***************************************************************** * * Titel: The Genesis of ON CERTAINTY: Some Questions for Professors Anscombe and von Wright Autor: Philip Hoy, London, UK Dateiname: 17-1-96.TXT Dateilänge: 53 KB Erschienen in: Wittgenstein Studies 1/96, Datei: 17-1-96.TXT; hrsg. von K.-O. Apel, N. Garver, B. McGuinness, P. Hacker, R. Haller, W. Lütterfelds, G. Meggle, C. Nyíri, K. Puhl, R. Raatzsch, T. Rentsch, J.G.F. Rothhaupt, J. Schulte, U. Steinvorth, P. Stekeler-Weithofer, W. 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Those articles and excerpts from * * articles which the subscriber wishes to use for his own * * private academic purposes are excluded from this * * restrictions. * * * ***************************************************************** Abstract This paper is divided into three sections. In Section 1, I draw attention to an unresolved, but also entirely neglected, disputed between the editors of On Certainty, Professors G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, and the late Professor Norman Malcolm. That dispute concerns the history of Wittgenstein's interest in G.E. Moore's anti- sceptical Defence, with Anscombe and von Wright maintaining that Wittgenstein had "long been interested" in Moore's Defence, and Malcolm maintaining to the contrary that he only became interested in this topic during the last eighteen months of his life. In Section II, I argue that although Malcolm overstates matters when he says that Wittgenstein had not been interested in the Defence prior to his visit to the USA in 1949, he is almost certainly closer to the truth than Anscombe and von Wright. In Section III, I explain why I think that this unresolved and neglected dispute is a significant one. I argue, first, that Anscombe and von Wright's account obscures the very real influence on On Certainty of ideas that Malcolm had explored in his 1949 paper 'Defending Common Sense'. (To the best of my knowledge, only one other commentator - Thomas Baldwin - has acknowledged the extent of Malcolm's influence on Certainty.) But then, and more importantly - if also more tentatively - I argue that acceptance of Anscombe and von Wright's account can encourage a distorted reading of the book, while acceptance of a modified version of Malcolm's account can help to guard against it. _______________________________________________________________ The Genesis of On Certainty: Some Questions for Professors Anscombe and von Wright I During the summer of 1949, Wittgenstein acted on a long-standing invitation from Norman Malcolm and his wife and went to stay with them at their home in Ithaca, New York. He was not in good health, and had less than two years to live, but even though he realised that the time was past when he could put his own work in order, the urge to philosophise was still strong. One of the things Wittgenstein did during the time he spent in Ithaca - which is briefly but vividly described by Malcolm in his Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir - was to become acquainted with the other philosophers then working at or visiting Cornell (Oets Bouwsma, Willis Doney, John Nelson, Max Black, and Stuart Brown), and to engage in numerous discussions with them. These discussions focused on many topics, including Frege's 'On Sense and Reference' and Wittgenstein's own Tractatus, but Malcolm reports that: "... the discussions that were of most value to me that summer were a series that took place between Wittgenstein and me, our topic being Moore's 'Proof of an External World' and also his 'Defence of Common Sense' [sic]. In particular, we talked about Moore's insistence that it is a correct use of language for him to say, when holding one of his hands before him, 'I KNOW that this is a hand'; or to say, while pointing at a tree a few feet away, 'I KNOW for CERTAIN that this is a TREE!' In a published article I had maintained that this was a senseless use of 'know', and Moore had made a spirited reply to me in a letter. Wittgenstein and I discussed these matters in a number of conversations, he making many observations of the first importance about the concept of knowledge."*1* Basing what he says on notes taken at the time, Malcolm proceeds to give an account of these conversations, and this makes it clear that when, some months after his return to Europe, Wittgenstein began to write the remarks which were destined to be published as On Certainty, he already had a good idea of what lines of thought he was going to explore.*2* When On Certainty eventually appeared, in 1969, it contained a preface written by the book's editors, G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, and in that preface they sought to account for the book's genesis as follows: "What we publish here belongs to the last year and a half of Wittgenstein's life. In the middle of 1949 he visited the United States at the invitation of Norman Malcolm, staying at Malcolm's house in Ithaca. Malcolm acted as a goad to [Wittgenstein's] interest in Moore's 'defence of common sense', that is to say his claim to know a number of propositions for sure, such as 'Here is one hand, and here is another', and 'The earth existed for a long time before my birth', and 'I have never been far from the earth's surface'. The first of these comes in Moore's 'Proof of an External World'. The two others are in his 'Defence of Common Sense'[sic]; Wittgenstein had long been interested in these and had said to Moore that this was his best article. Moore had agreed. This book contains the whole of what Wittgenstein wrote on this topic from that time until his death. It is all first draft material, which he did not live to excerpt and polish."