

Georg Meggle / Maria Ulkan

INFORMATIVES AND/OR DIRECTIVES?
(A NEW START IN SPEECH ACT CLASSIFICATION)

Summary

Any classification of illocutionary acts to be well-founded has to be based on logical principles characteristic of the different kinds of these acts; and the relevant principles have to be couched in terms of general action theory. This approach is specified for informatives and directives, and the essential connections between these two (most basic?) types of illocutionary acts are explicated and diagrammed - showing some primacy of the former. Discussion, of why in talking about communicative acts some divergence from ordinary language is to be recommended. Plea for starting speech act classification anew - of course, using better means.

In order to avoid being thoroughly ad hoc, any classification has to be principled - which holds with classifying (types of) *illocutionary acts* in particular. As a theory of illocutionary acts is best seen to be a special branch of *action theory in general*, it seems to be clear where the relevant classification-principles have to come from. (i) It is a general theory of action, in terms of which (basic) illocutionary acts are to be explicated; and, in order to be reliable, (ii) the needed classification-principles have to be derived from (the *logical connections* existing between) these action-theoretic explications themselves. Now, although much lip-service has been paid to (i), until quite recently virtually nothing has been done about working it out systematically. (The logic of illocutionary acts as given in Vanderveken (1991) is not formulated in action theoretical terms; therefore it is not an alternative to the approach sketched in this paper.) Consequently, the same holds true with the state of the art of task (ii). Thus, one has to make a new start. (For a first sketch of the theoretical background used her, see Meggle (1997a).)

Of course, proceeding via the lines of (i) and (ii) cannot take the form of a broad attack seeking to conquer all the members of the huge 'class of illocutionary acts' (As up to now there is no adequate explication of "illocutionary act" general enough to cover even such non-communicative acts as 'christening' at one blow. (To take just one of Austin's speech-act favourites), this 'class' is not yet well-defined. It is exactly for this reason that we prefer to talk of communicative acts as characterized in 1 and 2 below.) Instead, we shall try to aim at what is taken by us to be the centre of the whole continent or - as the classification in question will be hierarchical in any case - perhaps more to the point, at what we think to be the highest peaks (or peak?) of the whole area. Following Schiffer (1972), IV.2, we take it that (iii) informative and directive speech acts are the most general ones under which all the other communicative acts may be subsumed. In accepting Schiffer's (iii), we are opposing Searle's (1975) system of *five classes* of basic illocutionary acts; Searle's system criticised in Ballmer (1979) - but there not refuted, as shown in Ulkan (1992). In Schiffer, op.cit., our 'informatives' are called 'assertives'; but as with the latter term association with ordinary assertions might be unavoidable (by which

our stressing of the more abstract nature of the type of communicative acts we have in mind would be cancelled), we prefer - in analogy to 'directives' - the more technical former one.

But, whereas Schiffer merely contends that the resulting system of *two classes* can't be further reduced, this is exactly the point to be called into question in this paper. (Notice, that in the following nothing depends on whether (iii) will in fact be accepted or not. The question of how informatives and directives are interrelated remains to be answered anyhow.)

1. *Informal characterization.* Communicative acts are acts directed to other persons (addressees), produced with the *primary intention* of making the respective addressee either do something or acquire a certain propositional attitude. Communicative acts, when done with the primary intention that A is to *do* something, we call *directives* (short for 'directive communicative acts'), when done with the primary intention that A is to *believe* something, *informatives*. The very interesting questions of whether there are communicative acts with the primary intention that A is to *want* something (more general: that A is to acquire some preference), and, if affirmative, of whether their type, too, should be regarded as basic, belong to the many questions to be left unsettled here due to limitations of space. Proposals as to how this third type may be dubbed are welcome: meggle@uni-leipzig.de.

Primary intentions do not suffice to make an act a communicative one. But the essential further feature of communicative acts is not very hard to get at. It relates to how the speaker *believes* he achieves his primary aim: In communicative acts the speaker believes he achieves his primary aim iff his act is understood by his audience A to be a communicative one done with the primary intention in question. (Worth noting that 'speaker' is used here (as it is common practice in the literature) in the wide sense of 'communicator'. Thus, neither reference to phonetic nor even to auditive utterances is implied.) Now, although this characterization is obviously circular, it gives us at least a *criterion of adequacy* for any non-circular explication. And it follows from it that, for an act to be a communicative one, the speaker S must not only intend A to recognize his primary intention, but also to recognize all the relevant communicative intentions, e.g., that A is to recognize S's primary intention, etc.

