***************************************************************** * * Titel: Language and Reification. Some Remarks on Wittgenstein and Critical Theory Autor: Christoph *Demmerling*, Technische Universität Dresden Dateiname: 11-1-96.TXT Dateilänge: 32 KB Erschienen in: Wittgenstein Studies 1/96, Datei: 11-1-96.TXT; hrsg. von K.-O. Apel, N. Garver, B. McGuinness, P. Hacker, R. Haller, W. Lütterfelds, G. Meggle, C. Nyíri, K. Puhl, R. Raatzsch, T. Rentsch, J.G.F. Rothhaupt, J. Schulte, U. Steinvorth, P. Stekeler-Weithofer, W. 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Those articles and excerpts from * * articles which the subscriber wishes to use for his own * * private academic purposes are excluded from this * * restrictions. * * * ***************************************************************** ABSTRACT In this paper I defend the claim that, contrary to common assumptions, a comparison between Adorno's and Wittgenstein's reflections on language is of use in the development of a linguistic transformation of Critical Theory. Wittgenstein's reflections can be brought into a fruitful dialogue with Adorno's remarks on the function of concepts. The concept of reification was for a long time the basic concept of a critical theory of society. Nowadays it seems to be discredited. Wittgenstein's approach to linguistic analysis makes it possible to use this concept in a new way. In meinem Beitrag vertrete ich gegen verbreitete Auffassungen die These, daþ sich Elemente der Sprachphilosophie Wittgensteins für eine sprachkritische Transformation des Projekts einer kritischen Theorie nutzen lassen. Seine Ueberlegungen lassen sich in einen fruchtbaren Dialog mit Th. W. Adornos Bemerkungen zur Begriffstheorie bringen. Grundbegriff einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie war für lange Zeit der Begriff der Verdinglichung. Heute scheint er diskreditiert. Wittgensteins Sprachanalyse erlaubt es, diesen Begriff auf eine neue Weise zu gebrauchen. In this paper I would like to make some remarks on the possibility of a dialogue between Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and Adorno's Critical Theory.*1* But first of all, let me make some preliminary comments concerning enterprises of this type in general. Dialogue between philosophers of the analytic tradition and representatives of continental philosophy has not always been so easy as it is today. There are plenty of recent studies, for instance, of the relation between linguistic philosophy and phenomenology or hermeneutics. Often it is Wittgenstein's later philosophy which plays a key role in studies comparing these two great paradigms of twentienth century philosophy.*2* Others take Quine's and Davidson's philosophy as a starting point to close the gap between the analytic and the continental traditions.*3* Furthermore, the detailed reception of linguistic philosophy is one central feature of the recent development of Critical Theory up to Habermas' THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION or 'Transcendental Pragmatics' (Apel). That is to say, even within the third great stream of European thinking - Critical Theory - one finds a tendency to overcome the differences between various schools and styles in philosophy, differences to which for a long time nearly every European philosopher was commited. It has not, however, been Wittgenstein's philosophy which has functioned as the background for the linguistic transformation within Critical Theory. It has rather been the theory of speech-acts developed by Austin and Searle as well as the idea that "meaning" and "truth" are closely connected together. The members of the 'Frankfurt School' proposed a framework aimed at providing a normative account in moral and social theory. They regarded Wittgenstein's later philosophy with scepticism because they assumed that it implied a form of relativism. Indeed, the reception of Wittgenstein's work among social philosophers or social theorists is still guided by a few key suggestions found in P. Winch's well-known study, THE IDEA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE.*4* It is no surprise, therefore, that in the field of social philosophy Wittgenstein's philosophy is either understood on a methodological level or taken up by authors pleading relativism, e. g. R. Rorty or J.