*3* Seven years after On Certainty appeared, Malcolm published a paper entitled 'Moore and Wittgenstein on the sense of "I know"', and in the course of this he took issue with some of the things I have quoted Anscombe and von Wright as saying. He begins by elaborating on the point we have already seen made in his Memoir: "After brooding on the matter [of Moore's response to sceptical arguments and views] for some years, I published in 1949 an article impertinently entitled 'Defending Common Sense' in which I turned AGAINST Moore's 'defence of common sense'. I argued that Moore actually MISUSED the expressions 'know' and 'know with certainty', when he made assertions such as 'I know I am a human being,' or 'I know with certainty that that's a tree.' Unwittingly, my article played a part in the genesis of Wittgenstein's final notebooks, which have been published under the title sber Gewissheit-On Certainty. Wittgenstein came to visit me in Ithaca just after my article had appeared. I made some mention of it, and Wittgenstein wanted me to read a part of it to which I did. This precipitated a series of discussions between us, of which I give a partial account in my memoir of Wittgenstein. I did not learn until several years later that Wittgenstein had kept on thinking and writing about the subject matter of these discussions."*4* To this passage, which is NOT clearly at odds with what Anscombe and von Wright say in their preface, Malcolm appends a footnote, which IS: "In the preface to the English translation of On Certainty, the editors report that Wittgenstein 'had long been interested' in Moore's claim to KNOW such propositions as 'Here is a hand' and 'The earth existed long before my birth' ... I am doubtful of the accuracy of that report. Wittgenstein had remarked to me in Cambridge in 1946-47 that the only work of Moore's that greatly impressed him was Moore's discovery of what Wittgenstein labelled 'Moore's paradox' ... I asked, in protest, whether he didn't agree that Moore's 'defence of common sense' was an important idea. Wittgenstein gave an affirmative nod of the head; but I had the definite impression that this part of Moore's thought had not much occupied him. I should add that Wittgenstein once said to me that Moore's lecture, 'Proof of an External World' ... would have been a RIDICULOUS performance had ANYONE OTHER THAN MOORE given it. I think he meant that Moore's integrity and deep seriousness, not the philosophical content of the 'Proof', was what gave value to the lecture. My belief is that what transpired in Ithaca was not that a long-standing interest of Wittgenstein's was restimulated, but rather that he suddenly became absorbed in a subject matter that had not previously captured his attention."*5* Anscombe and von Wright have never replied to the points made in this footnote, but that they are unmoved by them is evident from the fact that in all subsequent reprintings of On Certainty their preface has been allowed to stand, word-for-word.*6* Who is right about the history of Wittgenstein's interest in Moore's knowledge-claims (or his Defence, as I shall henceforth call the strategy within which those claims have their home)? And why, exactly, should it matter? The first of these questions will be addressed in section II, and the second will be addressed in section III. II It is not hard to show that Malcolm is wrong about the history of Wittgenstein's interest in Moore's Defence. Readers familiar with Philosophical Investigations will recall the following remark: "It is possible to imagine a case in which I COULD find out that I had two hands. Normally, however, I CANNOT do so. 'But all you need is to hold them up before your eyes!' - If I am NOW in doubt whether I have two hands, I need not believe my eyes either. (I might just as well ask a friend.)"*7* There can be no question but that Wittgenstein is here thinking about Moore's knowledge-claims, and expressing views about them which are of a piece with views expressed in On Certainty. And what is true of this remark is also true of the following remarks, to be found both in Zettel and Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology: "No one but a philosopher would say 'I know that I have two hands'; but one may well say: 'I am unable to doubt that I have two hands.' "'Know', however, is not ordinarily used in this sense ..."*8* What is significant about these remarks is their dating. The one appearing in Philosophical Investigations is culled from MS 138, and is dated 15.2.1949, while those appearing in Zettel and Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology are culled from MS 137, and are dated 25.8.1948. This makes unavoidable the conclusion that Wittgenstein's interest in the Defence antedates his trip to the United States, for the first was written some five months before Wittgenstein's departure for Ithaca, while the second and third were written some six months earlier still. I put these points to Malcolm in a letter, and here is his reply: "You are right to think that Wittgenstein had SOME interest in Moore's assertions before the summer of 1949. The remarks you refer to in Investigations and RPP-2 almost certainly show that there he was thinking of Moore's assertions. The fact remains, however, that he did say to me in 1946-47 that the only thing in Moore's philosophical work that impressed him was 'Moore's Paradox'. I overstated the matter in saying in my footnote that the topic of Moore's 'defence of common sense' and his assertions of the form 'I know that the earth ...' etc., had not previously captured his attention. That is not true. But what is true, I believe, is that beginning with the summer of 1949, Moore's thinking in 'defence of common sense' engaged Wittgenstein intensively, much more intensively than ever before."