This first extremely rough characterization exploits Grice's (1957) definition of *utterer's meaning* which was shown in Schiffer (1972) not to fulfil our stated criterion of adequacy. Now, it should be clear that the problem of explicating communicative acts non-circularly is not a trivial one, and that some logical machinery has to be used in order to keep all the different things involved in reflexive intentions really distinct. In formal action-theoretic terms the explication problem was solved in *Grundbegriffe der Kommunikation* - in the following referred to as GBK. As in elucidating the conceptual connections between informatives and directives we need some part of this machinery, a simplified version of the *GBK*-explication will be presented in the next §. (The main simplification consists in omitting a particular operator for conditionals, which already would have to come in to strengthen the equivalence contained in $B(X,p \equiv D(X,f))$, thus making D1 more adequate.)

For his belief that A will recognize the relevant communicative intentions of his act S may have any reasons whatever. (Which is, of course, not to deny that in normal cases these reasons will be quite specific ones as including supposed common knowledge of linguistic and other conventions.) But, as none of these possible reasons is essentially connected with informatives and directives, there is no need to specify them at this stage. And, in fact, if our considerations

are to be really general, they *should not* be specified either. (Doing this would already engage us in some kind of further sub-classification, which is another story - to be told elsewhere.)

2.1 *Preliminaries of formal explication.* As communicative acts are a special kind of intentional acts, the latter term is to be explicated first. Writing $D(X,f)$ for 'At time t person X does (act of type) f ', $B(X,p)$ for 'At t X (strongly) believes that p ' and $W(X,p)$ for 'At t X wants that p ', the relevant concept of intention can (restricting our considerations to situations of decision under certainty) easily be given as follows (As we are treating all referring expressions occurring in the following intensional contexts as standard names, the problem of the distinction between *de re* vs. *de dicto* readings does not arise. For corresponding widenings see *GBK*, § 8. The logical principles regulating our use of the terms mentioned in the definiens of D1 as well as some principles connecting beliefs/wants ascribed to a particular person at different times are also mentioned or specified in *GBK*):

D1: $I(X,f,p) := D(X,f) \ \& \ W(X,p) \ \& \ B(X,p \equiv D(X,f))$
 At t X does f with the intention to bring about p iff, at t , X does f , wants that p , and believes that p (will be the case) iff she (X) does f

Clearly, in $I(X,f,p)$ the proposition expressed by p has to be such that X believes it to be realized at time t' , where t' is (usually immediately) following t . When talking about doings, beliefs and wants at t' , we shall make this time-reference explicit by writing D',B' and W' .

Now, in order to get at the logical structure of our basic communicative acts (or act?), two further highly specific intention-concepts are needed. The first is the Gricean concept of an *M-intention* as used by him in the definiens of his (1957)-explication for *utterer's meaning*, to be improved and made more precise as follows - with $K(X,p)$, for 'X knows that p ', as short for $B(X,p) \ \& \ p$, i.e.: X believes that p , and it is the case that p :

D2.1: $MI(X,Y,f,r) := I(X,f,D'(Y,r)) \ \& \ B(X,D'(Y,r) \equiv K'(Y,I(X,f,D'(Y,r))))$

At t X does f with the *M-intention* that Y is, at t' , to do r iff X does, at t , f with the (primary) intention to bring it about that, at t' , Y is to do r , and S believes at t , that Y will, at t' , do r if and only if S 's primary intention will be recognized (known) by Y at t' .

In Grice's own formulations the second condition of D2.1 contains 'S intends' instead of 'S believes'. But this is surely inadequate, as the truth of the embedded equivalence will not be brought about by S 's doing of f . The further condition $I(S,f,B'(A,I(S,f,D'(A,r))))$ mentioned by Grice - of course, in ordinary language terms only - follows already from the definiens of D2.1; therefore, although in itself necessary, it need not be mentioned explicitly. With the help of the epistemic principle $B(X,p) \equiv B(X,B(X,p))$ and of the principle (**) $W(X,p) \equiv B(X,W(X,p))$, the reader will be able to verify that the first condition of D2.1 (or D2.2) may be even reduced to $D(S,f)$, the other conditions of $I(S,f,D'(A,r))$ (or $I(S,f,B'(A,p))$) being entailed by $D(S,f)$ in conjunction with the respective second condition. The same holds with the conditions mentioned in (*) in 2.2 as well.