-F. Lyotard.*5* However, the quarrel between the followers of Critical Theory and Wittgenstein is not new: H. Marcuse called Wittgenstein's philosophy a 'Triumph des positiven Denkens' and Adorno remarked that it would be the task of philosophy to say what actually cannot be said. *6* Adorno's remark speaks against the last sentence of the TRACTATUS. Reading the classical texts of Critical Theory, one sometimes gets the impression as if their defenders tended to identify clear thinking with being politically conservative or even reactionary. This view is obviously false.*7* Despite these tendencies one can find numerous studies concerning the relation between Wittgenstein, Marx and Marxism.*8* Moreover there are events in Wittgenstein's life, even if he was a conservative in general, which show a certain sympathy for left- wing ideas. For instance, it is well-known he wanted to emigrate to Russia. The economist J. M. Keynes, a close friend of Wittgenstein, said to the amabassador of the Soviet Union in Great Britain - I. M. Maisky - that Wittgenstein had considerable sympathy for the form of life which the Russian government wanted to establish.*9* Wittgenstein himself confessed that the Neapolitanian economist P. Sraffa, who hold politically left views, had a great influence on his thinking. Wittgenstein was also a friend of Fania and Roy Pascal at the time they were working on a translation of Marx's GERMAN IDEOLOGY. And he was acquainted with the Marxist classicist G. Thomson, whose reasearch in Greek philosophy and the development of money stands in the background of the sociogenetic epistemology of A. Sohn- Rethel. Although I think that interpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy such as Marcuse's and even Habermas' or Apel's are wrong, I don't believe that it would be possible to relate Wittgenstein's philosophy to Criticial Theory on the basis of his own intentions. Wittgenstein was in no way a left-wing intellectual. It was Schopenhauer rather than Hegel, Kierkegaard rather than Marx whom he studied and praised. I think therefore that a comparison between Wittgenstein's thought and Critical Theory is only possible in a SYSTEMATIC manner. Putting aside Wittgenstein's own intentions, can we USE his arguments - or at least some of them - in the framework of a Critical Theory? The dialogue between Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and Adorno's Critical Theory seems to be very important for a postmetaphysical version of a critical theory of society. Wittgenstein's later philosophy gives us the means to reconstruct the classical tradition of the philosophy of praxis with greater regard for the role of intersubjectivity. Furthermore, it gives us the means to supplement the classical theory of reification with an analysis of the hypostaziation of our conceptual schemes. In this paper I would like to show that an approach to a critique of reification can be developed which recognizes the fact that a wrong and 'ontological' understanding of our conceptual schemes can cause social pathologies similar to those which are described by classical theories of reification - for instance, Marx's theory of commodity-fetishism. In the first part of my paper I present the basic claims of the philosophy of praxis (1). In the second I would like to make some brief remarks concerning Wittgensteinian arguments for this tradition (2). In the third part I show that Adorno's critical considerations in the field of social philosophy and epistemology are categorically rooted in a critique of language which can be related to Wittgenstein's (3). In the last part I briefly address the normative ideals of a critique of reification which is related to language (4). 