*9* So, while conceding that Wittgenstein had had some interest in Moore's Defence before his trip to Ithaca, Malcolm continued to insist that the interest had not been long-standing, and gave it as his opinion that it had not been particularly deep-going either. We should pause here, to acknowledge that saying of someone that they HAD LONG BEEN INTERESTED IN something is not saying anything terribly determinate. Just how long-standing or deep-going an attitude would have to be in order to count as a long-standing interest will depend on a number of factors (including the age, background and habits of the person to whom it is attributed). However, I see no very obvious reason for questioning Malcolm's assumption - evident in his reply to my letter - that, used in connection with Wittgenstein and Moore's Defence, the statement implies serious thinking of three or more years' duration. Now, is there any evidence - evidence going beyond what Anscombe and von Wright say in their preface, I mean - that Wittgenstein had given serious thought to Moore's Defence for three or more years before his departure for Ithaca? So far as I have been able to ascertain, there is NOT. The natural place to begin an inquiry is with Anscombe and von Wright themselves. Was what they said about the duration of Wittgenstein's interest based on what Wittgenstein had told them, or otherwise revealed? Or had they had heard about it through a third party - from Moore himself, perhaps? And whatever the answers to these questions, was there anything in writing - an entry in a diary, a remark in a notebook, a comment in a letter - which could be used to substantiate the claim? Von Wright replied to the letter of inquiry I sent him as follows: "I am afraid there is very little I can say which would be of real help to you. My expressed opinion [if that 'my' is intended literally, it could help to explain why I did not get a response to the idential letter of inquiry I sent Anscombe] that Wittgenstein had long been interested in Moore's view of 'common sense' knowledge and the way in which Moore had argued for the existence of an external world, is not based on any particular remarks in the posthumous writings - such remarks may be found - but on the way in which W[ittgenstein] spoke about these things in numerous conversations after 1947 when I saw him often. I do not remember his ever having said to me that he had been acquainted with Moore's famous papers since time so and so." When von Wright speaks about the conversations he had with Wittgenstein after 1947, it is not clear whether he means AFTER 1947 WAS UNDER WAY, or AFTER 1947 WAS OVER. Until half-way through 1948, when he accepted the offer of Wittgenstein's chair in Cambridge, Von Wright remained Professor of Philosophy in Finland, and this fact might incline us to accept the latter interpretation. However, it is also true that, in the Easter Term of 1947, von Wright visited Cambridge - as a guest of the Moral Sciences Faculty, which wanted him to lecture on induction - and knowing that he and Wittgenstein met and talked during this period might incline us to accept the former interpretation. On the other hand, whichever interpretation we accept, von Wright clearly does not mean us to understand that it was just because he remembered Wittgenstein discussing the Defence after 1947 - even discussing it on numerous occasions - that he and Anscombe had seen fit to describe him as having "long been interested" in the topic. To have described him in this way, on these grounds alone, would have been thoroughly misleading. Rather, we must take very seriously his statement that it was THE WAY IN WHICH he remembered Wittgenstein discussing the Defence on those occasions that led he and Anscombe to say what they did. Now, if all we had to go on was von Wright's reply, the issue between Malcolm and him would have to be declared moot, because all we have here are two men's different and conflicting impressions. Fortunately, however, there are other places to look for evidence, and by the time I received von Wright's letter, I had already combed most of them, with results that I must now set out. The first of the other sources of evidence is the Nachlass. As careful an examination of this as I was able to make revealed that the earliest remark unambiguously expressive of an interest in the Defence is the earliest of the remarks quoted at the beginning of this section, but this - as we have seen - was written only eleven months before Wittgenstein's departure for the United States.*10 * Of course, it is not impossible that Wittgenstein was interested in the Defence earlier but for some reason never put his thoughts about it down on paper. It is not IMPOSSIBLE, but it does seem VERY UNLIKELY, for the Nachlass can be read as an intellectual diary, recording the development of Wittgenstein's thoughts on just about all topics known to have engaged him, on a more or less daily basis.*11* Another place to look for evidence is in Wittgenstein's correspondence - that part of it, at any rate, which dates from 1925, and has been made available.*12* However, a careful reading of this correspondence uncovers not a single reference to the Defence, much less any indication of interest in it. The significance of this finding should not be exaggerated, though. In his letters, Wittgenstein generally confined himself to personal matters, and only rarely ventured onto philosophical ground.*13* Thus, even during those months when we know that he was hard at work on On Certainty's remarks, his letters give no indication of the fact. A third place to look for evidence concerning the duration of Wittgenstein's interest in the Defence is in the lecture-notes, recollections, portraits and memoirs which have appeared since Wittgenstein's death.*14* Here too, however, one will search in vain. The Defence is never adverted to. A fourth source of evidence - and the only other one available to us, so far as I can see, are Wittgenstein's other students (i.e. those who are not party to this dispute, and who have not published lecture- notes, conversation-notes, profiles, memoirs, etc.) One of these was able to help, and in ways which, by now, I confess, rather surprised me. Peter Munz was one of the small group of students who attended Wittgenstein's last classes held in Cambridge during the session 1946- 47, and he does recall Wittgenstein's discussing Moore-type propositions at some stage in the year (though, typically enough, Moore's name was never mentioned, and neither were any of his papers). Since Malcolm was also a regular at the classes Munz is referring to, it is not immediately obvious how what we have seen him saying about Wittgenstein's lack of interest in the Defence, when questioned about it during that year, can be squared with Munz's recollection that Moore-type propositions did come up for discussion in those classes. One possible explanation is that Wittgenstein's discussion of these propositions was prompted by the conversation Malcolm reported, the one in which Wittgenstein praised Moore's discovery of the paradox and then had to deal with