Wittgenstein on private language and privat mental objects.

Jacquette, Dale (1994) Wittgenstein on private language and privat mental objects. Wittgenstein Studien, 1 (1).

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Wittgenstein's private language argument in his philosophical investigations is explained and critically evaluated. The implications of Wittgenstein's conclusion that there can be no private sensation language are examined, in light of claims that Wittgenstein by the private language argument also proves that there can also be no private mental objects. The concept of a criterion of correctness is discussed as the key to Wittgenstein's reflections, and counterexamples are considered that raise doubts about the soundness of the private language argument. Difficulties identified in standard interpretations of Wittgenstein's argument indicate that the rejection of private sensation languages does not automatically imply a third-person hard psychological theory, such as logical behaviorism, nor does the argument effectively support reductivist or anti-intentionalist philosophy of mind.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Sprache, Geist
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Sprachphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Studien 1994-97
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Depositing User: Dr Simo Saatela
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 12:38
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 12:38
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2193

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