From Marx to Luhmann – a “Sociological Turn”?
Aspects of the development of European
society’s scientific self-description
(The
paper contains the written version of one out of a serial of lectures on
European social theory, held at the sociological department of Michigan State
University between September and December 2003)
by Manfred Füllsack
The
following considerations will regard the social theoretic conceptions of Karl
Marx and Niklas Luhmann as two essential cornerstones in the development of
European society’s scientific
self-description in the last 150 years. The underlying assumption thereby
is that the way European society scientifically describes itself has undertaken
a decisive turn from social philosophy to sociology in the course of this
development, leaving not much more of the original Marxian conception
unchallenged than the notion that the form of society’s self-description is determined by society’s social structure.
Regarding the consequences this turn has had for social theory I tend to call
it a sociological turn.[1]
In
order to outline some of the implications of this turn, I will in the following
discuss an aspect of the conception of social systems by Niklas Luhmann that is
generally referred to as differentiation
theory (1.). Subsequently to it, I will use this aspect to review some
assumptions of the social theoretic conception of Karl Marx (2.).
1.1. observation
Referring
to a logical calculus of the mathematician George Spencer Brown, Niklas Luhmann
starts out with a basic differentiation by which he defines observation as an act of distinguishing something from something
else and indicating one of these two
distinguished sides. Observation thus, (admittedly very abstractly) is defined
as the synchronous operation of distinction and indication. To observe
something as a system for example, means to draw a line between this something
and everything else, and to indicate this
something as a system.
Defining
observation in this abstract way enables Luhmann to conceive the operations of
systems themselves in terms of distinctions and indications. Systems of a
higher organization level for example, might observe something in their
environment as complex, or in other
words, as problematic. This means in
Luhmann’s terms, these systems distinguish
something in their environment and indicate
it as complex or problematic. More conventionally one might say, these
systems experience, so to speak, a “maintenance-problem” in their environment.
In order to overcome this “maintenance-problem”, in order to maintain their
operativity (their “existence”) in this complex environment (or: in order to
“solve” their problems), systems basically do nothing else than to distinguish something in their
environment and indicate it as this
something.
For
illustration, let us regard the environmental conditions a social system
perceives as problem, for instance, in terms of uncontrollable changing weather
conditions. A first step to overcome this problem could be to observe weather changes, and in doing so
to distinguish, say, rain from
sunshine and indicate it as such, or
to distinguish temperature
differences and to indicate them as
such, and so on. Of course, real-life
problem solving activities of real-life societies
usually will entail much more and much more complex
operations than this. But basically, according to Luhmann, they all are
made up of the basic operational dual of distinction
and indication.
By
distinguishing and indicating systems try to “solve” what they perceive as
“problems” in their environment in order to maintain operativity, or in other
words, they try to reduce the
complexity of their environment. Every new distinction
and indication however, i.e. every new observation,
entails a differentiation of the system as well. A society disposing of, lets
say, a certain terminology for weather changes, how ever well elaborated this
terminology might be, is definitely a more
differentiated society than it has been before it developed this
terminology. Hence, this society has become a more complex society in the process of trying to solve its problems.
Or in other words, it has increased its
complexity in the process of reducing
complexity.
This
circumstance is by no means coincidental in the frame of this theory. On the
contrary, it marks a crucial point: according to this theory, every complexity reduction entails an
increase of complexity in another regard of the system. What is perceived
as reduction and what as increase depends solely on the
perspective of the observer. Or in other words, it depends on what kind of
phenomena are distinguished and indicated as relevant by an observer.
Observing social history for example, in classical Marxist terms, and
distinguishing and indicating phenomena like the liberation of productive means
from capitalist’s control as “progressive” seemed (at least at some point in
history) to give reason to describe this history in terms of complexity reduction (of “problem
solutions”). Observing the same history in, say, terms of Max Weber by
distinguishing and indicating phenomena like “bureaucratization” can, as we
know, as well give reason to describe this history in terms of complexity increase. We will come back
to this important point a little bit later and see that the possibility to
change (to “oscillate”) between these perspectives itself can be explained as a
consequence of system’s differentiation.