Malcolm's protest concerning the Defence. Fortunately, we do not need to worry about the merits of this - or any other - explanation, because we do not need to worry about the apparent conflict. I say this partly because Munz does not wish to give the impression that Wittgenstein spent a great deal of time discussing Moore-type propositions, but mainly because the period we are concerned with is the period before 1946, not the period after it. Now, it might be said - it has in fact been said, by someone who read an earlier draft of this paper - that the absence of corroborating evidence should not incline us to doubt the testimony of On Certainty's editors. After all, they were long- standing students of Wittgenstein's, and, such was his trust in them, they were named as two of his three literary executors as well. I entirely accept that Anscombe and von Wright's testimony should not be treated lightly (for the reasons given, and others besides). However, unless we view the absence of corroborating evidence as, not just puzzling, but troubling, we will be guilty of treating Malcolm's testimony too lightly. After all, he was a long-standing student of Wittgenstein's too - as a matter of fact, he arrived in Cambridge one year before von Wright and six years before Anscombe - and if he was not named as one of the literary executors, this was surely because, as a resident of the United States, he was too far from the Nachlass, not because he did not enjoy Wittgenstein's confidence. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, I tentatively conclude that Malcolm was right to be doubtful about the accuracy of Anscombe and von Wright's claim concerning the genesis of On Certainty, even if - as he later admitted - his own understanding of its genesis had been imperfect one. III Why does this dispute matter? I have two reasons for thinking that it does, and will explain them in turn. To begin with, I think it unfair that Malcolm's role in the genesis of On Certainty has been relegated to that of enthusiastic bystander. He was not a bystander, but - to persist with the metaphor - a key player in the match. Malcolm had been interested in Moore's Defence ever since the late 1930's, and had contributed a paper on the subject to the 1942 Festschrift, The Philosophy of G.E. Moore. In this early paper, entitled 'Moore and Ordinary Language', Malcolm had put forward a LINGUISTIC interpretation of Moore's anti-sceptical argument - treating it as a defence not so much of common SENSE as of common USAGE - and had argued that, thus understood, the argument was entirely successful.*15 * Although he never saw fit to abandon this interpretation of the argument, he did come to think that he was wrong about its anti- sceptical value, for he became persuaded that it involved misuses of language which were every bit as serious as those with which it charged the sceptic.*16 * Just as the sceptic's use of 'We cannot know ...' had been taken to be meaningless, because it sinned against the paradigm case argument, so now was Moore's use of 'I know ...' taken to be meaningless, because IT sinned against the requirement that genuine knowledge-claims can only be made where (i) there is a question at issue and a doubt to be removed, (ii) the claimant is able to give a reason for his or her assertion, and (iii) it is possible to carry out an investigation that would settle the question. Malcolm had explored this way of thinking with Moore during 1946-47, but made it public in 'Defending Common Sense', the paper that was published early in 1949, a part-reading of which led to the discussions he had with Wittgenstein after the latter's arrival in Ithaca.*17* Now, there are many lines of argument in On Certainty.18 But readers familiar with the book will not need persuading that one of the most important - judging not only by the number of remarks devoted to it, but also by the ease with which it can be used to explain the presence of the other lines - is essentially that which Malcolm had articulated in 'Defending Common Sense'.*19* The only other commentator I know of who has acknowledged the nature and extent of On Certainty's indebtedness to Malcolm is Thomas Baldwin, who has written: "As Malcolm has explained, he discussed ['Defending Common Sense'] and Moore's response to it with Wittgenstein while the latter was staying with him; it was these discussions with Malcolm which provided Wittgenstein with the stimulus to develop the views he collected in his notes On Certainty (indeed there is a good deal of Malcolm in On Certainty). So Moore's response to Malcolm [reconstructed from notes and letters in the Cambridge archive] can be read as a response to parts of On Certainty".*20* There is no question but that Wittgenstein's handling of this theme is more subtle, more searching and more imaginative than Malcolm's, but all I want to urge here is that Malcolm's thinking - the product of an indisputably long-standing interest - played a key role, both in INSPIRING Wittgenstein's reflections on the Defence, and in SHAPING them too.*21* My second reason for thinking that the disputed history of Wittgenstein's interest in the Defence matters is rather more serious, and will take longer to explain. At root, what I will try to show is that acceptance of Anscombe and von Wright's account of On Certainty's genesis can encourage a seriously distorted reading of the book. Consider again the last two sentences of the passage quoted from On Certainty's preface: "This book contains the whole of what Wittgenstein wrote on this topic from that time (i.e. the time of his stay in Ithaca) until his death. It is all first-draft material, which he did not live to excerpt and polish." As a matter of fact, the first of the two claims made in this quotation is quite possibly false, because there are grounds for thinking that not everything Wittgenstein wrote about the Defence during the post-Ithaca period was included in On Certainty. But that is a subject for another paper.*22 * Here I want to look at the second of the two claims, which, though not false, is potentially misleading, because it can give the impression that the book's most serious shortcomings are such as could have been taken care of by the editor in Wittgenstein rather than the philosopher.