Indiferencia parcial sobre el pasado

In Being Known (1999), Peacocke supports that a property-identity link is constitutive of the understanding of past-tense utterances. Such a link is the one with the property which is required to be for an analogue present-tense utterance to be true. My thesis, Partial Indifference, is that the link in question is only the one with the property which is required to be for an analogue tenseless utterance to be true. In this paper, I defend partial indifference by way of two arguments. Firstly, according to partial indifference a property-identity link entail trivially a truth-value link, and it is not explained by Peacocke's property-identity link. Secondly, partial indifference eliminates any mention of the present as at the level of reference as at the level of sense, and thus it guarantees a constant reference to the past.