1. The term 'philosophy of praxis' is used here to refer to all any philosophy which claims that the basis of the constitution of society is human activity as an integrated whole of working, creating and acting. (In order to avoid terminological confusions I use the English word "practise" when I want to talk simply about what people do, without the assumptions of philosophies of praxis.) The fundamental thoughts of a philosophy of praxis were first developed by Marx in his earlier writings. There he wanted to show that human activity was both the basis of Kantian epistemology and the medium of production and reproduction of society. In his view, transcendental philosophy was a philosophy of social acting. A similar position can be found in pragmatist and existenzialist writings. The claim that society or even the whole world is a product of human acting has been criticized by a number of recent theories in sociology and philosophy. Examples include N. Luhmann's system-theory and the debate concerning the category of subjectivity. The latter led not only analytic philosophers like Ryle and Wittgenstein but also continental authors like Derrida and Vattimo to a groundbreaking revision of arguments of transcendental philosophy. Above all they criticize the view that the constitution of society is a result of human action. However, we shouldn't give up so easily the position of the philosophy of praxis, especially if we want to save the normative intentions of Critical Theory. What I have in mind is a 'weak' version of a constitutional theory of society; a version which doesn't take singular subjects or even the 'big subject' (society) as a starting point. From the outset such a version recognizes the fact that intersubjectivity is the matter from which both society and subjects are constituted. The view that subjects constitute society taken in a weak sense seems to be a necessary supposition to develop an adeaquate theory of reification. And the latter seems to be the normative core of a critical theory. A contemporary version of a philosophy of praxis must address problems of intersubjectivity and language. J. Habermas has used arguments from sociological functionalism and analytic philosophy to suggest that the classical philosophy of praxis as it was developed by Lukács and in certain respects by Adorno, Horkheimer and others is a special kind of philosophy of consciousness. In this theoretical framework, then, the philosophy of praxis cannot be developed on the basis of a philosophy of language. This has been Habermas' main argument against the former tradition of Critical Theory or philosophy of praxis. Sometimes Habermas seems to suggest that a philosophy of praxis and a philosophy of language are mutually exclusive. But this view is misleading for two reasons. First can be shown with the help of Wittgenstein's later philosophy how a philosophy of praxis can be developed within the framework of a philosophy of language. Furthermore, Adorno's works themselves entail a philosophy of language. 2. "Die Philosophie stellt eben alles bloþ hin und erklärt und folgert nichts." "Sie läþt alles wie es ist."*10* Remarks of this kind seem to stand precisely against the aims of a critical theory and would seem to confirm Marcuse's claim that Wittgensteins' Philosophy a "Triumph des positiven Denkens".*11* I have said that I want to interprete Wittgenstein's philosophy of language in the framework of a theory of society SYSTEMATICALLY. That is to say, I am not interested in what Wittgenstein really intended; instead I want to show how some of his arguments can be used within a philosophy of praxis. (a) Language for Wittgenstein has a similar role as work for Marx and the Neo-Marxian tradition. Language is a basic form of human life, a basic form of human praxis. Criticizing the ideal- language philosophy of Logical Empiricism, Wittgenstein stresses the point that "wir im Wesen nur eine Sprache haben und das ist die gewöhnliche Sprache ... die Umgangssprache ist bereits die Sprache ..."*12* The analysis of meaning has to begin with our ordinary speech. Meanings are created in the human praxis of ordinary speech. Wittgenstein writes: "Philosophen sprechen sehr häufig davon, die Bedeutung von Wörtern zu untersuchen, zu analysieren. Aber laþt uns nicht vergessen, daþ ein Wort keine Bedeutung hat, die ihm gleichsam von einer von uns unabhängigen Macht gegeben wurde ..."