*23* In a short but suggestive paper, delivered to the 2nd International Wittgenstein Symposium (held in Kirchberg in 1977), C.G. Luckhardt argued that, contrary to the widespread view that On Certainty is taking ideas already applied in other contexts (in Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, for example) and imaginatively applying them elsewhere, "it seems advisable to read the work not as an extension of earlier points, but as an exploratory work, at times at odds with earlier views, and even at times at odds with itself."*24* Luckhardt had been particularly struck by the presence in On Certainty of two contradictory lines of thought. According to one of these - let us call it Line 1 - the propositions which Moore said he knew to be true are of such a kind that it does not make sense to say that they are known or that they are true. The conceptual impropriety involved, which is taken to account for the linguistic oddity of Moore's claims, is explained by reference to the foundational character of those propositions: "I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense! I am sitting at his bedside, I am looking attentively into his face. - So don't I know, then, that there is a sick man lying here? Neither the question nor the assertion makes sense." (OC 10) "... The propositions, however, which Moore retails as examples of such known truths are indeed interesting. Not because anyone knows their truth, or believes he knows them, but because they all have a similar role in the system of our empirical judgements." (OC 137) "I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry." (OC 151) "No one ever taught me that my hands don't disappear when I am not paying attention to them. Nor can I be said to presuppose the truth of this proposition in my assertions etc., (as if they rested on it) while it only gets sense from the rest of our procedure of asserting." (OC 153) "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of SEEING on our part; it is our ACTING, which lies at the bottom of the language-game." (OC 204) "If the true is what is grounded, then the GROUND is not true, nor yet false." (OC 205) "One says 'I know' when one is ready to give compelling grounds. 'I know' relates to the possibility of demonstrating the truth. Whether someone knows something can come to light, assuming that he is convinced of it. "But if what he believes is of such a kind that the grounds that he can give are no surer than his assertion, then he cannot say that he knows what he believes." (OC 243)*25* According to the other line of thought - let us call it Line 2 - it DOES make sense to say of Moore's propositions that they are known and true. The remarks in which Line 2 are to be found are of importantly different kinds, however. In some, Wittgenstein is self-consciously thinking about the need to retreat from Line 1, either because he is no longer sure that Moore's claims are linguistically odd, or else because he is no longer sure that their linguistic oddity derives from any kind of conceptual impropriety: "I know, not just that the earth existed long before my birth, but also that it is a large body, that this has been established, that I and the rest of mankind have forebears, that there are books about all this, that such books don't lie, etc. etc. etc. And I know all this? I believe it. This body of knowledge has been handed on to me and I have no grounds for doubting it, but, on the contrary, all sorts of confirmation. "And why shouldn't I say I know all this? Isn't that what one does say?"(OC 288) "If someone says, 'I know that that's a tree' I may answer: 'Yes, that is a sentence. An English sentence. And what is it supposed to be doing?' Suppose he replies: 'I just wanted to remind myself that I KNOW things like that'? ---" (OC 352) "In the language-game (2), can he say he knows that those are building-stones? - 'No, but he DOES know it.'" (OC 396) "Haven't I gone wrong and isn't Moore perfectly right? Haven't I made the elementary mistake of confusing one's thoughts with one's knowledge? Of course I do not think to myself 'The earth already existed long before my birth,' but do I KNOW it any the less. Don't I show that I know it by always drawing its consequences?"(OC 397) "'I know that this room is on the second floor, that behind the door a short landing leads to the stairs, and so on.' One could easily imagine cases where I should come out with this, but they would be extremely rare. But on the other hand I shew this knowledge day in, day out by my actions and also in what I say." (OC 431) "But now, isn't it correct to describe my present state as follows: I KNOW what this colour is called in English? And if that is correct, why then should I not describe my state with the corresponding words 'I know etc.'?" (OC 531) "So when Moore sat in front of a tree and said 'I know that that's a tree,' he was simply stating the truth about his state at the time." (OC 532) "Do I know that I am now sitting in a chair? - Don't I know it? In the present circumstances no one is going to say that I know this; but no more will he say, for example, that I am conscious. Nor will one normally say this of passers-by in the street. "But now, even if one doesn't say it, does that make it UNTRUE?? (OC 552)*26* In other remarks, Wittgenstein explores Line 2 in a way which suggests that he has either not hit on the possibility of Line 1, or else has simply forgotten about it*27* "My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. 