***************************************************************** * * Titel: The Mysterious Appeal of 'Wittgenstein's Conservatism' Autor: Denis McManus, Cambridge - United Kingdom Dateiname: 16-2-95.TXT Dateilänge: 61 KB Erschienen in: Wittgenstein Studies 2/95, Datei: 16-2-95.TXT; hrsg. von K.-O. Apel, N. Garver, B. McGuinness, P. Hacker, R. Haller, W. Lütterfelds, G. Meggle, C. Nyíri, K. Puhl, T. Rentsch, J.G.F. Rothhaupt, J. Schulte, U. Steinvorth, P. Stekeler-Weithofer, W. 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Those articles and excerpts from * * articles which the subscriber wishes to use for his own * * private academic purposes are excluded from this * * restrictions. * * * ***************************************************************** This paper attempts to explain the abiding appeal of the suspicion that Wittgenstein is a conservative thinker. Among Wittgensteinians, there is a growing orthodoxy which takes the notion of 'Wittgenstein's conservatism' to be 'nutty' (Diamond 1991 p34). One justification for this opinion is that the charge of conservatism has typically been defended on the basis of highly implausible interpretations of Wittgenstein. However, the critical core of the conservatism charge has been mislocated by Wittgenstein's supporters and by most of his critics. No conservative theses are defended in his work. But in challenging the conceptual tools so often used in justifying criticism of our practices, Wittgenstein appears to abandon us to a conservatism BY DEFAULT. To understand this charge, we must broaden the context within which Wittgenstein's work is normally discussed. Odd as it may sound, what Wittgenstein ACTUALLY SAYS may only be one (and perhaps not the most important) consideration that we must bear in mind in assessing whether he is a conservative thinker. A familiar task for any supporter of Wittgenstein is that of showing how his criticism of philosophical fantasies leaves intact undeniable realities. For example, his assault on a private language does not deny that we have sensations. But making this APPARENT is one of the central tasks undertaken in Wittgenstein's reflections on these topics. The suspicion that Wittgenstein has undermined the conceptual resources which are necessary if we are to see the radical intellectual reassessment of our practices (for which I use the short- hand 'radical critique') as rational is an instance of this general worry regarding his analyses. I explain this general worry by mapping out a previously-ignored aspect of his analogy between psychoanalysis and his own philosophical approach. This aspect focusses on the intimacy with which confused philosophical notions are interwoven with our understanding of philosophically-uncontentious forms of thought and action. Drawing on this aspect of the analogy, I show that, although overlain by a host of interpretative errors, it is the default version of the conservatism charge that lies at the bottom of the highly unfashionable criticisms of Wittgenstein made by Ernest Gellner. Sections 1 and 2 sketch the grounds on which Wittgenstein has been depicted as an inherently conservative thinker and criticise two popular rebuttals of this charge. I suggest that all the rival parties in these controversies may be mistaken in ascribing general theses to Wittgenstein. However, I go on to argue that even if this is conceded, the worry remains that Wittgenstein condemns us to default conservatism. Section 3 examines difficulties highlighted by Wittgenstein's psychoanalytic analogy, difficulties of which section 4 shows default conservatism to be an instance. 1. The non-rational base Conservatism is a complex phenomenon and several different claims could be denoted by 'Wittgenstein's conservatism'. Marcuse, for instance, accuses Wittgenstein of providing 'an intellectual justification for . . . the defamation of alternative modes of thought which contradict the established universe of discourse' (Marcuse 1964 p173). Nyiri, on the other hand, proclaims that '[t]he results of Wittgenstein's later philosophy can be summed up by saying that 'freedom', if this should mean something different from being bound by genuine traditions, is simply incompatible with reason' (Nyiri 1976 p505).*1* In what follows, I shall be focussing on (and shall take 'Wittgenstein's conservatism' to denote) the particular claim that if one were to accept Wittgenstein's perspective, one would see that the possibility of a radical critique of our existing ways of thinking and acting is a fantasy. A number of different theses which can be attributed to Wittgenstein have been cited as support for this conservatism charge. These include the claims that our activities are not fundamentally reason-based,*2* that a transcendental perspective is an impossibility*3* and that ordinary uses of language are, as Russell put it, 'sacrosanct' (Russell 1959b p13).*4* Corresponding to these claims are different forms of defence of Wittgenstein and in the present and following sections I examine two of these. Both draw our attention to important features of Wittgenstein's thought but go on to postulate implausible and highly unWittgensteinian stratifications of thought and action. The first defence challenges a conservative reading of Wittgenstein's recurrent casting of doubt on the possibility of uncovering 'the reasons at the bottom of our language-game' (OC 204).*5* According to Wittgenstein, '[e]xplanations come to an end somewhere' (PI 1) and there one finds ways of acting, rather than thought (OC 204, 135).