*13* According to Wittgenstein, words don't get their meanings from the way in which the isolated individual uses them. Meanings are created in a COMMON practise of language use. Wittgenstein's reflections on the problem of following a rule and his arguments against the possibility of a private language make perfectly clear how intersubjectivity is interwoven into the practise of speech-acts in a constitutive way. He showed that it is impossible to follow a rule alone and he justified this claim on the ground that language is possible only within a community of speakers. This reading of Wittgenstein has been established, for instance by S. A. Kripke. While Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein's 'private language argument' as a sceptical argument remains controversial, his recognition of the social nature of the 'solution' hits the mark.*14* (b) In Wittgenstein's writings language is a kind of practise constituting human experience. Human practise is not only the background of language; language itself is a praxis, that structures human knowledge and human experience of the world. This is decisive for the reconstruction of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language in the framework of a philosophy of praxis. As the Norwegian philosopher Kjell S. Johanessen aptly puts it: "Der Praxisbegriff wird deshalb zum Begriff unserer Konstitution der Welt durch Sprache."*15* Exactly at this point a connection is made between a theory of constitution and a theory of intersubjectivity. (c) Wittgensteins critique of representational theories of meaning is intended as a critique of reification. Meanings are always related to contexts, they are temporal and procedural. Not realizing this means reifying meanings. But Wittgenstein's aim is not only to correct a wrong picture of language; he also wants to cure us of misunderstandings of ourselves and our lives caused by a wrong understanding of language. (d) Furthermore, Wittgenstein's therapeutic understanding of philosophy corresponds to the emancipatory aspects of classical Critical Theory. His philosophy can be read as a kind of "eingreifendes Denken" (engaged thinking) as B. Brecht used to characterize Marx's philosophy. Wittgenstein writes: "Die Philosophie ist ein Kampf gegen die Verhexung unseres Verstandes durch die Mittel unserer Sprache."*16* He wants to analyse SEMANTICAL FETISHISM as it is caused by a fixed and static understanding of our conceptual schemes. Consider, for instance, the theories Wittgenstein calls "name-theories of meaning" - theories, that assume that every word denotes a thing. One example of the different distortions which can result from this representational picture of language concerns time. Think of the quantified view of time that can be produced by our use of the word "time" as a noun.*17* Such a critique of time corresponds to a tradition of critique within the classical philosophy of praxis, e. g. Marx's critique of time as working time*18*, Lukács' claim that time is assimilated to space in capitalist society.*19* 3. Admittedly Wittgenstein's reflections are not embedded in the framework of a theory of society; he develops his critique of reification exclusively in terms of linguistic analysis. The work of Th. W. Adorno, on the other hand, seems to be quite different. His critique of certain uses of philosophical concepts and of language in general is founded on Marx's theory of commodity fetishism. Therefore his considerations concerning language are bound from the outset to a critical theory of society. In this paper I can't discuss all the arguments put forward by authors like Habermas and Wellmer, who attempt to substantiate the suspicion that Adorno is a typical representative of a monological philosophy.*20* These thinkers hold the view, that Adorno belongs to the classical tradition of a philosophy of consciousness. To defend the opposite view, i. e. that he doesn't belong to this tradition, I quote only one passage from his book on Husserl, in which Adorno very clearly stresses the priority of intersubjectivity. "'Mein' Ich ist in Wahrheit bereits eine Abstraktion und nichts weniger als die Urerfahrung, als welche Husserl es reklamiert. Durch das Possesivverhältnis bestimmt es sich als höchst vermitteltes. In ihm ist "Intersubjektivität" mitgesetzt, nur nicht als beliebige reine Möglichkeit, sondern als die reale Bedingung von Ichsein, ohne welche die Einschränkung auf 'mein' Ich nicht kann verstanden werden."