For M-intentions with the primary aim that Y is to believe that p, we can stipulate correspondingly:

$$D2.2: MI(X,Y,f,p) := I(X,f,B'(Y,p)) \ \& \ B(X,B'(Y,p) \equiv K'(Y,I(X,f,B'(Y,p))))$$

At t X does f with the M-intention that Y is, at t', to believe that p

There is another concept, not contained in Grice's proposal, but necessary to make this very proposal adequate. It relates to the fact that in communication all the relevant communicative intentions must be intended by the speaker for his addressee to be quite out in the open. More generally defined (with $\forall n$ as short for 'For all n'):

$$D3: \quad (a) \quad I_1(X,Y,f,p) := I(X,f,B'(Y,p))$$

$$(b) \quad I_{n+1}(X,Y,f,p) := I_1(X,Y,f,I_n(X,Y,f,p))$$

$$(c) \quad I^*(X,y,f,p) = \forall n I_n(X,Y,f,p)$$

That Y is to believe that p, is intended by X's doing of f in a way (intended by X) to be *absolutely out in the open* for Y

Note, that by $I^*(X,Y,f,p)$ it is not implied that X himself is believing that p.

2.2 Informatives and Directives / Explications. Now, our criterion of adequacy for any definition of communicative acts can, for directives, be stated as follows. (The reader is asked to transform it into the corresponding criterion for informatives by himself. The structures of both of these criteria may be compared with the structures of the definiens of D2.1 and D2.2.) That an act of type f produced by S at t is a directive communicative act with the primary intention that A is to do r, will be represented by the symbol $CA_d(S,A,f,r)$; correspondingly, we write $CA_i(S,A,f,p)$ for an informative primarily intending A to believe that p. (Of course, as the kind of primary intentions in question is already determined by referring to r (action) or p (proposition), respectively, the indices *d* and *i* in $CA_d(S,A,f,r)$ and $CA_i(S,A,f,p)$ are superfluous. But *not* so, when we are generalizing by abstracting from r and p, thus coming to $CA_d(S,A,f) := \forall r(CA_d(S,A,f,r))$ and $CA_i(S,A,f) := \forall p(CA_i(S,A,f,p))$.)

$$(*) \quad CA_d(S,A,f,r) \equiv I(S,fD'(A,r)) \ \& \ B(S,D'(A,r) \equiv K'(H,CA_d(S,A,f,r)))$$

As already proved in *GBK*, criterion (*) and its analogue for informatives are fulfilled by defining directives and informatives in the following way (thus proved to be adequate):

$$D4.1: CA_d(S,A,f,r) := MI(S,A,f,r) \ \& \ I^*(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r))$$

$$D4.2: CA_i(S,A,f,p) := MI(S,A,f,p) \ \& \ I^*(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,p))$$

So much for the *logical structure* of our two central communicative acts. As, in the end, they are defined exclusively by means of our three action theoretic concepts $D(X,f)$, $B(X,p)$ and $W(X,p)$ in application only to speaker S , it should be clear that neither $CA_d(S,A,f,r)$ nor $CA_i(S,A,f,p)$ entail anything about whether the respective communicative act is in fact understood by A , or anything about whether A really does or believes what he is primarily intended to do or to believe; i.e.: our communicatives are communicative acts in the wide sense of communication attempts - these attempts being successful (communicative acts in a stronger sense) or not.

Unfortunately, in what is usually taken to be a theory of speech acts this fundamental distinction between communicatives in a weak and in a strong sense is being systematically neglected. (In the rare cases where *illocutionary act* is in fact tried to be explained, addressee's understanding ('uptake') is following Austin (1962) - already regarded to be a necessary condition. For further criticism of this and related points see Meggle (HTS), I.4, and Ulkan (1992).

