Stigol, Nora (2001) Representacionalismo y Qualia. Teorema, XX (3). pp. 31-38.
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Abstract
One of the most important challenges the present philosophy of mind faces, is to feature the phenomenal aspects of our conscious experiences properly. The present debates are mostly about the questions of the existence and nature of these aspects. Phenomenalists and representationalists have the main roles in these arguments. I briefly present the strategies used by both sides--especially the eliminative strategies that appeal to the principle of transparency of consciousness. I analyze Harman's proposal trying to show some of its difficulties. I propose a different way to conceive the "intrinsic qualities of experience". This proposal may not demand to commit with eliminative attitudes such as Harman's.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Experience; Metaphysics; Qualia; Representation; Harman, G. |
Subjects: | Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XX (2001) |
Depositing User: | Wolfgang Heuer |
Date Deposited: | 06 Dec 2020 13:52 |
Last Modified: | 06 Dec 2020 13:53 |
URI: | http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2721 |