*21* But for my main argument a different side of Adorno's thought is decisive: his theory of conceptual schemes (concepts) as it is found in his NEGATIVE DIALETICS. At the center of these reflections one finds a critical theory of concepts which directs its attention to the disparity between the general function of concepts - assigning things - and the individuality of the things assigned by these concepts. Adorno's version of dialectics is already intended in this disparity. He writes: "Ihr Name (derjenige der Dialektik, C.D.) sagt zunächst nichts weiter, als daþ die Gegenstände in ihrem Begriff nicht aufgehen, daþ diese in Widerspruch geraten mit der hergebrachten Norm der adaequatio."*22* The contradiction between the general function of concepts and the uniqueness of the individual or of a particular object lies behind Adorno's attempt to go beyond concepts by means of concepts. It is the task of philosophy - if I understand Adorno correctly - to set concepts in motion and to protect things from being fixed by concepts. It has been argued that Adorno's argument here is rooted in the romantic motive of unspeakability and that therefore one has to reject it. It is more fruitful, I think, to distinguish different kinds of critiques of language when working with Adorno's argument. There is a strong kind of a critique of language that identifies language in general with power and force; here transcendence of the force of identification caused by language is excluded. But there is a weaker kind of critique that supposes it possible to distinguish two different levels of language-use. This weaker form argues that we can always correct wrong and violent forms of language-use within language itself. In my opinion only the latter kind of critique makes sense. Furthermore it corresponds to positions one finds in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. In Adorno's view philosophy is more than a critique of language. It is also an 'Ontologie des falschen Zustandes'.*23* This seems to be the most striking difference from Wittgenstein. Adorno's philosophy gives us the means to deal with the connection between the misleading use of language on the one hand and pathologies and distortions of our ordinary life in capitalist society on the other. (A similar project that works with historical material can be found in Foucault's analysis of the connection between discourse and power.) But despite this difference, Adorno's characterization of the task of philosophy is strikingly similar to Wittgenstein's. Adorno writes: "Die Entzauberung des Begriffs ist das Gegengift der Philosophie." *24* Philosophy has to demystify concepts and language in general. In this way the task of philosophy is to overcome the bewitchment of reason by language. In this context Adorno refers explicitly to the fetish-theorem of Marx; the reification of concepts is a "fetishism of concepts."*25* My reconstruction of Adorno's philosophy with regard to language shows in which way a critique of language and a critique of society can be linked. 4. Admittedly I have only begun to draw the basic lines of a project in social philosophy that directs its attention to language. I would like to use the final pages of this paper to talk about the normative ideal of a 'right' use of language. What could be the right way of understanding our language and our concepts? F. Jameson points out that the right use of language according to Adorno consists in placing concepts in the contexts of their use. (Of course this is also true for Wittgenstein.) In terms of Hegel and Marx Jameson writes: "Die grundlegende Operation mittels derer der Begriff entdinglicht werden kann ... besteht in seiner Wiedereinsetzung in die Totalität oder das System ..."*26* According to a common interpretation, the concept of reconciliation is discredited. Adorno seems to be, then, commited to an obsolete metaphysics which one can no longer be trusted as a possible foundation for a critical philosophy of society. Given the assumptions presented in this paper, though, the concept of reconciliation should not be interpreted as a gnostic impulse and theological retreat or as an attempt to set one's own normative demands against the bitter world, if only to preserve the former from the threat of the latter. Rather the concept of reconciliation ought to be understood in a weaker sense, namely, as Jameson writes: as the "Aufhebung der Spannungen und Widersprüche zwischen dem Allgemeinen und dem Besonderen."