3. *Logical connections.* A principled classification of communicative acts to be really worth its name has to be based on the logical structure of the acts to be classified. Now, having arrived at this structure for our two candidates, let's consider how these candidates are correlated. Then, the resulting logical connections will give us immediately the relevant classification principles which are to be discussed next.

Any directive is an informative, *too*, as shown by the following theorem ((1) and (5) correspond to the theorems T.K67.1 and T.K70 of *GBK*, proved in its appendix. The restriction needed for the soundness of (α) is formulated in T.K72 as presented and proved in Meggle (*HTS*), by means of which, in connection with (1), (2) to (4) can easily be shown to be valid.):

$$(1) \quad CA_d(S,A,f,r) \supset CA_i(S,A,f,CA_d(S,A,f,r))$$

And, although the sentence

$$(\alpha) \quad p \supset q \vdash CA_i(S,A,f,p) \supset CA_i(S,A,f,q), \text{ for any } S \text{ and } A$$

does not state a principle generally valid in communication-logic, it can be proved to be valid, when restricted to cases where (a) S believes that A will come to believe that q only via S 's doing of f , and (b) S believes (a) to be, or to become, mutually known by himself and A . (For a precise statement of the conditions of mutual knowledge see Meggle (1993).) Now, this condition being clearly fulfilled at least with respect both to $I^*(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r))$ and $MI(S,A,f,r)$ and $I(S,f,D'(A,r))$, at least the following principles can be derived from (1):

$$(2) \quad CA_d(S,A,f,r) \supset CA_i(S,A,f,I^*(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r)))$$

$$(3) \quad CA_d(S,A,f,r) \supset CA_i(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r)) \text{ and}$$

$$(4) \quad CA_d(S,A,f,r) \supset CA_i(S,A,f,I(S,f,D'(A,r))).$$

Further, as may be proved by generalization for any of these principles, it is analytically true that

$$(5) \quad CA_d(S,A,f) \supset CA_i(S,A,f)$$

Any directive is an informative, *too*.

The reason why we are stressing the *too* should be obvious. That directives are informatives, *too*, is not to deny that there are important differences between them. By saying that an act *f* produced by *S* at *t* is a directive, we are implying that *S*'s primary communicative intention is that *A* is to *do* something, by saying that the act in question is an informative, that *S*'s primary communicative intention is that *A* is to *believe* something. But this essential difference is not being cancelled by (5) and its more specific corollaries. Of none of the five theorems the converse holds without further qualification. Thus, to take just (4), it would be utterly false to regard a directive with the primary intention that *A* is to do *r* as being *the same* as an informative with the primary intention that *A* is to believe that *S* has this very intention - as proposed, e.g., by Armstrong (1971) and rightly rejected in Bennett (1976), § 41, p.134: "The crucial objection is that [Armstrong's] account of injunction-meaning obliterates the distinction between *S*'s telling *A* to do *r* and *S*'s *merely* informing *A* that *S* favours *A*'s doing *r*. It is no defence to say that one can tell someone to do *r* by informing him that one wants him to do *r*; that is not in dispute. My point is that one can seek *just* to inform someone that one favours his doing *r*, not aiming to tell or advise or request or recommend him to do *r*; but on Armstrong's account this is impossible, for if you tell the person that you favour [intend] his doing *r* then you have *ipso facto* fulfilled Armstrong's conditions for telling him to do *r*. In short, in Armstrong's account the whole essence of injunctions, as of statements, is informative." To make our position clear once more: It is - cf. (5) - in fact *part* of the essence of directives to be informative, *too*, but this is not their *whole* essence.) And the same verdict would have to be reached with respect to accepting the converse of the stronger theorems (1) to (3). (For a *prima facie* argument to the contrary drawing its apparent force from ordinary language usage see § 5 below.)

Now, directives making up a special sort of the genus of informatives, the crucial question left to be answered is this: What feature has to be adjoined to informatives of the kind specified on the right side of our above theorems in order to get the respective directive expressed on their left side? As a first shot, one might try to start with (4) and adjoin to its right side $I(S,f,D'(A,r))$, thus getting

$$(\beta) \quad CA_d(S,A,f,r) \equiv CA_i(S,A,f,I(S,f,D'(A,r))) \ \& \ I(S,f,D'(A,r))$$

The leading idea of this proposal consists in taking directives to be special kinds of informatives for which in producing them the speaker is *sincere*.