*6* Moreover, Wittgenstein not only denies the existence of ultimately- grounding reasons. He also denies that they are necessary, insisting, for example, that '[t]o use a word without a justification does not mean to use it without right' (PI 289). To his critics, this proves that Wittgenstein is the only thing worse than a sceptic, that is, a dogmatist. On the assumption that radical critique is the assessment of the fundamental reasons which underlie our practices, Wittgenstein's criticisms of the idea that our activities are fundamentally reason- based can be interpreted as an attack on the idea of radical critique. Wittgenstein tries to seal up the gap left by the excision of radical critique, and the reasons which would have underwritten it, by asserting that the kind of justification radical critique sought is not a necessary condition of intellectual respectability after all. According to Gellner, this manoeuvre 'in effect tends to underwrite all current concepts, however useless, anachronistic [or] inconsistent' (Gellner 1959 p56). According to the first form of defence, Wittgenstein's critics fail to focus on the specific TYPES of activity which Wittgenstein argues lack a rational grounding. They have ignored the possibility that his views on the grounding of THESE activities might differ substantially from his views on this same possibility with respect to more complex conceptual systems. This claim may be read as evidence for a general thesis which would divide up our activities into those to which Wittgenstein's anti-rationalist claims apply and those to which they do not. It is this latter move which I will argue is mistaken. The following quotations illustrate the kinds of activities which Wittgenstein argues cannot be provided with rational foundations: Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet when I want to get up from a chair? There is no why. I simply don't. This is how I act. OC 148 No rule of inference is needed to justify the inference ['p v q follows from p.q'], since if it were I would need another rule to justify the rule and that would lead to an infinite regress. LI 56 Looking at these cases it can be seen that the conservatism thesis applies Wittgensteinian slogans to cases quite unlike those which Wittgenstein examined. One need not have the same attitude towards cases such as those in the quoted remarks as one has towards the idea of justifying particular instances of, say, political thinking. Jones rebuts the conservatism charge by claiming that Wittgenstein developed his conception of thought and language with a specific task in mind, as a result of which 'to give it a wider political interpretation would be to remove it from its "original home".' (Jones 1986 p283) Moreover, Wittgenstein is not so much denying the existence of a rational foundation (which we hoped to find at the base of our activities) as drawing our attention to those points at which the request for reasons is ceasing to make clear sense. The areas of thought which are occupying the mind of Wittgenstein are those which lie 'beyond being justified or unjustified' (OC 359). Their 'lacking' a justifying reason is not a matter of 'hastiness or superficiality' (OC 358) and is certainly not a reason for thinking that the thoughts in question are 'arbitrary'.*7* In the cases Wittgenstein examines, doubt is not indicative of intellectual scrupulousness but of misunderstanding. We are not foisting 'our' colour concepts on children when we offer them no reasons as to why 'this is red'. A tempting reading of the above points undermines the conservatism charge by isolating a certain layer of human activities to which Wittgenstein's anti-rationalist claims apply and distinguishing this layer from the rest of human activity. Commentators have found a role here for two interpretations of Wittgenstein's concept of 'form of life'. Firstly, there is what might be called the 'behaviour-pattern' view according to which 'form of life' refers to 'basic human activities and responses like hoping, feeling certain, measuring, giving orders, asking questions and greeting people, and indeed using language generally' (Sherry 1972 p161). Secondly, there is the view that we should think of a form of life as 'something typical of a human being', analogous to 'biological' functions like walking and sleeping and broadly in the same category as nutrition or reacting to the environment.*8* Since '[w]hat has to be accepted [are] forms of life' (PI p226), the equation of 'forms of life' with eating, sleeping, hoping, regretting, etc. renders the conservatism charge innocuous.*9* This approach faces three difficulties. Firstly, it reads Wittgenstein as advocating a specific philosophical thesis, something which he insisted was not his aim.*10* Secondly, it is unclear what contribution the thesis in question makes. The question whether the activity under examination falls within the layer where grounding becomes nonsense seems little more than a restatement of the question whether the demand for grounding is legitimate. This leads us on to the third problem. If Wittgenstein's defenders wish to draw a distinction between a substructure, to which Wittgenstein's anti- rationalism applies, and a superstructure, where the demand for grounding reasons does make sense, how are we to understand the lack of respect for such a border which he manifests in his attacks on scientifically-minded criticism of religion and magical belief?*11* Pursuing rationalism high into the 'superstructure', Wittgenstein shows no sign of relying on a general thesis regarding a layer of unimpeachable activity.*12* 2. The non-philosophical superstructure Another pattern of stratification that one may impose on thought is exploited by the second defence of Wittgenstein that I shall discuss. It undermines the conservatism charge by constraining his apparently anti-intellectual arguments to the philosophical side of a philosophical/non-philosophical distinction. According to this picture, our radical forms of thought themselves constitute practices or language-games and thus they escape Wittgensteinian criticism. Wittgenstein's attacks on philosophical propositions which focus on their detachment from ordinary human practices seem to point towards the impossibility of any form of thought which insists on its independence from our accepted practices. Since the rationality of radical critique appears to depend on the intelligibility of a concept of 'reason' that would transcend the practices to be assessed, critics conclude that Wittgenstein's philosophy cannot accommodate radical critique. This reading is bolstered by claims such as that '[a] REASON can only be given WITHIN a game' (PG 97) and by Wittgenstein's insistence that we 'must speak the language of the every day' (PG 121, PI 120) thereby bringing words 'back from their metaphysical to their everyday uses' (PI 116). There are at least two manoeuvres which have proved popular as responses to this version of the conservatism charge. Firstly, one can assert that reflection is itself an aspect of our practices and thus has an 'everyday use' of its own. Secondly, one can deny that Wittgenstein's arguments apply to anything other than philosophical thought. These approaches are really two sides of the same coin. Many different writers have pledged allegiance to one form or other of the first approach. For example: [O]ur most sophisticated forms of reflection, including