttered with the aspiration of being true. If one sees no hope of establishing the truth of a sentence then that sentence tends not to be uttered. One aims at truth.

{b} if a sentence belongs to a language, then either it must do so by virtue of syntax, or lacking such a theory (whose aim is the establishment of well-formedness), by being often used. From {a} obvious falsehoods won't be used often, so lacking syntactic criteria they will not belong to language. {The relevance of the above discussion is, in case it needs stressing, that by cancelling the category of ill-formed sentences, those that would be there, are transferred to the category of falsehoods.}

Lewis himself is quite explicit in denying the criteria of 'having been uttered at least once' – type any relevance in deciding sentence-hood. He must then fall back on the situation where different semantic structuring constitutes no bar on syntactic acceptability. We would then lay ourselves open to the following cases.

**Example.* Let 'ø' be the expression in case, and the *only* one where the two languages differ in semantic structuring. Let 'ø', to make matters easier, be a common noun in both languages. We have $\langle \text{ø, dog} \rangle_a$ and $\langle \text{ø, cat} \rangle_b$.

Lewis' claim is then that 'ø'_a is acceptable in whatever contexts 'ø'_b is acceptable in, and *vice versa*. But will *anyone* speaking L_b *ever* say things like 'This cat ['ø' is said of course, this is the semantic layout] gave rise to a fine breed of Sheepdogs?' and mean it is the ancestor of dogs? Of course not, *that* would be meant (and said) by the person meaning [dog] when saying 'ø'. But since not, what then is the point of saying that 'This ø gave rise to a fine breed of Sheepdogs' is a sentence (verbal expression to Lewis) of L_b? And this is a simple situation, the mind boggles at the thought of these semantic differences occurring all over without being reflected in *any* grammatical construction.*

APPENDIX B

The situation, then, is that two different languages may share some expressions, but not all; that they cannot share items {we take over words, by quoting, from alien tongues, but not that part of the words which is their syntactic connections}, if items are shared we have one language, not two. (This makes, for me, {3} and {4} into equivalent claims.) This doesn't stop us from having a partial understanding with some speakers, we *are* capable of partly understanding something of foreign tongues.

The strong thesis on word identity, as language relative, amounts to a restriction on the reading of the quoted expression similar to the restriction espoused by Geach in *Mental Acts*. ('ja' in Polish is a different word from 'ja' in German.)

Typographical information (identity) is insufficient for the identity of an item, thus for the identity of the quoted expression. So the quoted expression is not defined simply by saying it is such and such marks (letters) in that order. (Remember: a quoted expression is an item.) We need to know its linguistic home.

This identificational complexity exists even though we can give sufficient information about the identity of a word simply by showing the typographical pattern. (An exercise within a language.)

We have earlier touched upon difficulties created by the fact that different languages have some expressions in common. But this fact is a coincidental merger of *independent* facts of convention. It is not a theoretical fact stemming from the use of language {as if certain expressions *must* occur in every language}, nor is it observable *within* a language.

Indeed, in any one language an expression will be seen as only *one* word. (Modify so as to account for homophony and homography: where differently written words are pronounced the same way, and differently pronounced words are written the same way.) It is the distinction between *languages* that carries over into a distinction between different words. The Polish word 'ja' is different from the German word 'ja' *because Polish and German are different languages.*

Paradigmatically we quote the German word 'ja' because we quote from a German text. And two languages are different insofar as they are spoken by two groups which, due to this, stand in a relation of mutual noncomprehension.

This account entails that, on Geach's view broadly conceived, the characterization of the Polish 'ja' as a personal pronoun, while the German 'ja' is a sign of affirmation, would not constitute a *sufficient* reason for saying that we here have *two* words. That is, if we left out the qualifications *Polish* and *German* we would not be left with a reason good enough for saying we had two words. (We would, leaving out the qualifications, believe we were speaking about one language.)

The insufficiency follows from the fact that, within one language, grammatical categories often cut one word up in that way. When we encounter such cases which conclusion ought we to draw?

We are least likely to say we therefore have two *words*, we are more likely going to argue that grammar is deficient in allowing such cases, we are perhaps most likely going to argue that here occur two senses of the word 'word'. That is the way out taken by John Lyons, in his *Introduction to theoretical linguistics*, page 86, among others; his example, on page 69, is that 'Down the hill' and 'The soft down on his cheeks' exhibit one phonological (and orthographic) but two grammatical words 'down'.

This example is not a case of homographic or homophonic mismatching. In such cases we know how to count words, we simply combine the numbers exhibited in the media making the largest number of different word articulations.

Lyons' example is a case of one word carrying multiple meanings, plus, more gravely, being of two grammatical categories. Lyons' proposal amounts to saying that e.g. English does not have as many words as are marked orthographically as headings in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, were this complete, but as are marked by sub-headings under the above classification, each sub-heading listing one meaning, or one grammatical category, of the orthographically marked word.