In general terms: In producing an informative act of kind $CA_i(S,A,f,p)$, *S* is sincere iff *p* is believed to be true by *S* himself. It is not entailed by $CA_i(S,A,f,p)$ that $B(S,p)$ is true. For the question why this entailment *should* not be generally allowed, see the intuitive discussion in *GBK*, 3.1.3. Nevertheless, in *normal* cases $B(S,p)$ will be true, *too*. But, intuitive reasons apart, there is a further theoretic advantage -not yet noted in *GBK*, but heavily enforcing its settlement of this problem - of $B(S,p)$ *not* being involved in $CA_i(S,A,f,p)$: Not taking this position would preclude any possibility of distinguishing between $CA_d(S,A,f,r)$ and the wider concept of directives mentioned in § 5 below.

But, although the idea of taking directives to be *sincere* informatives is absolutely correct, its realization in (β) is not the one needed to make (β) true. For its right side does not entail that (a) *S* believes that *A* will do *r* iff it is recognized by *A* that he is to do *r* - which is, as stated already by Grice (1957), a necessary condition for $CA_d(S,A,f,r)$. But substituting $MI(S,A,f,r)$ for $I(S,A,D'(A,r))$ wouldn't do either. For it is not entailed by the resulting new right side of (β) that

S believes it to be known by A that (a) - which is a further necessary condition for $CA_d(S,A,f,r)$ following from our informal characterization of communicative acts in § 1 and, accordingly, derivable from our adequacy criterion (*) in 2.2.

Thus, we have to look for some stronger alternatives. To preclude having to enter into too much discussion, let us jump just to the right one. It follows already from our definitions D4.1 and D4.2 that:

$$(6) \quad CA_d(S,A,f,r) \equiv CA_i(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r)) \ \& \ MI(S,A,f,r)$$

Directives primarily intending that A is to do r *are* (analytically equivalent with) informatives primarily intending that A is to recognize that S M-intends A to do r, i.e., informatives primarily intending that A is to believe that $MI(S,A,f,r)$ and such that S is sincere. Strictly speaking, sincerity of $CA_i(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r))$ entails just $B(S,MI(S,A,f,r))$. But as it is generally true that (**) $W(X,p) \equiv B(X,W(X,p))$, it is also (cf. lemma L.15 of *GBK*) generally true that (7) $MI(S,A,f,r) \equiv D(S,f) \ \& \ B(S,MI(S,A,f,r))$. And thus, as $D(S,f)$ is already entailed by $CA_i(S,A,f)$, sincerity of $CA_i(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r))$ entails $MI(S,A,f,r)$ as well.

Thus, instead of defining in the beginning both informatives and directives, we might have started with informatives alone, directives then being defined as special (sincere) informatives in the form arrived at by (6). And, as the converse procedure is not possible, this is enough to claim the primacy of informatives over directives to be fully justified. And thus, as we are accepting Schiffer's thesis (iii), stated in our introductory remarks, we may say that there is indeed just *one* peak which is the highest one in the wide area of communicative acts. Informatives constitute the only class under which *all* the other communicative acts can be subsumed. There is just one basic type of communicative acts.

The analogue of (6) holds for informatives as well:

$$(8) \quad CA_i(S,A,f,p) \equiv CA_i(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,p)) \ \& \ MI(S,A,f,p)$$

Informatives primarily intending that A is to believe that p are (analytically equivalent with) informatives primarily intending that A is to recognize that S M-intends A to believe that p, i.e., informatives primarily intending that A is to believe that $MI(S,A,f,p)$ and such that S is sincere.

4. *Beginning of principled classification.* Taking (6) and (8) together, one can see that both $CA_d(S,A,f,r)$ and $CA_i(S,A,f,p)$ can be considered to be special cases of (sincere) informatives with the primary intention that A is to believe that S's doing of f is connected with some M-intention directed at A. Thus, starting with the idea that communicative acts are acts involving reflexive intentions, we obtain the general classification schema *figure 1*. ($P_{[\varphi,A]}$ is to stand for a sentence-schema containing "A" as referring to A and " φ " as expressing the quality φ of A, φ being either the quality of doing some action or the quality of believing something to be true. Where the intention represented by $I(S,f,P'_{[\varphi,A]})$ is also a M-intention, we use the abbreviation $MI(S,f,P'_{[\varphi,A]})$ accordingly. (Of course, $P'_{[\varphi,A]}$ is not allowed to be equivalent with a sentence not essentially containing "A" and " φ ", as is the case, e.g., in $p \ \& \ (\varphi(A) \vee \neg\varphi(A))$.)