reflection on language-games of reflection, are practices in the sense that participation in them presupposes customary ways of acting with or using words, the following or contesting of which involves the exercise of a wide range of nonreflective techniques and abilities. Tully 1989 p182 Giving up the ideal does not . . . result in surrendering all standards, but rather in finding the standards in the immanent functioning, in norms which have always been there, but we have not deigned to notice. Finch 1983 p4 Adherents of the second approach are also not difficult to find: Virtually everything Wittgenstein wrote on aesthetics, metaphysics, ethics and politics shows hostility to philosophy being used to 'confirm or confute' any theory or position outside what he took philosophy to be about. Jones 1986 p281 The link between the two claims is that one can affirm the existence of the mechanisms of radical critique while denying that such critique is necessarily philosophical. Rather, '[f]or Wittgenstein, as for Marx, the answers we require must be forged in practice' (Lugg 1985 p472). This defence faces a fundamental problem in attempting to substantiate the boundary between the philosophical and the non-philosophical. If, for example, one argues that 'common sense' is itself 'metaphysically contaminated' (Eagleton 1982 p72), one cannot assume that a critique of philosophy will leave everything within 'common sense' unchanged. The problem is far worse, and far more clearly so, within other intellectual, but ostensibly non-philosophical, fields. Firstly, what of the many ideas, at work in other spheres, which have philosophical implications? What becomes of WERTFREI social science, for example, once one rejects the fact/value distinction? What becomes of literary theories based on the rejection of 'the intentional fallacy' after the mind/body distinction is junked? This is only the tip of the ice-berg. What seems to be a far greater problem concerns those ideas which have emerged out of philosophical reflection. Sociologists acknowledge that their discipline developed out of philosophy but does that mean it developed out of nonsense? What of the Helsinki Declaration on Human Rights? Is this the work of the 'misleading power of grammar'? And what of the ways in which philosophy has moulded how we think about certain concepts? Did Locke ruin 'property'? Has Nietzsche ruined 'power'? Substantiating a sharp distinction between the philosophical and the non-philosophical is a notoriously difficult thing to do*13* and the image of a substructure of philosophically-uncontentious activity, overlain by a superstructure of reflection becomes less and less convincing as one attempts to understand, on that basis, activities which involve something like reflective understanding. In the 'upper' echelons of radical critique, the 'non-philosophical practice of critique' appears to merge with paradigmatic philosophical controversy. Moreover, would Wittgenstein have believed it possible to draw a philosophical/non-philosophical distinction? For Wittgenstein, that would be a distinction between the confused and the potentially intelligible ('potentially' because the non-philosophical may suffer from non-philosophical confusions). Can we really suppose that he thought he could draw this in a general manner, once and for all? There may seem something of this project in the TRACTATUS, but can it be read into the later work with its steadfast commitment to the particular?*14* 'The philosophical' cannot be treated as 'a continuous streak of philosophical ore' running through space and time (Rorty 1984 p70) and consequently, we cannot save ourselves the labour of unearthing where, when and how philosophical confusion provides the foundation for apparently respectable claims in fields we would not normally see as philosophical. This brings me to what I would suggest is a common mistake made by all the rival parties in the controversies sketched in the present and previous sections. The mistake is that of ascribing general theses to Wittgenstein. This claim is both ambitious (in that it is difficult to state coherently, let alone establish) and modest (in attributing a more limited significance to Wittgenstein's arguments than his supporters are wont). I will not attempt to show that this claim can be defended, allowing myself this omission on the grounds that it is the modesty of the claim that is most important in the remainder of the paper. I wish to argue that there is a suspicion of conservatism which lingers even if Wittgenstein does only criticize particular philosophical ideas. Both those who accuse him of conservatism and many of those who seek to defend him against this charge assume that Wittgenstein is obliged to give substance to two boundaries - an upper boundary, where critical thought dissolves into philosophical nonsense, and a lower boundary, where critical thought meets a stratum of forms of action so basic as not to require justification. But is it true that Wittgenstein will undermine the distinction between real and unreal demands for justification unless he can substantiate the distinctions mentioned? A particularist interpretation spares Wittgenstein this unenviable task. This kind of interpretation denies that Wittgenstein would have us drop the idea that philosophy can reveal some sort of formal characteristic, knowledge of which would allow us to sieve the most disparate of activities for 'justified claims'. This view is rejected not because philosophy CAN give us such knowledge, but rather because WITTGENSTEIN's arguments do not entitle us to make any claim of this degree of generality, positive or negative. The last thing Wittgenstein would wish to do is 'give substance' to something like 'THE distinction between real and unreal demands for justification'. Looking back over the cases focussed upon in section 1, a particularist interpretation of Wittgenstein suggests that his point is that we cannot make sense of these particular demands for justifying reasons. This claim is not justified by the cases belonging to a general category, being instances of 'forms of life', for example. Rather, we cannot find an adequate specification of what it is that we are trying to say. In answer to the question 'Are our fundamental practices well grounded?', this interpretation of Wittgenstein suggests he would respond: Well, what do you mean? 3. Philosophy and therapy At the heart of the conservatism charge, there remains a fear which a particularist interpretation cannot allay. The nature of this fear can be explained by drawing on an aspect of Wittgenstein's analogy between philosophy and therapy, an aspect which has not been properly acknowledged by his supporters.