We shall not discuss the merits of this proposal. Even if it were acceptable, as a device of grammar or lexicon, it is dubious whether Geach *therefore* ought to say that 'down' in the first of Lyons' examples, was, *ontologically* speaking,

a different word from 'down' in the second example. (And that the German 'ja' was different from the Polish 'ja' *because* one is a sign of assent and the other a personal pronoun.)

It is of no use to suggest *either* that this ambiguity of 'word' leaves us no option but to scrap our inquiry into the existence of words *unless* we heed these different meanings, and construct an ontology for each one, *or* (alternatively) that the proper ontological candidate for item-hood is Lyons' *grammatical* word.

It is still words *qua* represented in vocal sounds and graphic inscriptions that constitute our focal point of interest.

The different senses of the word 'word' operate on words *and not on expressions*, that is, *words* are *substantially* introduced *before* the ambiguities of 'word' are systematically employed in our linguistic theories, how do we otherwise single out that which is ambiguous? ('Substantially': not all uses of 'word' introduce words as being part of the ontology; but words are nevertheless not theoretical expedients, eliminable on demand.)

Within a language this licence, to construe one phonological/orthographic pattern as more than one grammatical word, is a case of ambiguity *in the word*. And such ambiguity is part and parcel of what we learn, or are equipped to grasp, when we acquire the word. It is only when we encounter the same expression employed in another language that we are thrown off the identity track.

For quoting purposes we ought to tag quoted expressions, to show where they come from. The tag cannot be put inside our quotes, because it would then be *part* of the quoted expression. The only way seems to be to put the tag outside the quotes: 'The Polish words ' . . . ' ', etc.

How much work of identification must the tagging do? And does the *quoter* know enough to individuate languages he *quotes* from?

The identification could, minimally, be something like this: the language spoken there and there by such and such people. For this work only one language can be a serious contender under the given specification. (We can go wrong both because several quote and several are quoted from.)

Some might feel the minimal requirement unduly meager. They would like to say that e.g. 'Polish' carries a far greater identificatory weight, in a descriptive sense, than the minimal type above. They would have to explain how we come to possess such detailed knowledge of a language, detailed enough for such descriptive accuracy, without having quoted from it previous to the possession of such detailed knowledge. (We all learn our language(s) from other speakers, and do so by taking up their words into our discourse.)

APPENDIX C

On page 27 I toyed with the idea that the type could be identified as the presently used token, and it was stated that the presently used token is the only token existing *qua* type.

On page 8, under [1], it says that a word is a word even when not used.

These two positions seem to conflict with each other, I hope to show this is not the case.

To take the second position first. To say that a word is a word even when not used is an assertion to the effect that we can look up, or refer back to, an utterance made earlier, and say that it consists of such and such words. And we can do this without having to conclude that the speaker, who composed that utterance, is still in the process of using those words, is still producing the utterance.

The first point is more complicated. What I meant is that we, at no time, can focus our attention, – in an adequate referring manner –, on more than one token. A point, if one wishes, about the human apperception of words.

A corollary of this is that reference to a type is a mental act employing one particular token. So phrases like: ‘that token here, and that token there, and . . .’ do not collect, and preserve, in one act of referring, adequate references to several tokens, each and every declared a type – the type.

*To pursue the analogy with rulers: to refer to an item is like *using* a ruler; while we can talk about, refer to, look at, several rulers at once, we cannot use more than one at a time. To refer to a token, *qua* type, is analogous to using a ruler.*

APPENDIX D

To end on something completely different.

If a Pole, addressing a German (in I don’t know what language), said, while pointing to *ja* {the linguist’s device, see page 5}: ‘this is a personal pronoun’; and the German replied (in the same language) that *ja* is a sign of affirmation, then, *if both were talking about a word in their own language*, their common *referent* cannot be the word they are talking about, since they are talking about differing words. {This is a display of token (see page 30), but at the cost of placing the sentence in the mouth of the speaker, the sentence is not where the token is.}

Do they have a common referent, if so, what is it? First, we can say that they pointed to the same object, and that this was the physical marks in front of them. But in that case, what they pointed to is what neither of them was talking about.

Can we give them a common subject matter? That is, let what they refer to be what they are talking about?

There are only two candidates:

{1} for each, his own word, or

{2} the composition of the tenth and the first letters in the Roman alphabet.

Or are these two really one?, since each of them knows that a word in his language is composed of the tenth and first letters in the Roman alphabet (in that order).

Is this then their shared subject matter and referent? Well, if so, suppose they each grant the other the truth of *his* remark, then each would also have

to know that those two letters (in that order) *are not* a word in his own language (but, on the contrary, in the other's language).

And while pointing, and talking, to which would each one be referring: the word in his language that *is* those two letters, or those two letters which *are not* a word in his language?

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Submitted at a joint meeting 11 November 1974 by Mr. Gullvåg.

Printed August 1976.

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Section: A.78. 17-2T.