The other side of understanding

Czarnecki, Tadeusz (1994) The other side of understanding. Wittgenstein Studien, 1 (2).

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Abstract

Epistemic criteria of X necessary truths including a word "X" are media of understanding of the word "X". A person who is not acquainted with criteria of X does not understand the word "X". Nevertheless, when they are misused, criteria are also responsible for loss of understanding.In order to reveal the other side of understanding one should modify the category of "language game" by /1/ distinguishing between teaching and playing epistemic language games and /2/ introducing the additional category of "language as a whole". These steps allow to interpret phenomena appearing at the boundaries of language. Some declarative sentences, when they are viewed from the perspective of teaching, may be classified as both synthetic a priori and analytic whereas the same sentences, when they are viewed from the perspective of playing, are classified as empirical. Other sentences, when they are viewed from the perspective of language as a whole, may be classified as these which lost their empirical character. An analysis of these phenomena leads to the conclusion that criteria are misused when one treats them as genuine moves while playing epistemic language games. A person who states criteria of X while playing epistemic games with a word "X" proves that he does not understand the word "X" because the stating of criteria is a manifestation of the nonsense of playing.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Sprachspiel, Verstehen, Sprache
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Studien 1994-97
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Sprachphilosophie
Depositing User: Günther Friesinger
Date Deposited: 13 Feb 2003
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2011 18:50
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/421

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