*15* This failure goes some way to explaining why these supporters are seen by non-Wittgensteinians as missing the point of, or otherwise ignoring, the 'real', 'substantive' philosophical issues. There are forces which keep philosophical claims in place, forces which the Wittgensteinian must redirect if he or she is to successfully relinquish the philosophical claim. Wittgenstein's suggestion that his techniques can be compared with forms of therapy has attracted a great deal of attention.*16* An aspect of the analogy which has so far been ignored focuses on the fact that successful therapy does more than simply reveal that the subject's neurosis is based on some sort of erroneous belief. It also harnesses and redirects the energies which force the belief on the subject. Correspondingly, in a case of what might be called 'philosophical therapy', one may not remove the compelling thought simply by offering an argument which claims to show the thought is mistaken, no matter how valid the argument may be and no matter how convinced the 'patient' is of its validity. There are other forces at work, forces which overwhelm the recognition that the claim is flawed.*17* One way to imagine the functioning of these forces is as locating the philosophical thought at a crucial point in a structure which contains many jealously-guarded beliefs, a structure which would apparently disintegrate without the philosophical thought being present. The edifice containing the philosophical thought which is to be attacked cannot simply be demolished, because this structure contains too much which it would be crazy to reject. Those who would simply demolish the structure will come under fire not only from advocates of the philosophical claim but also from those who back the other beliefs with which the structure serves to associate the philosophical claim. Instead the edifice must be dismantled, in such a way that one can show the subject that the treasured beliefs do not rely on the philosophical claim as had been thought. Philosophical claims do not occur in our thoughts by accident, like so many chance impurities. There are forces at work which cause them to be where and what they are. Failure to recognize this aspect of the therapy analogy results in philosophers who regard themselves as Wittgensteinian all too often showing themselves to be among the most unsympathetic of 'therapists'. It is easy to condemn a particular philosophical claim as a 'misuse of language', but it is far more difficult to detect, harness and redirect the forces that make the claim compelling. Wittgenstein stresses this aspect of philosophical 'therapy' in the Big Typescript: The strange thing about philosophical uneasiness and its resolution might seem to be that it is like the suffering of an ascetic who stood raising a heavy ball, amid groans, and whom someone released by telling him: 'Drop it.' One wonders: if these sentences make you uneasy and you didn't know what to do with them, why didn't you drop them earlier, what stopped you from doing it? Well I believe it was the false system that he thought he had to accommodate himself to, etc. Ph 10*18* We cannot simply 'drop' the utterances which trouble us because they seem to be essential parts of a system we value. The Wittgensteinian analysis shows us that this was a 'false system' and once this is recognised we can retain what really matters to us and drop the excrescences which our misunderstanding foisted upon us. Until the 'false system' is revealed, we will continue to view with scepticism those arguments which, if valid, would make us sceptical about our favoured philosophical claims. At first glance, we have here a neat analogy with what Freud has to say about repression. Crucial characteristics of this phenomenon are 'that the satisfaction of an instinct which is under repression would be quite possible, and further, that in every instance such a satisfaction would be pleasurable in itself; but it would be irreconcilable with other claims and intentions.' (Freud 1915) One way of elaborating on the analogy would be to say that we recognize, in some way, the nonsensical nature of our philosophical claims but cannot acknowledge this recognition because of the destructive effect this would seem to have on other meaningful and treasured claims. We cannot acknowledge that our philosophical claim is confused because this would seem to undermine claims which it would be crazy to undermine. This first reading of the analogy necessarily depicts the subject as failing to recognize the lack of connection between the philosophical claim and those with which it is supposedly, but not actually, related. We can deepen the analogy by explaining this failure as itself due to repression. According to this second reading, it is not only the philosophical claim's lack of sense that is repressed but the 'false system' too. We cannot acknowledge that our rejection of the philosophical claim would NOT oblige us to reject our treasured beliefs. But why shouldn't we acknowledge this? Why should we hide the 'false system'? One answer would be that our commitment to the false system may satisfy certain desires. These can take a variety of forms, ranging from intellectual 'desires', such as the pursuit of simplicity and coherence, to more 'libidinal' desires, including fantasies of control and passivity, recognition and hiddenness, authorship and non- responsibility, determinacy and indeterminacy of self. In this way, Wittgenstein's approach could be reconciled with the insights of Marx and Nietzsche into the motivation of philosophers. However, if Wittgenstein's analyses rid us of fantasies, his claim to be destroying 'nothing but houses of cards' (PI 118) can at best be a half-truth, since the loss of fantasies may be a major loss. The philosophical claim's distorting lens diminishes some unpleasant aspects of our practices and magnifies the pleasant. At this point, '[w]hat has to be overcome is not a difficulty of the intellect, but of the will' and what makes the subject under discussion difficult to grasp is 'the contrast between the understanding of the subject and what most people want to see' (Ph 5). Three important qualifications need to be made here. Firstly, the role of 'libidinal' motivation in this second reading of the psychoanalytic analogy is less clearly developed in Wittgenstein's work than is the role of, for example, the 'craving' for generality (BB 17) and for simplicity (APR 36) and other more straightforwardly intellectual 'desires'. It has been my aim solely to show that the involvement of 'libidinal' factors is a natural extension of Wittgenstein's perspective. Secondly, the involvement here of the intellectual 'desires' in no way implies that these NECESSARILY generate 'false systems'. That these forms of thought may lead to confusion does not show that they are inherently confused and there is indeed reason to think that they are essential to our pursuit of understanding.