Figure 1

By step I and II communicative acts are imbedded into the frame of intentional acts of a particular kind; and after III the informatives of the represented kind is split up for some action or some belief of A, respectively. That step I is true, but also the right side of II, may be the case, if, for example, S does not believe that it is known by A that (a) S believes that $P'_{[\varphi, A]}$ will be true iff it is recognized by A that $I(S,f,P'_{[\varphi, A]})$. And that the left side of II is true, but also the right one of III, this may be the case, if, e.g., it is not believed by S that it is mutual knowledge between S and A that (a). (For an example, where $CA_i(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r))$, but not $CA_d(S,A, f,r)$, see 5.2 below.) Each entry on the left side of a branching entails the upper entry of which it is a branch; and each branching entry entails the alternative of its branches.

5. *Informatives and directives in ordinary language.* Informatives and directives as defined in D4.1 and D4.2 are acts of a more abstract kind than ordinary language seems to be equipped with. Now, although the primary justification of these notions consists in their systematic fruitfulness, nevertheless it may be questioned whether we have got at the right notions for even the paradigm cases of ordinary informatives and directives to be able to be subsumed. The adequacy of starting with reflexive intentions of some kind already taken for granted, there are mainly two arguments by which our approach may be called into question; let us consider them separately.

5.1 *The informative/directive dichotomy.* Ordinary language seems to contain the presupposition that a communicative act is either a directive or an informative, but never both - in clear opposition to our definitions by which, as already stated in 3 above, it follows that

$$(4) \quad CA_d(S,A,f,r) \supset CA_i(S,A,f,I(S,f,D'(A,r)))$$

Now, although this does not mean (cf. 3) that directives are to be simply equated with informatives, our very thesis that directives are informatives, *too*, seems to be at variance with ordinary language, which, in Bennett's words, seeks to keep "the distinction between statements and injunctions ... deep and secure"; *op. cit.*, p.135.

But this reliance on ordinary language does not make up a real objection to our more technical notions. As already noticed by Bennett himself (op. cit., 135), the informatives following from $CA_d(S,A,f,r)$ are always such that they are about "a proposition about S's state of mind, which S seeks to communicate mainly or wholly because he thinks it is a means to achieving, through the Gricean mechanism [modified by us in D4.1 and D4.2], some other effect", in the case of $CA_d(S,A,f,r)$ this other effect being $D'(A,r)$. Now, when asked of what particular kind a particular communicative act is or, what on our general level would amount to the same, of what kind the primary communicative intention of the act in question is, it would be utterly misleading, if this question would be answered only with reference to one of the weaker communicative intentions, which are involved in the communicative act, too. In ordinary language the informative/directive distinction is exclusively connected with what the strongest communicative intentions of the action to be classified as such and such are. Not so in our more general approach. But as this approach may be brought in accordance with ordinary usage by means of the very distinction between stronger and weaker communicative intentions, nothing is lost. And that very much is to be gained by approaching communicative acts in our more general terms, seems to be clear enough. Finally it should be noticed that for $CA_d(S,A,f,r)$ and $CA_i(S,A,f,p)$, where p is *not* a proposition of the kind drawn attention to by Bennett, the distinction between these acts is as "deep and secure" as before. (In *figure 1*, both are represented at stage V; but both are to be subsumed under informatives of kind IV.)

5.2 *Informatives and directives in a wider sense.* That our concepts of informatives and directives may also diverge from ordinary language usage in another respect was hinted at by Alston's (1964, 41) remark that for an act to be of illocutionary type T it need not be a *sincere* illocutionary act of type T. To borrow his example: Even if I know perfectly well that a certain door is already open, when saying to you 'Please open the door' I may nevertheless be said to be asking you to open the door, Thus, as asking you to do r does not imply that I do really intend you to do r , and asking someone to do something being clearly a special case of directives, it follows that directives don't generally involve the primary intention attributed to them by our definition D4.1. And the same argument may be brought forward as far as informatives are concerned.