*27* This means that our speech-acts have always to be placed in a context, because meanings are temporal and procedural. With regard to the practical consequences of such an understanding of language, I would like to call the right use of language a 'mimetical' use. Language is used mimetically if it is assimilated to the situation and the partners of communication. Adorno uses the concept of mimesis to denote the sensual and receptive attitudes of human beings. I think we can use this idea of mimesis - that means to perceive situations and to act and talk carefully - as the basis to imagine the right use of language. World-disclosure must always be mimetical. Mimesis is relevant where general claims and concepts disturb communication. For instance, think of situations in which we can't manage with our concepts. Situations in which we make moral judgements are often of this kind. Such judgements are based on the description of the situation. A wrong description leads to a wrong judgement; a new description requires a different judgement. One must be open to the situation and to new descriptions of the situation in order to treat people in the right way. An instance is to be found in Kant's famous example of lying. According to Kant it is forbidden to lie. It doesn't matter what kind of situation we have. But there are certainly situations, in which the general concept of lying doesn't obviously apply. Here we need a kind of mimetical capacity to see what kind of situation we have.*28* A reified language-use insists on patterns and schemas of perception, whereas mimesis enables us to revise our concepts tailored to the situation. The supposition that we must be able to revise our conceptual schemes when necessary can serve as the normative background of the discussed kind of critique of language relevant to social philosophy. Notes: *1* For a more detailed version of the discussed argument see my book (1994) SPRACHE UND VERDINGLICHUNG. WITTGENSTEIN, ADORNO UND DAS PROJEKT EINER KRITISCHEN THEORIE, Frankfurt/M.; for a discussion on the composition of this paper and for improving my english I would like to thank Mark Lekarew (Berlin). *2* To mention just two instructive examples see: Gier, Nicholas (1981) WITTGENSTEIN AND PHENOMENOLOGY. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LATER WITTGENSTEIN, HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER AND MERLEAU-PONTY, Albany; Rentsch, Thomas (1985) HEIDEGGER UND WITTGENSTEIN. EXISTENTIAL- UND SPRACHANALYSEN ZU DEN GRUNDLAGEN PHILOSOPHISCHER ANTHROPOLOGIE, Stuttgart. *3* See for instance Tietz, Udo (1995), SPRACHE UND VERSTEHEN AUS ANALYTISCHER UND HERMENEUTISCHER SICHT, Berlin. *4* See Winch, Peter (1958), THE IDEA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, London; Habermas, Jürgen (1970), ZUR LOGIK DER SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN, Frankfurt/M., 220-251; Habermas' view of Wittgenstein is examinated by Hastedt, Heiner (1991), DAS PROJEKT EINER KRITISCHEN THEORIE IM SPIEGEL VON WITTGENSTEIN; in: Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 16.1, 49-58. *5* See Rorty, Richard (1989), CONTINGENCY, IRONY, SOLIDARITY, Cambridge/Mass. Rorty often refers to the Wittgensteinian term of a 'language game' to express his view; a critical objection to Rorty's use of Wittgenstein's ideas was given recently by Putnam, Hilary (1995), PRAGMATISM. AN OPEN QUESTION, Cambridge/Mass., 32 ff.; concerning Lyotard see for instance Lyotard, Jean-François (1979), LA CONDITION POSTMODERNE, Paris. *6* Adorno, Theodor W., (1982), NEGATIVE DIALEKTIK, Frankfurt/M., 21. *7* It is well-known that many members of the Vienna Circle were on the political left. Just after the rise of National- Socialism many of them decided to go to the United States; a definitve study of the early history of the 'Positivismusstreit' which contains much material concerning the relation between members of the early 'Frankfurt School' and those of the Vienna Circle was published recently by Dahms, Hans-Joachim (1994), POSITIVISMUSSTREIT. DIE AUSEINANDERSETZUNGEN DER FRANKFURTER SCHULE MIT DEM LOGISCHEN POSITIVISMUS, DEM AMERIKANISCHEN PRAGMATISMUS UND DEM KRITISCHEN RATIONALIMUS, Frankfurt/M. *8* Benton, Ted (1976), WINCH, WITTGENSTEIN AND MARXISM; in: Radical Philosophy 13, 1-7; Danford, John (1978), WITTGENSTEIN AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, Chicago; Fann, K.