Wittgenstein Versus Russell On Logical Realism

Riverso, Emamuele (1995) Wittgenstein Versus Russell On Logical Realism. Wittgenstein Studien, 2 (2).

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In l9l3 Bertrand Russell was credited as the supporter of a sort of Platonism in which a world of relations served as the framework for all existing and possible knowledges. In his works on mathematics and logic he employed logistics to build up all branches of mathematics using only logical relations. Instead Wittgenstein had no inclination to conceive of logic as a description of a particular sort of objects.He wanted to find in logic the means of discovering the structure of facts and its projection in the language. Russell was prompted by Wittgenstein to abandon his Platonism. He tried to salvage his logistic achievements by separating them from Platonism of relations. He adopted the principle of extensionality and declared logic as purely linguistic but could not satisfy Wittgenstein's requirements. He could not make logic self-sufficient as Wittgenstein required. The view of Wittgenstein remained very different because what he cared for was only clarification of thought and of facts as we conceive them.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Sprache, Platonismus, Logik
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Sprachphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Studien 1994-97
Depositing User: Users 122 not found.
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 12:44
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 12:44
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2246

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