1.2. constructivism
Let
us for the time being stay a bit longer at the purely formal and admittedly
high abstract level of Luhmann’s conception. On this level, systems do not
distinguish and indicate (observe) “at free will” as one might think
experienced sociologists do. Systems always observe in respect to their
possibilities. A social system for example, in possession of a certain
terminology for categorizing weather changes might observe storms as consequence
of air pressure differences. A social system without such terminology, i.e. a less complex, less differentiated social system, might observe storms for example
as the anger of gods. In other words, systems always observe their environment
in dependence of their own state of differentiation. Their level of
differentiation determines their possibilities to observe.
Relative
simple systems, as we might for example regard air-conditioning systems, owe
their level of differentiation and thus their observation possibilities to
their producer, i.e. for example to the engineer who constructed them. Such
systems – they are called “allopoietic” in system theory – usually dispose of a
certain set of distinction possibilities, in the case of an air-conditioner for
example of a set of temperature limits beneath or above of which the system is
meant to perform certain actions. In this regard one might say that the
environment of such an air-conditioning system (as perceived by this system – not by an external observer!) consists
of exactly three phenomena: “too hot” temperatures (in the case of which the
cooler is switched on); “too cold” temperatures (in the case of which the
heater is switched on); and “normal” temperatures (in the case of which nothing
happens). Any changes in the complexity of the environment of this system (any
“problems”), the system perceives exclusively in regard to these three
phenomena. If the house in which the system is positioned should catch fire and
start to burn, the air-conditioning system can do no other than perceive this
fact as “too hot”. Switching on the cooler is the only possibility it has to
react. Only an external observer, an
observer who observes the observations of the air-conditioning system and thus
can be called a second order observer,
might see that switching on the cooler in a burning house is not the most
reasonable reaction for an air conditioning system to maintain operativity.
This external observer however, has
to dispose of completely different distinction possibilities in order to be
able to observe this.
More
complex systems, as for example such that have developed some kind of memory in order to recall results of
earlier undertaken observations might develop an ability to learn. Such systems might become able to
alter, enrich and develop their own observation possibilities and eventually
may even become able to define values and norms for their observations. Such
systems might become self-referential (“self-aware”?)
in a way that enables them to observe their own observations and describe
preconditions and consequences of this ability in a complex theoretical
conception called system theory. But however complex these systems eventually
become, basically they still are bound to their own unique perception as it is determined by their possibilities to
observe. Their environment as they perceive it, marks, so to speak, their
horizon, which can be extended with certain efforts, but can never be left.
In
this regard, this conception builds on the assumption that what ever a system
perceives is constructed by the
system. Or more laxly formulated:
what ever an observer is observing is not
“out there somewhere in reality”, but is “constructed” by this observer. “Problems” in this regard are always
the “problems” of an observer. Problems
do not exist independently.
For
illustration let us take a look at the kind of “problems” social systems were
concerned with some 150 years ago, and compare them to the “problems” of modern
day’s societies. While for example the organization of industrial labor in the
middle of 19th century was perceived so problematic in Europe that
it brought force all kinds of “social scientific” activities ranging from
Marxism to positivist sociology, big parts of modern societies seem not very much concerned with work anymore.
Their “problems”, to pose some striking examples, might consist in endeavors
like organizing the next holyday trip or the next weekend’s dinner party, or to
keep actual work requirements low in order to be able to “freely” pursue whatever
one perceives as his “true” vocation, be it artistry, writing, sports, or
philosophy. At least in certain parts of the world, modern society’s “problems”
seem to be rather “leisure time” problems than work problems. It should be not
astonishing, that these problems ask for different solutions than a 19th
century social theory can offer.
How
ever simple this circumstance might seem, the decisive point of it is that all
these “problems”, be they work or post-work or what ever kind of problems, are genuine problems for the society who has
them. Or more tautological: they are “problems” for those who have the
possibilities to perceive them as such.
And
this brings us back to the conception of system’s differentiation: as we said, according
to this conception, the perception of an observer is essentially determined by
the level of differentiation of this observer’s observation possibilities. If
the observer is a social system, and
if this social system is complex enough to dispose of an own specialized
subdivision (subsystem) for observing and describing the system’s proceedings,
lets say, in written form, then this form
of societal “self-description”
depends essentially on the state and level of system differentiation. In other
words, the social theoretic conception of Karl Marx as the one of Niklas
Luhmann are both related to the differentiation structure of the society their
authors lived in.
In
order to illustrate how this notion differs in its Luhmannian version from the
one of Karl Marx, it might be helpful to compare (admittedly very
superficially) certain aspects of the state of differentiation of European
society some 150 years ago and today.