*19* Thirdly, our formulation of the second reading of the analogy with Freud on repression is misleading, in that it asserts that the nonsensicality of the claim AND the false system are repressed. It may be more accurate to say that this nonsensicality is AN ASPECT OF the false system. On the one hand, the system conceals the philosophical thought's dissociation from the kinds of claim of which its touted meaning implies it is an instance. On the other, it presents the philosophical claim as intimately bound up with treasured beliefs and practices, as well as treasured fantasies. These aspects are two sides of the same coin. The false system presents the philosophical claim in question as not only meaningful (the first aspect), but also as essential to the intelligibility of some of our most jealously-guarded beliefs (the second). The strategic concerns that this aspect of the psychoanalytic analogy foregrounds are clearly visible in Wittgenstein's discussion of the idea that an inner, mental object or process is crucial in determining what our thoughts are. In challenging this notion, Wittgenstein is immediately under threat from the philosophical error's most potent form of defence - 'the false system': The first step is the innocent ethereal conception in which one (nevertheless) leaves open the 'kind' of processes or states. But the next is that one sees that no matter what KIND of thing this something is of which one wants to talk, it explains nothing and is a useless fiction. But now if one gives up this fiction, it seems as if one is denying everything mental and thereby saying there is only the bodily.*20* Certain forces impel us to misunderstand our own concepts and if a particular interpretation of a phenomenon is compelling, the rejection of this interpretation will appear to be a denial of the existence of the phenomenon: The 'private experience' is a degenerate construction of our grammar (comparable in a sense to tautology and contradiction). And this grammatical monster now fools us; when we wish to do away with it, it seems as though we denied the existence of an experience, say, toothache. NFL 270 Wittgenstein works against, in order to expose, a 'false system'. We see this effort in, for example, his argument that, despite what we may have thought, 'inner objects' play no part in how we imagine mind- reading (PI p222). In arguments such as these, we see what it is about the 'false system' which makes it 'false'. The philosophical claim at its core fits neatly with certain facts about our relation to our own thoughts. But when pressurised, we see that the role this claim was thought to play it does not play at all. We also see here how costly the loss of fantasies can be, as the 'inner, mental object' picture underwrites a certain comforting ideal of knowing another's mind. Glossed over are the real problems involved in the process known as 'getting to know someone' and in their place is a relatively straight- forward account of gaining knowledge of an (admittedly elusive and unusual) object.*21* Perhaps even more important is the corresponding demystification of self-knowledge. Our mind is defined as a space within which we see our thoughts with perfect clarity. Such a picture serves to reinforce the belief that I know what I want and no one else can say otherwise.*22* This example reveals the two aspects of the false system. The philosophical postulation of 'inner objects' to which I have 'privileged access' rests upon truths such as that my own avowals play a crucial role in other peoples' attribution of thoughts to me. In addition, the philosophical picture obscures the fact that, in certain circumstances, my avowals count for very little (situations in which others know best or in which I am literally 'losing my mind'). The 'false system' 'connects' talk of 'inner objects' with my ordinary expressions of thought, showing that such talk is meaningful, and makes the intelligibility of this talk 'essential' to the intelligibility of some of my most precious beliefs, for example, my being an individual who knows his own thoughts and can decide for himself. The denial of a substantive claim and the exposure of a claim as a fantasy both 'make a difference'. Both can radically change the way a person lives and thinks and which category a particular rejection belongs to is perhaps THE issue at stake between Wittgenstein and his opponent. A claim I would not wish to defend is that Wittgenstein rejects nothing but fantasies. This amounts to the claim that he correctly follows the procedures he himself lays down. This is a strong claim concerning a very large body of work. More importantly, it would be misleading to suggest that one could establish whether Wittgenstein had followed his own rules by discovering whether what he rejects are fantasies, because what Wittgenstein offers us ARE REASONS for thinking that what he rejects are fantasies. He shows that what are offered as solutions are not solutions at all. He shows that problems we felt we needed to solve are not the problems we thought they were. If we were to argue that a particular analysis offered by Wittgenstein only denies the intelligibility of a fantasy, what we would be doing would be more akin to CONTINUING those analyses than defending a finished product. What we have here are not independent routes to the same place and Wittgenstein himself worked towards a predetermined end-point only to the extent that he suspected particular claims were fantasies. Hence, the claim that all the philosophical notions which Wittgenstein casts doubt on are 'fantasies' is not something with which the Wittgensteinian who meets opposition can console himself, since that these claims are fantasies is what Wittgenstein's analyses SHOW, IF they are successful.