Searle on Perception

García-Carpintero, Manuel (1999) Searle on Perception. Teorema, XVIII (1). pp. 19-41.

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In the course of his discussion of perception, Searle criticizes representative theories in general. In this paper I will argue that, even though his criticisms may be adequate regarding a certain form of these theories, perhaps the most frequently defended by philosophers of perception, a version I will outline here escapes to them. A second issue I raise concerns Searle's claim that his theory of perception is a form of direct realism. I will raise difficulties for Searle's attempt to maintain at the same time a "token-reflexive" theory of perception and the thesis of direct realism.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Epistemology; Perception; Realism; Representation; Searle, J.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XVIII (1999)
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Epistemologie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Naturphilosophie
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 13:56
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 13:56

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