Without
doubt, European society of 19th century might be described as a
pretty modern society already, especially when compared to some other societies
in its vicinity at the time. Compared with today’s European society however, a
couple of remarkable differences still seem to be discernable. Lacking for
example the strong “middle class” that tends to “democratize” European society
today, the overall social structure of 19th century society seems to
have been rather polarized, the social strati more distinctly hierarchically organized. Mobility
between strati and between periphery and center, though definitely on the rise,
might have not yet reached the level of modern day’s Europe. Social positions
might have been still rather “ascribed” than “achieved”. And also the overall
differentiation of professions, roles, identities etc. might have bound
society’s members still a bit tighter to their inborn place. And last, but not
least, the international relations of European society might not have
questioned its self-perception and self-awareness in the way two World-wars, an
anti-colonization boom and finally the globalization movement has managed to
do.
Luhmann
calls the type of 19th century European social structure “stratified
differentiated” and ascribes to it as characteristic the possibility to observe
its own social situation from what has to be called “privileged” standpoints. In other words, the position of society’s
observers in this kind of social structure stood out by not yet being permanently subjected to other observations,
i.e. to the observations of alternative observers
from different social strati, from different subdivisions of society, from
different roles, from different nationalities, races, gender etc. as it is the
case in modern European society. Again in other words, the differentiation
structure of 19th century European society did not yet enable second order observation in the extent
European society does today.
As
a consequence, societal self-descriptions of these days could be considerably
more self-assured of being “true” and “objective” in the picture they made of
society. Marxists could, as we know, perceive the Marxian conception of society
and its specific understanding of what is “good” and “just” and what is “bad”
and “unjust” in this society as “scientifically” proven. As a matter of fact,
Marxists, and even more momentous Russian Marxists could even by means of pure
“logic” derive from this conception a receipt for society’s “radiant future”.
In
contrast to this, the social structure of modern day’s society, – Luhmann calls
it “functionally differentiated” – does not seem to provide any “privileged”
standpoints for the observation of society anymore. Its differentiation seems
to have reached a level of complexity in which due to the possibility of
constantly changing the viewpoint observations have become practically permanently exposed to vice versa observations, to second order observations. Observations
have become, so to say, recursively
networked in this social structure thus making second order observations
the prime operation modus of modern social systems and forcing every observer
to “autologically” turn back to the preconditions of his own observations. A
bit more laxly formulated one might say that today every social scientist with
a little bit of experience can see, or better: can not help not to see that the things he observes can be observed
in a completely different way by any other observer.
Observations
in modern societies thus are forced to operate “bottomless” – without any what
so ever kind of sustainable ontological conception of “truth”, “rightfulness”
or “justice”. Social science, according to Luhmann, has become a contingent and relativistic undertaking that in addition is forced to realize and
internalize this fact and to consider it as a fundamental precondition of its
own proceedings and of the descriptions of society it produces.
If
we now, in front of these conclusions, regard some assumptions of the social
theory of Karl Marx, it seems to become strikingly clear in what extent Marx’
conception is the offspring of a different, and this means, of a differently differentiated society.
2.1. surplus value
Let
us first take a look at the Marxian conception of surplus value and its alleged misappropriation by capitalists. This
conception has, as is well known, accounted for some of the more momentous
activities undertaken in the course of the venture to put Marx’ utopia into
practice.
Surplus
value, as Marx conceives it, is first of all an economic entity. Commonly it is
defined as the difference between the costs for reproducing a given manpower
plus the costs of row material, tools, workplace etc. needed for production in
a certain unit of time and the value this manpower with the given material and
tools can produce in the same unit of time. In other words, a carpenter who is
able to produce a table of 100 Dollar value from wood and tools and other
materials of 30 Dollar value while needing for the reproduction and maintenance
of his manpower including all additional side costs, say, 30 Dollars has
produced a surplus value of 40 Dollars. (100 – (30+30) = 40)
Perceiving
human history primarily as an upward pointed development of socio-economic
formations at the end of which the radiant height of communism is glooming,
this definition of surplus value seems to provide a neat and logical
explanation for the advancement of society by means of labor. And it also seems
to deliver a good reason to overthrow any kind of social (dis)order that
obstructs the “righteous” use of surplus. Scrutinizing this definition however
through the filter of the Luhmannian theory, doubts seem to arise regarding its
consistency – and this even before regarding the assumption that surplus value
might be misappropriated by capitalists. In respect to the relativity of observations under modern conditions, it seems
inevitable to raise the question according to whom and according to what given
point of time and space the definition of surplus has to be read.