'Take that chair over there,' 'Shut the door,' etc. etc." (OC 7) "The TRUTH of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference." (OC 83) "This statement appeared to me fundamental; if it is false, what are 'true' and 'false' any more?!" (OC 514) Now, some will be tempted to argue that the contradiction Luckhardt identifies is not a serious one, that it is verbal rather than substantial in nature. I suspect that this would be von Wright's response, for example, because in his 'Wittgenstein on Certainty', which acknowledges the presence of Line 1 but ignores that of Line 2, we find him glossing Wittgenstein's thoughts as follows: "... the fragments of a world-picture which underlie the language- games from the beginning represent only a 'pre-knowledge'. If this is subsequently honoured by the name 'knowledge', as Moore and some other philosophers have wanted to do, its conceptual character still is very different from those items to which we apply this name in the ordinary language-games with the epistemic words. Wittgenstein's 'builders' cannot SAY THEY KNOW these are building-stones (slabs, columns, etc.) yet this is nevertheless what they can BE SAID TO KNOW in knowing how to play the game (§396). Wittgenstein asks: 'Does a child believe that milk exists? Does a cat know that a mouse exists?' (§478) and 'Are we to say that the knowledge that there are physical objects comes very early or very late?' (§479). Each of these questions could be answered both Yes and No - depending upon how we understand them."*28* The suggestion seems to be that, so long as we understand that Moore's propositions have a "peculiar logical role", we can say what we like - in particular, that it does or doesn't make sense to say that they are known or true. The first thing to note here is that it was not only MOORE AND SOME OTHER PHILOSOPHERS who wanted to say of these propositions that they were known and true. Wittgenstein himself wanted to say these things, as we saw in some of the passages quoted above.*29* Von Wright obscures this fact by citing OC 396, OC 478 and OC 479, AND ONLY THESE. The second thing to note in connection with von Wright's response is that, if we can say what we like about these propositions for as long as we recognize that they play a "peculiar logical role", it is surely strange that Wittgenstein should have spent so much time worrying about the need to pull back from Line 1 to Line 2. Others may be tempted to argue - it has in fact been argued by the reader of an earlier draft to whom I referred on p. 9 above - that Luckhardt's argument rests on a crude misreading of Wittgenstein's text. If we attribute a view to Wittgenstein simply because we find that view expressed in his writing, this makes it possible to convict him of any number of contradictions. But this is a reductio ad absurdum of such an approach, not of Wittgenstein's work. Instead of approaching On Certainty as though it were a formal system, we should approach it as though it were a Platonic dialogue. Had Luckhardt done this, he would have been able to see that Wittgenstein's purpose is to explore the pressures that tempt us to assert Line 1 and Line 2 propositions, while unqualifiedly asserting neither. There are a number of things wrong with this objection. To begin with, there can be no justification for thinking that Luckhardt attributes contradictory views to Wittgenstein just because he finds these views expressed at different places in On Certainty. He attributes contradictory views to Wittgenstein because a close reading of the text can leave the open-minded reader with little doubt but that Wittgenstein himself was of a divided mind, now tempted in the direction of Line 1, now tempted in the direction of Line 2. But another reason for taking issue with this objection is that it seems motivated by the assumption that Luckhardt's purpose, in arguing as he does, must be to cast doubt on the value of On Certainty. Why else should his approach be likened to that of someone who has discovered a contradiction in a formal system? In fact, Luckhardt's purpose is much less radical. All he wants to do is to alert us to the fact that, where most of the commentators on On Certainty have approached it as though it were "a natural outcome of the rest of Wittgenstein's work ... forming part of a continuous whole", it cannot actually be read this way. To quote again from his concluding sentence: "... it seems advisable to read the work not as an extension of earlier points, but as an exploratory work, at times at odds with earlier views, and even at times at odds with itself".*30* Now, what is the connection between Luckhardt's argument and the disputed history of Wittgenstein's interest in the Defence? Towards the end of his paper, Luckhardt says that the contradictory nature of On Certainty ought not to surprise us, since, as the book's editors have pointed out, what it contains "is all first draft material, which [Wittgenstein] did not live to excerpt and polish." That Luckhardt should have settled for this explanation is curious, because, as I have already argued, Anscombe and von Wright's words carry with them the definite suggestion that On Certainty's shortcomings would have been more a matter for editorial than philosophical labour, and this cannot be squared with his view of the contradiction, which takes it to be revealing of a serious tension in Wittgenstein's thinking. Unless some more convincing explanation can be found, other commentators are likely to go on ignoring the contradiction (as was the norm prior to the publication of Luckhardt's paper) or else trying to explain it away (as has been the norm since its publication), here as the product of careless reading, there as the product of careless writing.*31* As I see it, a better explanation is to be found in what I hope to have rendered plausible in Section II, which is that Wittgenstein was trying out, in the various notebooks from which On Certainty is put together, ideas about the Defence which had not had a particularly long gestation.*32* NOTES *1* N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, with a biographical sketch by G.H. von Wright, and Wittgenstein's letters to Malcolm, (OUP, Oxford, 1984), pp. 70-71. *2* This is not to deny what Malcolm says in the Additional Notes appended to the second edition of his Memoir, namely, that "Wittgenstein's written remarks advance these topics into areas of thought that were not touched upon in those conversations" (p.84). *3* L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, eds. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1969), preface. *4* Norman Malcolm, 'Moore and Wittgenstein on the sense of "I know"', in N. Malcolm, Thought and Knowledge (Cornell UP, Ithaca, 1977), pp. 170-198, (p.171). *5* N. Malcolm, 'Moore and Wittgenstein on the sense of "I know"', p. 172. *6* There have been seven reprints since Malcolm's paper first appeared in 1976, the most recent of them in 1994. *7* L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, eds. G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trs. G.E.M. Anscombe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1958), Part II, Section xi, p. 221 §f. *8* L. Wittgenstein, Zettel, eds. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1981), §405- 406; L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol.II, eds. G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman, trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980), §737. *9* Personal correspondence, 1983. *10* Other remarks expressive of an interest, but not included in On Certainty, can be found in MSS 169, 170, 171 and 173, now published as parts of L. Wittgenstein, Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II, eds. G.H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue (Blackwell, Oxford, 1992). Wittgenstein did not date these remarks, but in their preface to Last Writings, Vol. II, von Wright and Nyman tell us that the earliest of these MSS, MS 169, could have been begun as late as spring 1949. If it was begun then, its Defence-related remarks definitely post-date both of ours. However, von Wright and Nyman also allow for the possibility that MS 169 was begun rather earlier, as early as the late fall of 1948, in fact. And if it was begun then, there is some possibility that the earliest of its Defence-related remarks, though it still can't antedate the first of ours, might antedate the second. (It is by no means sure, though, because the earliest of its Defence-related remarks doesn't occur until 4/5ths of the way through MS 169's 161 pages.) A still earlier remark, which might be thought to give evidence of interest in the Defence, is the following, dating from 1933-34: "There is no common sense answer to a philosophical problem. One can defend common sense against the attacks of philosophers only be solving their puzzles, i.e., by curing them of the temptation to attack common sense; not by restating the views of common sense". (L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books [Blackwell, Oxford, 1975], pp. 58-59.) I do not think we can be nearly as confident about this remark, however. It occurs in the middle of a discussion about solipsism, and although it could be directed at Moore, it could just as easily be directed at Russell, or at the imaginary interlocutor with whom Wittgenstein regularly does battle. *11* Evidence of interest in other philosophers' writings, reflection on which was to play a significant part in the shaping of On Certainty's most distinctive lines of thought is not hard to find in parts of the Nachlass which antedate 1946-47. Thus, if we go back to MS 119, and examine those of its remarks which were written between 24.9.37 and 22.10.37, we find Wittgenstein writing at some length on the subject of doubt, and saying things that prefigure much of what he says on the subject in On Certainty. These remarks were prompted by an interest in Russell's work on the perception of causation, as articulated in 'The Limits of Empiricism', his contribution to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for 1935-36. (For the relevant parts of MS 119, see L. Wittgenstein, 'Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness', ed. R. Rhees, trans. P. Winch, in eds. J. Klagge and A. Nordmann, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951 [Hackett, Indiana, 1993], pp. 368-405.) If it were objected that one or two of the remarks in MS 119 - the best example is §e on p. 381 - give evidence, not just of Wittgenstein's interest in Russell's paper, but also of his familiarity with Moore's Defence, I should not want to demur (though I would counsel caution, the remarks' provenance easily allowing of alternative explanations): after all, and as I have already explained, my concern is to discover how long Wittgenstein had been giving serious thought to the Defence, not how long he had been ACQUAINTED WITH it. *12* Since Wittgenstein had no contact with Moore between 1914 and 1929, it seems safe to assume that he did not become aware of the line Moore took in 'A Defence of Common Sense' before 1925, the year of its publication. The correspondence in question is to be found in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore, ed. with an Introduction by G.H. von Wright, assisted by B.F. McGuinness (Blackwell, Oxford, 1974); 'Wittgenstein's Letters to Norman Malcolm' in Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (OUP, Oxford, 1984), pp. 85-134; 'Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Georg Henrik von Wright' in eds. J. Klagge and A. Nordmann, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951 (Hackett, Indiana, 1993), pp. 459-479. *13* The chief exception to this occurs in a letter to Moore which was sent in 1944. In this letter he commended Moore for his discovery of a certain paradox, that involved in asserting sentences of the form 'p, but I don't believe that p' or 'I believe that p, but not-p'. For what it is worth, this was one and the same paradox as that whose discovery Wittgenstein is supposed to have told Malcolm was the only thing of Moore's that greatly impressed him. See Ludwig Wittgenstein: Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore, letter M42, October 1944, p. 177. *14* I cannot list all of the relevant material here. Readers are advised to consult eds. V.A. and S.G. Shanker, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments, V: A Wittgenstein Bibliography (Croom Helm, New York, 1986). *15* N. Malcolm, 'Moore and Ordinary Language', in The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, ed. P.A. Schilpp (Evanston, Illinois, 1942). *16* Although he denied it, citing Moore's reaction in support, Malcolm's linguistic interpretation seriously misrepresents Moore's position, as has been argued by a number of writers - most recently, and most effectively, Thomas Baldwin in his G.E. Moore (Routledge, London, 1990), pp. 280-285. *17* N. Malcolm, 'Defending Common Sense', The Philosophical Review, LVIII (1949), pp. 201-20. *18* To