*23* There is no GIVEN real/fantasy distinction and there are no independent grounds for thinking that, for example, QUALIA are fantasies, in advance of our arguing about them. With the example of sensation-language, we have what, in retrospect, seems a neat division between the philosophically-uncontentious activities and their philosophical interpretations. However, this retrospective view is deceptive in that it fails to reflect the power of the 'false system' which depicts the philosophical interpretation as seamlessly welded into the activities with which the philosopher insists it is associated. The neat retrospective view is Wittgenstein's ACHIEVEMENT. Finally, the analogy with therapy which I have developed sheds new light on Wittgenstein's emphasis on the description of ordinary facts of linguistic usage. Wittgenstein recommends the 'quiet weighing of linguistic facts' over 'wild conjectures and explanations' (Z 447) because the former will let us see what really hangs on the latter. Wittgenstein must dwell on the mundane facts which characterise our ordinary practices in order to show that they are not related to the philosophical conjectures in the way the philosopher suggests. Wittgenstein calls for description rather than explanation because if one takes 'explanation' to denote, for example, the providing of foundations for our practices (PI 124), 'explanation' is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's approach. To show that a particular philosophical claim is fundamentally unrelated to the practices it is claimed to underpin, it is not necessary to demonstrate that another philosophical claim DOES provide a foundation for those practices (or indeed that the very idea of practices having a foundation is nonsensical). Ordinary facts are taken as evidence for wild philosophical conjectures and Wittgenstein believes that appropriate redescription of these facts is the clarificatory procedure which will show the lack of connection. 4. Default conservatism Supporters of Wittgenstein criticise the conservatism charge for relying on misinterpretations of Wittgenstein's work. Some versions of the charge do indeed caricature his work and in the light of these interpretations the conservatism charge may appear 'nutty'. However, there is another way of understanding the charge which becomes obvious once one views the debate in the context provided by the psychoanalytic analogy. This version argues that although Wittgenstein may not positively endorse a conservative position, one cannot make sense of radical critique without invoking ideas which Wittgenstein has depicted as confused. Rather than insisting that philosophy 'leave everything as it is' (PI 124), it may be a consequence of Wittgenstein's conceptual purge that everything does stay as it is. Cavell has suggested that Wittgenstein's critics have based the charge of conservatism on the mistaken belief that 'ordinary language philosophy is meant to be a defence of ordinary beliefs' (Cavell 1984 p33). I wish to suggest that Wittgenstein's supporters have based their rebuttal of the conservatism charge on an overly narrow conception of what 'a defence of ordinary beliefs' would have to be. Wittgenstein has undermined certain ideas, regarding the self and the nature of meaning, which have played important roles in particular conceptions of the free thinker. Consequently, these conceptions appear to be delusional. This is worrying and if one fails to respond adequately to this worry, a demonstration that such conceptions are confused will not serve to eliminate the desire to affirm their intelligibility. It is as if too much hangs on these notions for it to be conceivable that they are nonsensical. A 'false system' presents the intelligibility of certain philosophical claims as a necessary condition of the legitimacy of, for example, radical criticisms of our established practices and, for Wittgenstein, '[t]he great difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there were something one COULDN'T do' (PI 374). Hence, when critics like Gellner claim that Wittgenstein undermines radical critique, it can be no more than a first step to attack the philosophical premises upon which the critics rely. One frequently encounters the insistence that when Wittgenstein discusses x, his conclusion is a rejection of a philosophical interpretation of x rather than of the reality of x itself. The psychoanalytic analogy shows that that the fundamental worry of those who maintain the philosophical interpretation is not resolved by this kind of insistence. As Wittgenstein put it, '[t]o convince someone of the truth, it is not enough to state it, but rather one must find the PATH from error to truth.' (RFGB 61). We are faced here with a pattern of thought which parallels the reading of behaviourism into Wittgenstein's attack on the 'inner object'. As Wittgenstein aims for the 'grammatical monster' (certain concepts used in the rationalisation of radical critique), the critic thinks he is aiming at the innocent truth which the monster holds hostage (radical critique itself). The situation may be more complex still in that the critic may accept that Wittgenstein only wishes to attack the philosophical fantasy and yet the critic cannot see how our philosophically-innocent concepts will make sense after the fantasy is eliminated. If we reject the ideas that we have used to underwrite the rationality of radical critique and the need for some form of underwriting remains, we seem to be precipitated into conservatism BY DEFAULT. What needs to be exposed, IF Wittgenstein is to be defended, is a 'false system'. In the remainder of this paper, I will show how the fear of default conservatism shapes Ernest Gellner's critique of Wittgenstein, a critique which is otherwise vitiated by its misinterpretation of Wittgenstein. In his book LEGITIMATION OF BELIEF, Gellner defines two approaches which in different ways set a premium on attaining a unified picture of our intellectual life. He names these 'oceanic monism' and 'critical monism': Oceanic monism is a unitary vision designed to give the believer a consoling, edifying or exhilarating sense of being merged with, sustained by, dissolved in the great One of which he and all else is a part. . . . [Critical monism is] the attempt to restore intellectual order by the sustained application of simple, delimited, lucid principles, principles designed to isolate and use the marks of a genuine knowledge Gellner 1974 p22 Gellner argues