An
indubitable positive or negative significance surplus value seems only to have
when conceived in concrete measures like money. 40 Dollars of surplus is
something that probably everybody can clearly appreciate. However, not every
output of work can that easily be conceived in such concrete measures as money.
The
output of a teacher for social theory for instance, to take a very striking
example, probably many of us would be ready to regard as education – an
education students later on, once they become social scientists themselves, can
use to build their own research and considerations on. Classically, education
of course is considered a very positive thing, an indispensable part of
“enlightenment”. Unfortunately though, in modern times a rapidly increasing
number of students of social science are not able to find work in their trained
profession anymore. Sometimes, an extended training in scrutinizing brain
consuming theoretical and philosophical conceptions that question everything
down to the preconditions of this questioning itself, even seems to
significantly reduce chances to find a satisfying job. So what, one might ask,
in this regard is the surplus of this
educational work? If these students have to be fed by welfare programs because
they are unfit to find “normal” jobs, this kind of “work” is generating surminus rather than any surplus.[2]
Hence,
whether surplus is surplus rather
than surminus depends essentially on
what kind of distinction/indication
is used in order to observe it. What can be surplus to one observer, can be surminus to another.
This
problem also concerns the assumption of Marx about what happens to surplus once
it is generated. According to Marx’ conception of history, the relation of
capitalists and proletarians is not of the obvious
expropriative and suppressive kind anymore that the relation of master and
slave or the relation of land owner and vassal has been in former times. The
relation of capitalist and proletarian is concealed through various complex
factors so that proletarians as a rule do not realize that capitalists are
expropriating them. According to Marx, it takes philosophy, or in other words,
it takes the Marxian conception, to make proletarians aware of the fact that
they are producing a surplus in their
work that then is skimmed off by their employers.
From
a proletarian perspective Marx’ argumentation definitely seems to have its
point: the product of the work of a proletarian is not his own. He gets wages
for it, but not the product itself. And wages are subject to fixed working
contracts so that as a rule the proletarian has neither a chance to work less,
nor to work more, neither to consume his product, nor to sell it, etc. The
product of his work is alienated to
him, because the productive relations are
not his own.
From
a capitalists point of view however, this situation might look different.
However exploitive his wage policies seems to the worker, subjectively
employers could have hard times to feel in command of productive relations themselves, when for example the unbeatable
cheapness of goods produced in countries with different labor laws skims off
the already tightly calculated margin of their activities and delays the
break-even-point of investments and profits even further into the future; or
when they are forced to take on another expensive credit in order to be able to
fight tough competition that has outgrown all local boundaries. Considering the
difference in “problem perceptions” as it is to be expected according to the
Luhmannian theory, it becomes clear that the “problems” of capitalists can seem
just as pressing and worrying to them as
can seem the problems of workers to workers.
Of
course one might say, there is nothing new in this circumstance. Different
viewpoints have polarized society at each point in history, and of course in
Marx’ times as well. However, the decisive difference, as pointed out by
Luhmann, is the fact that in modern “functionally differentiated” societies
differentiation and thus for example the chances for mobility between the two
(here ideal-typically exposed)
“classes” have reached a level, on which problem perceptions are no longer
bound to just one “class” for good anymore. In times of share-holder-value on
the one side and ever more rapidly bankrupting enterprises on the other side,
to name just two well-known examples, it has become common experience that the
positions of capitalists and proletarians can change in a few months even
several times. In short, modern society’s members have become well used to
accommodate several different problem perceptions at the same time. And they
also have become (or at least they seem in the process of becoming) quite well
acquainted with the experience that there are no “privileged” problem perceptions in modern society anymore – problem
perceptions that might somehow legitimate any “class struggle” as it seemed objectively to be the case to Karl Marx.
2.2. alienation
This
circumstance also concerns the Marxian notion of alienation and its significance for evaluating social and cultural
phenomena. According to Marx, work under capitalist conditions is alienated by several
factors. At first, as I have mentioned already, work is alienated because of
the growing discrepancy of productive
forces and productive relations.