mention just half-a-dozen of the more prominent lines: that which finds fault with the assumption that knowledge and certainty are both psychological states, or psychological states of the same kind, at any rate; that which questions the logical/empirical distinction, at least as traditionally conceived; that which insists on doubt's presupposing certainty; that which argues the need to distinguish between different kinds of error; that which maintains the bogus nature of philosophical doubt; and that which urges the importance of acknowledging practice's priority over intellection in discussions of epistemological foundations. *19* For anyone in any doubt about this, see, for example, the following remarks: OC, 4, 10, 58, 137, 151, 243 (the senselessness of Moore's knowledge-claims); 121, 222, 349, 431, 483, 546 (the necessity that there be a question at issue and a doubt to be removed); 18, 23, 40-1, 91, 111, 243, 245, 484 (the necessity that the claimant be able to give grounds for what they say); 23, 40, 138, 243, 484, 564, (the necessity that an investigation be possible). *20* Thomas Baldwin, G.E. Moore (Routledge, London, 1990), p.283. *21* Further support for the view that Malcolm had not been acting as a goad to a long-standing interest on Wittgenstein's part is perhaps - I would put it no more strongly than this - to be found in Ray Monk's biography, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. Talking about the philosopher's last two years, Monk writes: "to a much greater extent than hitherto, the stimulus for his philosophical thinking [was] provided by the thoughts and problems of others. The work he wrote ... though naturally in many ways of a piece with the Investigations, is in another respect quite distinct from it; it is much more directed to the solution of other people's problems." (Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, [Cape, London, 1990], pp. 551-2.) *22* See my 'On the Need for a New Edition of On Certainty', forthcoming. *23* The impression will possibly have been enhanced by von Wright's 'Wittgenstein On Certainty', a paper read at the Entretiens in Helsinki the year after On Certainty's publication, whose general assessment of the book reads as follows: "These writings possess a thematic unity which makes them almost unique in Wittgenstein's whole literary output. One can speculate about the reasons for this. Does it signify a change in Wittgenstein's philosophical style? Or does it only show that the author was losing his power of keeping a thousand threads of thought in his hand at once? There is no indication, however, that the quality of his thoughts was declining. Considering that the remarks constitute a first, unrevised manuscript they seem to me remarkably accomplished both in form and content." (G.H. von Wright, 'Wittgenstein on Certainty' in G.H. von Wright, Wittgenstein [Blackwell, Oxford, 1982], pp. 163-182 {p. 165}.) (In correspondence, Brian McGuinness has pointed out to me that this passage is misleading in another way besides, because it makes it sound as though the manuscripts from which On Certainty's remarks were drawn did not contain a significant proportion of remarks whose subject matter was quite unrelated: "... the manuscripts from this period contain remarks also on colour and on various points in the philosophy of psychology. It is the editors ... who have chosen to give us only one thread.") *24* C.G. Luckhardt, 'Wittgenstein on Paradigms and Paradigm- Cases: Problems with On Certainty', in eds. R. Haller, A. Hubner, E. Leinfeller, W. Leinfeller & P. Weingartner, Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought (Holder, Pichler, Tempsky, Vienna, 1978), pp. 379-383 (p. 383). *25* For other relevant passages, see OC 32, 40-1, 58, 93-99, 112, 121, 124-5, 136, 152, 162, 167, 210-13, 218, 222, 245, 308-9, 318- 21, 341, 347, 349-50, 352, 379, 401-403, 414-15, 419, 423, 464, 478-80, 504, 534-8, 564-5. *26* For other relevant passages, see OC 190-1, 203, 222, 258, 291, 327-30, 347-50, 353, 360, 386-8, 390, 398, 403, 417-9, 423, 427, 466, 504, 520, 553, 622-3. *27* It should be remembered that the epistemological side of Line 1 had been explored by Wittgenstein even before he began work on OC, as the remarks quoted from Zettel and RPP-2 on p.6 above demonstrate. *28* G.H. von Wright, 'Wittgenstein on Certainty', pp. 177-178. *29* Interestingly, von Wright finds himself drawn into saying the same even as he tries to gloss Line 1, speaking of "a foundation of accepted truth without which there would be no such thing as knowing or conjecturing or thinking things true". The tension between this and what he says in the rest of his gloss is evident: "... to think of the things, whereof this foundation is made, as known to us or as true is to place them on this very foundation, is to view the receptacle as another object WITHIN. This clearly cannot be done. If the foundation is what we have to accept before we can say of anything that it is known or true, then it cannot itself be known or true." (G.H. von Wright, 'Wittgenstein on Certainty', p. 175.) *30* I have sketched a partial defence of Luckhardt's position in these paragraphs, but more clearly needs saying. For a full defence, see my 'The Uncertainties of On Certainty', forthcoming. *31* We can find the contradiction IGNORED in Deborah Jane Orr, 'Did Wittgenstein Have a Theory of Hinge Propositions?' Philosophical Investigations, 12:2, April, 1989, pp. 134-153; we can find it EXPLAINED AWAY AS THE RESULT OF CARELESS READING, in Avrum Stroll, Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty (OUP, Oxford, 1994), p.132, and we can find it EXPLAINED AWAY AS THE RESULT OF CARELESS WRITING in Norman Malcolm, Nothing is Hidden (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986), pp. 213-214. (The last of the three references given above makes it clear that, even if a commentator were to accept the argument of Section II, this would not necessarily remove all obstacles to his or her acceptance of the contradictory character of On Certainty.) *32* I should like to thank Brian McGuinness, Peter Munz, Marie McGinn, Barney Dickson and Alan Sussman for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.