Wittgenstein on aesthetic practice: A critique of Weitz and Mandelbaum

This paper is an attempt to clarify some misconceptions of Wittgenstein concerning his views on definition in traditional aesthetics. I argue that Weitz fails to note a fundamental ambiguity in Wittgenstein's discussion of the encompassing similarities of games, which is related in a similar way to the issue of why an encompassing feature common to all artworks is confused. I then criticize Weitz's view that the following of rules is basic to Wittgenstein's thought, for Weitz has ignored the vital role of practices in the INVESTIGATIONS as well as throughout our aesthetic discourse. I have also argued against Mandelbaum's claim that the notion of family resemblances in Wittgenstein concerns aspects of ames which are "directly exhibited," and another claim (similar to Weitz's) which assumes the notion of family resemblances to be a justificatory aspect of Wittgenstein's thought. I then offer what could be called an introduction to an examination of the aesthetic practice of our culture.