Contextualismo y escepticismo

Cohen, Stewart (2000) Contextualismo y escepticismo. Teorema, XIX (3). pp. 113-126.

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Abstract

In this paper I argue that ascriptions of knowledge are context-sensitive. According to this view, the truth-value of a knowledge ascription will depend on facts about the speakers and hearers of the context in which the ascription is made. A consequence of this view is that a speaker in one context may truly assert that a subject knows p at time T, while another speaker in a different context truly denies that that same subject knows p at T. I then argue that this view can go a long way toward resolving the skeptical deductive closure paradox.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Contextualism; Epistemology; Scepticism; Klein, P.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Epistemologie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Naturphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XIX (2000)
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 13:55
Last Modified: 31 Jul 2021 18:19
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2737

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