According to Marx, as we know, the productive forces, or in other words, the
workers and their specific skills and tools due to their involvement in the
work process are permanently subjected to development, to “progress”, whereas the employers on the other side are stagnating
due to their exclusion from the work process and might eventually even degenerate
in their idling, as Marx liked to assume subsequent to Hegel.
In
any way, according to Marx the productive relations controlled by employers are
not subject to change in the same way the productive forces develop. That is
why the discrepancy between productive forces and productive relations is
steadily rising until one day it will tear apart social cohesion in revolution.
At least until then, one is to assume, workers are forced to work under
conditions they did not choose and they have no what so ever kind of control or
influence of. In other words, workers are alienated
from these conditions and therewith from their work and their product.
Before
we reconsider this argumentation in the light of Luhmann’s conception let us
look at two more reasons for alienation
Marx alludes to. The first is the commodity
form of work products and the second, tightly related to the first, is money.
Under
capitalist conditions, Marx states, the worker has lost nearly every chance to
experience his work product in terms of pure use value and in relation to his own efforts. The very moment the
product leaves his hands and is offered on a free market, it is turned into a commodity with an exchange value that is determined by the average (and no longer the individual)
manpower needed for its production. This exchange value as a rule has nothing
to do with its original use value
anymore, and it also has no relation to the actual
spent manpower. Due to this transformation
the worker might not even be able to purchase his own product. If it is
rare on the market and takes on a high exchange value it might get completely
out of his reach.
What
is more, under capitalist conditions the product, as well as the manpower of
its producer, as a rule is measured in money,
i.e. in an abstract exchange medium that does not allow to relate the amount of
work directly to the needs and requirements that initiated work in the first
place. The original reason to work therewith gets completely out of sight of
the worker. What he is working for is an abstract entity, an average value for
certain commodities he thinks he
requires. From his original needs and requirements he is alienated.
As
is well known, this conception of alienation
has found much reference in all sorts of so-called critical social theory. Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse have
used it to conceive cultural industry, as well as totalitarian societies.
Guenther Anders has used it to analyze TV-entertainment and advertising, George
Lukacs and in his succession André Gorz have applied it to economical reason,
and still Jürgen Habermas, although not using the term itself very often,
alludes in his conception to a deviation,
or as he calls it, to a “pathologization” of human development paths that he
considers reasonable for modern
societies.
When
regarded from the perspective of Luhmann however, these references bear one
fundamental problem. To speak of alienation
inevitably needs a notion of a state or condition from which something can be alienated.
In other words, to speak of alienation asks
for a notion of a non-alienated
condition. And this condition is hard to maintain in a world as relativistic as Luhmann perceives it. In
modern “functionally differentiated” societies, with their “perpetuated” vice-versa- (or second-order-) observations,
a “privileged” standpoint, an Archimedian point of view, so to say, from where
it would be possible to conceive a normal,
a non-alienated state of society is
nowhere to be found anymore. Modern societies in their complexity and in their
specific form of differentiation do not provide such a standpoint.
As
is well known, Marx and especially some of his Russian followers believed that
a certain, seemingly proto-communistic organization form of rural Russian
society, called obščina, might
provide such a non-alienated starting
point at which productive forces and productive relations corresponded to each
other and work was solely done in perfect match with the needs of the worker.
Today we know that neither this obščina,
nor any other kind of allegedly harmonic social
organization comes somehow close to the paradisiacal state Marx and his
successors thought them to be. On the contrary, as far as we know, working live
in former days has not been significantly more enjoyable than today’s.
This
complies with what is to be expected according to Luhmann’s theory. As there is
no imaginable beginning of the complexity reducing process of systems – what
one calls a “beginning” depends (as everything else) on the observer –, there
cannot be any imaginable beginning of the human work or problem solving process
as well. Keeping in mind that work as well, is always only the kind of activity
an observer is able to perceive as “work” (think of “work” of nature, “work” of
history, etc.), “work” has all along started,
without any conceivable beginning and without any conceivable end. To speak of
an alienation of work (which, as we
concede, might not be completely senseless on a less theoretical, more
pragmatic level) thus needs to take into consideration that this notion, as
well as the non-alientated state it
alludes to, are socially constructed
and thus dependent on the perspective of its observer.
2.3. organizing and planning
And
finally, this goes for one of the most momentous conclusions of the Marxian
theory as well – the emanation of communism from its predecessor social
formations. As is well known, Marx, and even more strikingly some of his
successors, believed to be able to deduce “by pure means of logic”, i.e.