Let us just concentrate on the essential moral of this intricate argument: Whereas in our approach sincerity of $CA_i(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r))$ or $CA_i(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,p))$ is necessary for having a case of $CA_d(S,A,f,r)$ or $CA_i(S,A,f,p)$, respectively, this sincerity condition is not generally required in ordinary language according to which an act may be classified as a *directive*^o (i.e., as a directive in the sense of ordinary language) or as an *informative*^o iff S *intends his act to be taken to be a directive* or an *informative* (in our strict senses). Accordingly, explication of communicative acts in this wider sense is easy:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{D5.1: } CA_d^o(S,A,f,r) &:= I(S,f,B'(A,CA_d(S,A,f,r))) \\ \text{D5.2 } CA_i^o(S,A,f,p) &:= I(S,f,B'(A,CA_i(S,A,f,p))) \end{aligned}$$

To give these directives^o and informatives^o their respective place in our *figure 1* classification is no problem at all, as the following two statements hold analytically ((9) follows directly from the theorems T.K74 and T.K75 proved in Meggle (*HTS*); the general truth of (10) is to be shown easily by analogy.):

$$\begin{aligned} (9) \quad CA_d^o(S,A,f,r) &\equiv CA_i(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r)) \\ (10) \quad CA_i^o(S,A,f,p) &\equiv CA_i(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,p)) \end{aligned}$$

To conclude, informatives^o and directives^o are exactly the informatives of kind IV (of *figure 1*), under which our directives and our CA_i(S,A,f,p) informatives are to be subsumed, which is enough to prove that our general concept of informatives is being presupposed by *informatives^o* and *directives^o* in the same way as it was by our *directives*. Thus, this second reference to ordinary language, too, can by no means lead to a reasonable objection to the primacy of informatives.

References

- Alston, W. A.: 1964, *Philosophy of Language*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
- Armstrong, D. M.: 1971, *Meaning and Communication*, *The Philosophical Review* 80, pp. 427-447.
- Austin, J. L.: 1962, *How To Do Things With Words*, Cambridge, Mass.
- Bach, K. / Harnish, R. M.: *Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts*, Cambridge Mass., 1979.
- Ballmer, Th.: 1979, *Probleme der Klassifikation von Sprechakten*, in: G. Grewendorf (ed.), *Sprechakttheorie und Semantik*, Frankfurt, pp. 247-274.
- Bennett, J.: 1976, *Linguistic Behaviour*, Cambridge.
- Grice, H.P.: 1957, *Meaning*, *The Philosophical Review* 66, pp. 377-388.
- Meggle, G.: 1981, *Grundbegriffe der Kommunikation*, Berlin / New York (de Gruyter): 1997² (In the paper referred to by *GBK*).
- Meggle, G.: 1984, *Handlungstheoretische Semantik*, unpublished - but widely spread in at least five different versions by copies. (Referred to by *HTS*). To appear 2001 at de Gruyter, Berlin / New York.
- Meggle, G.: 1993, *Gemeinsamer Glaube und Gemeinsames Wissen*, in: W. Lenzen (Eds.), *Tractatus physico-philosophici*, Osnabrücker Philosophische Schriften, S. 145-151; reprinted in: *Neue Realitäten - Herausforderungen der Philosophie*, ed. by Allgemeine Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Berlin, 1993, p. 761-767.
- Meggle, G.: 1997a, *Communicative Actions*, in: G. Holmström-Hintikka /R. Tuomela (Eds.), *Contemporary Action Theory*, vol. II, *The Philosophy and Logic of Social Action*, Dordrecht, 1997.
- Searle, J. R.: 1975, 'A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts', in: K. Gunderson (ed.), *Language, Mind and Knowledge*, Minneapolis, pp. 344-369.
- Schiffer, S.: 1972, *Meaning*, Oxford, 1988².
- Ulkan, M.: *Zur Klassifikation von Sprechakten. Eine grundlagentheoretische Fallstudie*, Tübingen (Niemeyer), 1992.