-T. (1974), WITTGENSTEIN AND BOURGEOIS PHILOSOPHY; in: Radical Philosophy 8, 24-27; Easton, Susan M. (1983), HUMANIST MARXISM AND WITTGENSTEINIAN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Manchester; Janik, Allan (1989), STYLE, POLITICS AND THE FUTURE OF PHILOSOPHY, London; Lamb, David (1980), THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRAXIS IN MARX AND WITTGENSTEIN; in: The Philosophical Forum XI, 273-299; Manser, Anthony (1973), THE END OF PHILOSOPHY: MARX AND WITTGENSTEIN. AN INAUGURAL LECTURE, Southhampton; Pitkin, Hannah (1972), WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE. ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, Berkeley; Raatzsch, Richard (1990), WITTGENSTEIN UND MARX - EINIGE METHODOLOGISCHE BEMERKUNGEN; in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 38/10, 931-939; Rossi-Landi, Ferruccio (1972), SPRACHE ALS ARBEIT UND ALS MARKT, München; Rubinstein, D. (1981), MARX AND WITTGENSTEIN. SOCIAL PRACTISE AND SOCIAL EXPLANATION, London; Zimmermann, Rolf (1975), WITTGENSTEIN UND DIE FRAGE NACH EINER MATERIALISTISCHEN SPRACHTHEORIE; in: Leist, Anton (Hg.), ANSÄTZE ZUR MATERIALISTISCHEN SPRACHTHEORIE, Kronberg/Ts., 293-334; a discussion of Marx in a Wittgensteinian Perspective is given by Kitching, G. (1988), KARL MARX AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRAXIS, London. *9* See Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1980) BRIEFE. BRIEFWECHSEL MIT B. RUSSELL, G. E. MOORE, J. M. KEYNES, F. P. RAMSEY, W. ECCLES, P. ENGELMANN UND L. V. FICKER, hg. v. Brian F. McGuinness und Georg H. von Wright, Frankfurt/M., 192. *10* Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1984), PHILOSOPHISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN. WERKAUSGABE BD. 1, Frankfurt/M., § 126; § 124. *11* Marcuse, Herbert (1967), DER EINDIMENSIONALE MENSCH. STUDIEN ZUR IDEOLOGIE DER FORTGESCHRITTENEN INDUSTRIEGESELLSCHAFT, Darmstadt/Neuwied, 184 ff. *12* Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1984), WITTGENSTEIN UND DER WIENER KREIS, WERKAUSGABE BD. 3, Frankfurt/M., 45. *13* Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1984), DAS BLAUE BUCH. EINE PHILOSOPHISCHE BETRACHTUNG (DAS BRAUE BUCH).WERKAUSGABE BD. 5, Frankfurt/M., 52. *14* See Kripke, Saul A. (1987), WITTGENSTEIN ÜBER REGELN UND PRIVATSPRACHE. EINE ELEMENTARE DARSTELLUNG, Frankfurt/M.; Baker, G.P./Hacker P.M.S. (1984), SCEPTICISM, RULES AND LANGUAGE, Oxford; Mc Ginn, Colin (1984), WITTGENSTEIN ON MEANING, Oxford. *15* Johannessen, Kjell S. (1986), SINNKONSTITUTION UND WISSENSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE. ZUR FORMULIERUNG DER GRUNDZÜGE EINER HISTORIOGRAPHIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN; in: Böhler, Dietrich u. a. (Hg.), DIE PRAGMATISCHE WENDE. SPRACHSPIELPRAGMATIK ODER TRANSZENDENTALPRAGMATIK?, Frankfurt/M., 55-72, 59. *16* PHILOSOPHISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN, § 109. *17* See DAS BLAUE BUCH, 22. *18* See MARX-ENGELS-WERKE (1977), BD. 4, Berlin, 83. *19* See Lukács, Georg (1923), GESCHICHTE UND KLASSENBEWUþTSEIN. STUDIEN ÜBER MARXISTISCHE DIALEKTIK, Berlin, 101. *20* Wellmer, Albrecht (1985), ZUR DIALEKTIK VON MODERNE UND POSTMODERNE. VERNUNFTKRITIK NACH ADORNO, Frankfurt/M., 48-114. 21* Adorno, Theodor W (1972), ZUR METAKRITIK DER ERKENNTNISTHEORIE, Frankfurt/M., 231. *22* Adorno, Theodor W., (1982), NEGATIVE DIALEKTIK, Frankfurt/M., 16. *23* Op. cit., 22. *24* Op. cit., 24. *25* Op. cit., 58. *26* Jameson, Fredric (1991), SPÄTMARXISMUS. ADORNO ODER DIE BEHARRLICHKEIT DER DIALEKTIK, Berlin, 35. *27* Op. cit., 42. *28* See my paper Demmerling, Christoph (1995), VERNUNFT, GEFÜHL UND MORALISCHE PRAXIS. ÜBERLEGUNGEN ZUR KULTUR DER PRAKTISCHEN VERNUNFT,in: Demmerling, C./Rentsch, T./Gabriel G. (Hg.), VERNUNFT UND LEBENSPRAXIS. PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN ZU DEN BEDINGUNGEN EINER RATIONALEN KULTUR, Frankfurt, where I give further arguments for this view.