that it is only by focusing on oceanic monism that one can credibly attack monistic approaches, because critical monism is not an option that one might choose to adopt. Rather it is 'mandatory in conditions of intellectual chaos such as in fact often obtain' (Gellner 1974 p22). Faced with an array of phenomena manifesting no intelligible pattern, the only option, if one would understand these phenomena, is a monistic one, that is, 'choose some point and try to recover a coherent picture by building anew, using it as a base.' (p13) Gellner claims that Wittgenstein's later work was dominated by 'the unitary vision that all unitary visions were mistaken as such and the source of all error' (p133). Past philosophy is merely an instance of this failure, driven as it is by 'a misguided pursuit of homogeneity in language, in thought [and] in reality' (p136). Gellner argues that although Wittgenstein may have latched on to a real source of illusion, he has nevertheless failed to recognise the way in which the need for philosophical thought arises, that is, 'through the collapse of inherited belief-systems' (Gellner 1974 p137). For example, the requirement that knowledge transcend particular contexts 'is dictated not merely by logic, but equally by the instability of contexts', by the pluralism and instability of modern societies (Gellner 1975 p91). Gellner claims that Wittgenstein has failed to recognize that circumstances place a demand on our thought which only critical monism can meet. According to Gellner, 'Wittgenstein's mystique of consensual custom denies that anything can sit in judgment on our concepts' (Gellner 1984 p254). Setting aside the conservatism of this denial, a more pressing problem is that this denial is defended on the basis of a non-existent consensus. In his confidence that once philosophical delusion has been dispelled an intelligible world will be revealed, Wittgenstein ignores the fact that we have no 'cosy and viable little island culture to crawl back into' (Gellner 1974 p143). 'Our culture is not a solution, [but] a problem' and hence the Wittgensteinian 'license to abstention from general theory' is crazy (p205, p139). 'A real historical situation has imposed a certain task on thought', the situation being that the conditions under which one COULD rely on common sense DO NOT HOLD (p44). According to Gellner's interpretation, Wittgenstein's philosophy shares the 'contingently self-refuting' character which Putnam ascribes to positions such as cultural relativism. In suggesting that what is true and false for a culture is determined by the culture's norms, such positions fail to recognize that there ARE no such norms. Since 'every culture has norms that are vague, norms that are unreasonable, norms that dictate inconsistent beliefs', our culture is not a solution, but a problem (Putnam 1982 p239). I wish to suggest a way of reading Gellner's critique which sheds light on the influence of default conservatism. Gellner offers a picture of critical thought, his critical monism. He takes Wittgenstein to be attacking this picture and substituting his own account, according to which 'consensual custom' solves the demands placed on critical thinking. However, the belief that this alternative form of thought could really substitute for critical monism is undermined as soon as one examines the demands placed on thought. It is specifically the COLLAPSE OF CONSENSUS that calls for thought. Wittgenstein pushes the thinker off critical monism's high-wire, confident that he will be caught in the net of established practice. What Wittgenstein fails to realise is that there is no such net. Although Wittgenstein is undoubtedly motivated by a suspicion of the 'craving for generality' (BB 17), Gellner misinterprets his work when he reads it as an assault on the pursuit of monistic accounts. Wittgenstein tries to expose the points at which monistic accounts start to become nonsensical. This effort can be rationalised by the truism that some unitary visions over-reach themselves. There is no need to invoke 'the unitary vision that all unitary visions are mistaken'. As a result of this misinterpretation, Gellner assumes that Wittgenstein offers us 'established custom' as a substitute for critical monism. Gellner rightly cannot believe that Wittgenstein simply dismisses the problems which critical monism is designed to solve and assumes that there must be an alternative account of how such problems can be solved. This he 'finds' in Wittgenstein's (admittedly perhaps implicit) belief that established customs can solve these problems. These interpretative errors do not vitiate Gellner's version of the conservatism charge. Although there are points at which Gellner suggests that Wittgenstein positively advocates the view that established customs can substitute for critical monism, his claims do not necessarily rest upon this misinterpretation. Rather 'custom' or 'tradition' is all that is left, according to Gellner, once one undermines critical monism. Wittgenstein does not need to argue positively for the intellectual adequacy of 'custom' in order to land us with 'custom' as our sole intellectual resource. Although Gellner criticises Wittgenstein's philosophy for failing to address the 'intellectual chaos' of our time, the more fundamental criticism is that it undermines those who would attempt to establish some cognitive order. The charge is not that Wittgenstein leaves us with a 'common sense philosophy'. Gellner is not suggesting that Wittgenstein challenged the adequacy of physics to explore the physical universe. Rather, he is claiming, firstly, that there are problems which the established sciences do not solve, which philosophy once attempted to solve and which still need solving and, secondly, that Wittgenstein denies us the resources necessary to solve these problems, that is, he denies us the conceptual underpinning of critical monism. I strongly suspect that these criticisms of Gellner's are unjust. Even if critical monism is 'the only possible strategy when facing a situation of total or near-total bewilderment' (Gellner 1974 p13), it may not be true that this strategy rests upon the philosophical fictions that Wittgenstein attacks. The fact remains that when thinking about criticism of established practices, it IS easy to slip into ways of speaking which suggest that such criticism does indeed rest on our exposing 'the true meaning of democracy' or such like. Thus to defend Wittgenstein here one must examine these