“scientifically”, the “sublation”, as it was called in the plurivalent Hegelian
term, of capitalism into the “higher” social organization forms of socialism
and finally communism. According to this assumption, the discrepancy between
productive forces and productive relations in capitalism inevitably will
increase to the point where it finally destroys social cohesion and forces
society to reorganize productive relations on a new level that does not foresee
any private property anymore and thus bears no chance for expropriation.
With
this prediction, Marx (by the way, in striking analogy with many others of his
19th century colleagues) was able to point out a distinct direction for social development, a telos of human history, so to speak, that gave rise to the believe that
social development as it logically can
be deduced might even be accelerated with the help of human organizing and
planning. In a classical Laplace-Spenceranian determinism, Russian Marxists
assumed that once a sufficient amount of social factors has been understood and
systemized for processing, society in its development could be steered like a
big ship into the safe haven of communism.
Today,
we know that this believe did not work out at all. And from the viewpoint of
the Luhmannian theory, we can now clearly see in what regard it has been
erroneous from the beginning. Having in mind that every complexity reduction
(every problem solution) a social system achieves necessarily entails an increase in complexity (new problems) in
another regard of the system, every trial to steer or to organize the
system in respect to an utopian idea
or any other kind of assumed superior social theoretic conception appears
doomed in the first place. Social systems, as they are conceived in the
Luhmannian conception, are essentially
unpredictable in the complexity of their development. Every little trial to
influence them differentiates them further, and turns them into a fundamentally
new system that again poses different conditions
to any efforts of organization.
Of
course, this shall not mean that social systems are thought to operate without
any kind of plan, without any kind of orientative conception in regard to which
they try to organize their operations. And it also shall not mean that Luhmann
considers endeavors a society undertakes in order to organize its development
as of no relevance for this development and thus futile. On the contrary, he is
of course well aware of (and also spent considerable efforts to scrutinize) the
ideational conceptions of society’s past
and future development. And he is of course also aware of the impact these ideational conceptions have had and
still are having on factual social development. What he points out, however, is
that these conceptions are necessarily doomed
to prove wrong if they are taken for more than just temporary orientations in regard to which systems arrange their immediate next operation. Modern social
systems are too complex to be predicted in
the long run. They are reacting in too many unforeseeable ways to their own
operations to allow any kind of overall social theoretic conception of their
future to stand the test of time.
In
other words, modern social systems are solving their problems not sub specie aeternitas anymore. They have
to react from step to step in respect to the conditions they themselves have
created in the immediate preceding step. And they do so with the only aim to
reduce the complexity (to solve the problems) they encounter on each of these
steps anew. They might of course design fantastic far reaching ideas,
conceptions or plans about where these steps might eventually lead them. But
they cannot count on any guarantee anymore that these plans might prove right.
What
is more, according to this theory, modern social systems (at least, one is tempted
to add, if they study the writings of Niklas Luhmann) are able to see and to
understand this circumstance as an essential precondition of their own
operations. Due to the “perpetuation”
of vice-versa- (second-order-)
observations in their particular form of differentiation, Modern social systems
in this regard are exposed to relativity up
to a point at which the conceptions they make of themselves and of their future
are fundamentally forced to operate “bottomless”. One might be willing to call
this condition postmodern. For
reasons I have explained elsewhere, I tend to call it the consequence of a
fundamental sociological turn.
[1] Cf. to this also: Füllsack, M., 2003, Auf- und Abklärung. Grundlegung einer Ökonomie gesellschaftlicher Problemlösungskapazitäten. Aachen (Shaker)
[2] A far-fetched example you
say? Here is another. Austria has one nuclear power station. When it was built
in the early 1970s, huge expectations were raised on how much it will push
Austrian economy and how important it will be for the country. In this time,
everybody, from the simple construction worker to the technicians, architects,
and politicians, was absolutely convinced that his work will contribute to an
enormous surplus for Austrian
economy. In the course of the 70s however, as in the rest of the world, the
ecological movement became strong in Austria. And in 1978 a plebiscite decided
that Austria shall not use any nuclear energy – just at the time when the power
plant was finished and ready to use. Since then it is standing there about 25
miles from Vienna, being conserved and maintained every now and than for
enormous sums and having not produced one single cent of surplus.