philosophical temptations with the same sensitivity that Wittgenstein himself displays, rather than simply saying that he never defends conservative theses. What we would then be examining would be misinterpretations of radical critique. This would extend the work of Wittgenstein's philosophy, the study of abiding and powerful illusions. Philosophical problems arise when we come to believe that our 'ordinary ways of thinking' commit us to the existence of entities or knowledge of paradoxical kinds. In the same way, radical critique may appear to commit us to the reality of many of the fictions that Wittgenstein attack. Thus his writings may appear to commit us, by default, to conservatism. I suspect that the source of these appearances are misunderstandings of radical critique. But making this clear may be as challenging a task as those which Wittgenstein faces in showing that having sensations does not rest on having a private language, that making mathematical discoveries does not rest on mathematical Platonism, that seeing-as does not rest on our having perceptions like inner pictures, etc., etc.. As the psychoanalytic analogy leads us to expect, Wittgenstein can seem to have undermined the only ways in which we might see critical thought as defensible and consequently can appear to be attacking such thought. If we could show that critical monistic thought was intelligible without recourse being necessary to concepts that Wittgenstein challenges, we would have exposed the 'false system' which generates this appearance and, with it, the charge of default conservatism. In freeing Wittgenstein of the suspicion of conservatism, it is not enough merely to point out that he never advocates conservative doctrines. In addition, the faithfully Wittgensteinian 'therapist' must examine and 'defuse' those aspects of our thought which nourish the 'false system'.*24* FOOTNOTES *1* Nyiri's work on Wittgenstein's conservatism can be found in this paper and also in Nyiri 1979 and 1984. *2* Gellner asserts that, by 'showing that the REASONS UNDERLYING CRITICISMS of accepted habits are in general mistaken' (Gellner 1959 p249), Wittgenstein 'tends to underwrite the norms that happen to be built into current usage' (p133), leaving us with 'conceptual conservatism' (p124). *3* Nagel takes Wittgenstein's later work to imply 'that nothing can make sense which purports to reach beyond the outer bounds of human experience and life' (Nagel 1986 p105). *4* Eagleton attributes to Wittgenstein 'a fetishism of common usage' (Eagleton 1982 p82) which leaves 'the whole structure of everydayness comfortingly in place' (Eagleton 1990 p312). *5* When referring to works by Wittgenstein, abbtreviations given in the references section are used, followed by page or section number as appropriate. *6* He quotes with approval Goethe's 'IM ANFANG WAR DIE TAT' ('In the beginning was the deed') - FAUST I (cf. CE 420, OC 402 and CV 31). *7* When Wittgenstein asserts that the grammar of colours is neither straight-forwardly arbitrary nor straight-forwardly non-arbitrary (Z 357-58), he is pointing out that the same problems which affect 'reasons' also affect 'arbitrary'. '"Arbitrary" as we normally use it always has reference to some practical end' (LI 60)) and reassessing 'reasoned' requires us to reassess 'arbitrary'. (Hence, we need not read the Z passage as showing that 'Wittgenstein had not made up his mind as regards ontology' (Maury 1981 p161).) *8* Cf., e.g., Hunter 1968. *9* A third interpretation which has proved popular, but which encourages rather than undermines the conservatism charge, takes 'form of life' to mean a style or way of life, emphasising social and especially cultural factors. Cf., e.g., Sutherland 1975. *10* This point is discussed in greater depth later. *11* Cf. APR and RFGB. *12* The possible reply that religion and magical belief may not BE 'superstructural' illustrates my second criticism. *13* For criticisms of two versions of the philosophical/non-philosophical distinction, see Burnyeat 1984 and Lear 1989. *14* Wittgenstein's sweeping claims about 'philosophy' may appear to endorse this kind of stratification of thought. Space prevents me from demonstrating how ambiguous this support is. *15* Wittgenstein draws this analogy on a number of occasions. Cf., e.g., PI 133 and Ph 6-7. *16* Lear 1984 and Kenny 1982 develop interesting interpretations of the analogy. *17* It is for this reason that pointing out that a typical philosophical thought is wildly out of kilter with the rest of our ordinary beliefs is unlikely to eliminate that thought. The thinker of the thought already KNOWS that the thought is, in this sense, counter-intuitive. *18* The broken underlining are 'indications of discontent or uncertainty' (Ph -Editor's Note). *19* According to Gellner, Wittgenstein missed both of these facts. See Section 4. *20* MS 116, 322, quoted in Hacker 1990 p262. *21* Cavell suggests that '[i]n making the knowledge of others a metaphysical difficulty, philosophers deny how real the practical difficulty is of coming to know another person' (Cavell 1979 p90). The philosophical problem of privacy occludes the 'natural problem' of communication, characterised by inarticulacy, disinterest and alienation (Cavell 1976 p265, p69). *22* Cavell suggests that the concept of a private language captures a 'fantasy of necessary inexpressiveness' which, among other things, allows us to always insist that we have not been properly understood (Cavell 1979 p351). The notion that this kind of individualist fantasy underlies our belief in the Cartesian 'mental arena' has obvious affinities with the claim that the philosophy of the Enlightenment was a historically-specific ideological construct serving the interests of the rising bourgeoisie (cf., e.g., Mannheim 1929 pp197-206). *23* Wittgenstein encourages this fraudulent consolation with statements such as that '[i]f you find yourself stumped trying to convince someone of something and not getting anywhere, tell yourself that it is the WILL and not the intellect you're up against' (MS 158, 35, quoted in Baker and Hacker 1983 p289 n23). *24* I would like to thank Renford Bambrough, Jane Heal and Maureen Eckersley for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. References Baker, G.P. and Hacker, P.M.S. (1983) Wittgenstein: Meaning and Understanding, Oxford: Blackwell. Burnyeat, M. (1984) 'The sceptic in his place and time', Philosophy in History, ed. 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